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1Overview of the three papers
1.1 Introduction
The three essays in this thesis investigate the role of the board of direc-
tors from different angles. The first – “Aligned, informed, and decisive.
Characteristics of value-creating boards” – is a broad overview and a test
of theories that have been put forward on the relationship between board
characteristics and firm performance. The second essay – “Better firm per-
formance with employees on the board?” – deals in depth with one as-
pect, the impact of employee directors upon firm performance. The third
essay – “Board control and departures” – takes up the question of CEO en-
trenchment as viewed through the interaction of CEO turnover and board
changes. Overall, the three essays1 find that board characteristics matter;
that government regulation to favour worker participation in the board
reduces firm performance; and that CEO entrenchment is not typical of
Norwegian boards. While the co-determination essay explores the rela-
tionship between owners and employees, the board control essay investi-
gates the relationship between owners, the board, and the CEO.
Why is the board an interesting object of study, and why should one
study Norwegian boards? The board is interesting because of its impor-
tance. The board appoints the CEO, decides on the CEO’s reward, larger
investments and strategy, and monitors the company. Thus, the function-
ing board’s decisions should have long-term impact upon the company in
setting its future direction and in motivating its management. The Nor-
wegian board is interesting because its institutional conditions allow the
testing of aspects of the board’s functions that are not possible elsewhere.
This concerns regulations on co-determination and on the protection of
minority shareholders (Porta et al., 1998).
Besides the main question of each essay, they all deal with endogene-
1For short: AID, co-determination, and board control
1
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ity in some form. In the board literature, endogeneity is usually taken to
mean that board characteristics are themselves at least partly determined
by former firm performance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). This may be
termed reverse causation. The AID and co-determination essays test for
this kind of endogeneity. Furthermore, the AID essay tests for simulta-
neous endogeneity among board characteristics (Agrawal and Knoeber,
1996). However, endogeneity is often defined for a model of simulta-
neous system of equations, where endogenous variables are determined
jointly within the model as a function of exogenous variables (Davidson
and MacKinnon, 1993, p. 622). This kind of endogeneity is explored in
the co-determination essay. Here, the variable employee directors is taken
to be exogenous together with former firm performance and control vari-
ables, and endogenous variables are board characteristics, leverage and
average wage. The last essay on board control essay deals more closely
with the Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) proposition that board character-
istics are endogenously determined from the CEO’s stronger bargaining
position arising from former good firm performance.
Both Bhagat and Black (1999) and Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) di-
vide board studies into overall studies of firm performance upon a set of
board characteristics on the one hand, and on the other studies of the im-
pact of board characteristics in discernable board actions, for instance a
takeover bid. The AID and the co-determination essays fall into the first
category, the board control essay belongs to the second. The two research
strategies reflect different conceptions of the board. Bhagat and Black hold
that the board’s impact is best studied in a long-time data set, since the
board’s actions are general and apply to all value-creating aspects of the
firm. Hermalin and Weisbach think that the board intervenes only in times
of exception, thus, only the proper, discernable board actions can truly re-
veal which board characteristics have an impact upon firm performance.
Both research strategies benefit from the availability of a panel data set.
Such a data set is used here, unlike most board studies.
Thus, the three essays utilise the same data, that is, a relatively long-
term panel data set of all non-financial listed firms in Norway in the period
from 1989 to 2002. Since the essays share the same data set, it is natural to
explain this first, and also to describe some salient institutional issues.
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1.1.1 Data and institutional background
Our sample is all non-financial firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange
(OSE) at year-end at least once over the period 1989–2002.2 To reduce cen-
soring bias in the tenure measures, I start collecting director data in 1986.
The ownership structure data covers every equity holding by every in-
vestor in every sample firm. The public securities register (VPS) provided
the ownership data, accounting and share price data is from the OSE, and
board data was collected manually from Kierulf’s Håndbok and a public
electronic register. The registers provided the name of the CEO as well
as the name, date of birth, and board position of every board member.
In most cases, the records also show whether the director was elected by
shareholders or the employees. Since the first name is known, the direc-
tor’s gender is known as well.
The resultant data set is of a panel data nature, that is, repeated ob-
servations of the same firms over a number of years are in the data base.
This makes the data file large in international comparisons. The panel data
requires statistical techniques that are only now beginning to be applied
among researchers in the corporate governance field.
The institutional framework is important in understanding the papers.
First, board regulations are such that the CEO cannot at the same time be
the board’s chairman. Thus, a power split is built into the law. The board
is small by international comparisons, numbering about five shareholder
elected members. The number of management members is likewise very
low. Background checks on the board reveal, for instance, that the chief
financial officer (CFO) is a member of the board only by exception. The
CEO is seldom a member, too. Another law-based feature is the presence
of employee representatives on the board. A politically induced effort to
increase the fraction of female directors is also evident.
The ownership concentration of Norwegian firms is low by European
standards. Norwegian firms have a less concentrated ownership struc-
ture than in any other European country except the UK. For example, the
average largest owner holds close to 50% of voting equity in a continental-
European listed firm, and 15% in the UK. The corresponding US figure
2The OSE had an aggregate market capitalization of 68 bill. USD equivalents by year-
end 2002, ranking the OSE sixteenth among the twenty–two European stock exchanges
for which comparable data is available. During our sample period, the number of firms
listed increased from 129 to 203, market capitalization grew by 8% per annum, and market
liquidity, measured as transaction value over market value, increased from 52% in 1989 to
72% in 2002 (sources: www.ose.no and www.fibv.com).
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is 3% (Barca and Becht, 2001). Norway has a civil law regime, which is
generally considered less investor–protective than common law. Never-
theless, La Porta et al. (2000) find that Norway’s regulatory environment
provides better protection of shareholder rights than the average common
law country. According to their theory of institutionally determined own-
ership structures, the strong investor protection is a major reason why
Norway’s ownership concentration is so low.
1.2 Aligned, informed, and decisive
The first essay pulls together different components of board design in or-
der to explain firm performance, and to explore possible endogenous re-
lationships. Most of the literature in corporate governance approaches
the analysis of board structure in a piecemeal manner (Bhagat and Black,
1999). But to be effective in furthering shareholder value, board compo-
sition must solve the three problems of alignment with shareholders’ in-
terests, internal and external information collection, and rational and ex-
pedient decision-making. The paper builds upon explanations given in
the literature, but also develops new measures to reflect this many-sided
board nature.
Interest alignment in a board is achieved through ownership and board
independence. The higher is the share of ownership in the company, the
higher is the owner’s incentives and power to monitor the agent (Shleifer
and Vishny, 1986). Two variables measure this effect, that is, the directors’
ownership and the outside ownership concentration. The outside own-
ership concentration is measured by the Herfindahl index3. The higher
the board independence from monitored officers the better aligned is the
board with owners.
The Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) model predicts that the longer the
history of good performance under the current CEO, the less independent
the current board. Consistent with the model, we introduce a new mea-
sure of board’s independence as the difference between the average tenure
of its non-CEO directors and the tenure of the CEO:
Independence≡ 1
n
n
∑
i=1
non-CEO director tenurei −CEO tenure (1.1)
3The Herfindahl index for outside ownership concentration is the sum of squared own-
ership fractions across all the firm’s outside owners. Its maximum value is one (a single
investor owns every share held by the outsiders), approaching its minimum value of zero
as the ownership structure gets increasingly diffuse.
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where non-CEO director tenurei is the number of years since non-CEO di-
rector i entered office, and n is the number of shareholder–elected direc-
tors. The average director has longer (shorter) tenure than the CEO when
expression (1.1) is positive (negative). According to Hermalin and Weis-
bach (1998), the board is more independent the higher the value of (1.1).
The board may have access to better information when the CEO is also
a board member, when the CEO is a board member in other companies
(exported CEO), when CEOs of other companies are directors (imported
CEO), and when directors who are not CEOs are directors in other com-
panies and meet directors in yet other companies. This so-called small
world property of interlocking corporate boards (Conyon and Muldoon,
2006) is approached with network theory (Wasserman and Faust, 1994),
that is, with the information centrality measure.
Finally, the board’s decisiveness is approached with the board size and
board heterogeneity. Decisions are supposed to be made more easily the
smaller and more homogeneous is the group (Mueller, 2003). Yermack
(1996) and Eisenberg et al. (1998) show that smallness is a desirable prop-
erty in boards. Gender, the age dispersion of directors, and the fraction
of employee directors constitute the heterogeneity measures. Most stud-
ies of the gender effect in boards, for instance Shrader et al. (1997) and
Smith et al. (2006), conclude that increased gender heterogeneity means
lower firm performance. Likewise, evidence in FitzRoy and Kraft (1993);
Gorton and Schmid (2000) and Falaye et al. (2006) show a negative rela-
tion between employee directors and firm performance. The age disper-
sion is new to the literature. Notice that employee board representation
is imposed through the political process, while gender diversity became
strongly recommended during the period under study, but no concern is
given to age dispersion.
In the main relation Tobin’s Q, measured as the firm’s market value
over its book value of assets, is the dependent variable whose variation we
seek to explain using the above board characteristics. Panel data give re-
peated observations of the same firm, so that data need to be transformed
in order to remove the serial dependence in the error terms. We choose
the fixed effects method (Woolridge, 2002) to do so. An advantage of this
method is that the need for control variables disappears. Furthermore the
general method of moments (GMM) estimation method gives further ad-
vantages compared to rival methods, as it is free from assumptions of the
variable’s distribution and its non-linearity.
We find that firm performance improves with higher director owner-
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ship and network score, while a larger and more heterogeneous board re-
duces firm performance. Gender and employee directors are negatively
related to firm performance. Thus, our results are consistent with what is
observed in other investigations. We subject the results to robustness tests,
in that different definitions of e.g. the network variable is used. Still, we
find that the results withstand these tests.
A common objection to performance studies is that board characteris-
tics are a result from earlier performance. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998)
hold that the board is endogenously chosen. Thus, in their theory, there
is a “reverse causation” that runs from firm performance to board char-
acteristics. Furthermore, board characteristics may be internally related,
either as complements or as substitutes to each other (Agrawal and Knoe-
ber, 1996). A long-time panel data set alleviates endogeneity problems
(Bhagat and Black, 1999), since firm performance is related to different
board characteristics across firms at a given time, but also contains vari-
ations in these relationships in the same firms across time. Furthermore,
most boards are elected in the spring and early summer, and the firm per-
formance recorded at year-end. Thus, the same-year board impact of the
board’s characteristics should become evident. Nevertheless, we test for
endogeneity explicitly in two ways. First, a lagged Tobin’s Q is included
in the basic regression, and second, important board characteristics are
assumed to be dependent.
The tests reveal some endogeneity. In particular, and remembering
that a higher network score means better firm performance, we find that
well-performing firms tend to attract well-connected directors. We also
find that board characteristics are complements rather than substitutes,
if they are internally related. However, when we include the preceding
period’s performance none of the earlier results are materially upset, in-
dicating that the reverse causation hypothesis receives confirmation to a
minor degree only.
Our results have relevance for the ongoing debate about corporate
governance in many countries. In particular, we find no economic argu-
ment for mandating independence or diversity, such as requiring by law
or code that a minimum fraction of directors are independent, employees,
or of a given gender. If anything, regulatory implications are the oppo-
site of what is argued in the public domain: Regulators should encour-
age more owners in the boardroom, more directors with multiple seats,
fewer employee directors, less gender diversity, and smaller boards. Inde-
pendence is already at its optimal level and needs no regulatory pressure
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of the type which is currently introduced worldwide. In fact, regulation
aimed at preventing costly scandals in a small number of firms may end
up destroying more value in the vast majority of firms.
1.3 Better firm performance with labour on the board?
While the “Aligned, informed, and decisive” paper presents a broad over-
view of board issues, the second paper looks at the relationship between
firm performance and employee directors in more detail. Although co-
determination (employee board representation) exists in many European
countries, the issue is under-researched. Jensen and Meckling (1979) pre-
dict that codetermination needs backing in laws, and this is indeed the
case for Norway, where codetermination was enacted in 1972 (Aarbakke
et al., 1999).
The central idea of the paper is that the presence of employees on the
board has both a direct and indirect effects upon firm performance. The
indirect effects come about when shareholders adjust unregulated gover-
nance mechanisms in order to compensate for perceived negative conse-
quences of employee representation. Buchanan and Tullock (1962) predict
such an outcome in the political arena, and in Germany much effort has
been done to avoid codetermination effects, for instance, by limiting the
number of meetings in the supervisory board.
Former studies mostly find a negative relationship between firm per-
formance and employee board representation. This applies to Germany
(FitzRoy and Kraft, 1993; Schmid and Seger, 1998; and Gorton and Schmid,
2000) and to Canada (Falaye et al., 2006), in addition to our own results in
the “Aligned, informed, and decisive” essay. However, Fauver and Fuerst
(2006) report a positive effect in information-intensive industries in Ger-
many. None of the studies investigate the indirect effects employee direc-
tors may have upon other governance variables, and only our own uses
panel data. Also, compared to the German and Canadian experience the
Norwegian institutional setting offers some advantages. First, employee
directors sit on the board, while they are present in the rarely conven-
ing and little informed supervisory board only in Germany. Second, the
employee directors are elected due to their employment in the firm, not
because they are owners as in Canada, or as union representatives, as
in Germany where one third of the labour representation is reserved for
union representatives. Third, in all size classes and in all industries a
dichotomy arises between those firms that have employee directors and
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those that have none. This is useful for testing as it allows the creation
of sub-samples with e.g. codetermined firms with more than 200 employ-
ees. In all, the Norwegian institutional framework should give a sharper
picture of the employee director effect than former studies.
The relationship between employee directors and firm performance is
treated in different strands of literature? From a property rights perspec-
tive Becht et al. (2003) argue that board representation can be a guaran-
tee against shareholders’ expropriation of employees’ rents through their
“urge to dismiss”, and that this may bring forth employees’ investments
in firm-specific human capital and the cessation of industrial action. The
firm-specific human capital makes the employee a residual claimant on
par with investors. The stakeholder theory position is that employees are
superior monitors of management, since they observe day-to-day action
(Blair and Stout, 1999). Board representation implies that owners may get
access to the information. Both these positions would predict a positive
relationship to firm performance.
A negative relationship may result from the collective choice problems
that parties with divergent interests induce in decision-making (Tirole,
2001 and Hansmann, 1996). The shareholders’ objective is to maximise
firm value, while the employees’ objectives are to maximise wages and
to protect firm-specific human capital. The resultant mixed firm objec-
tive means longer decision time and compromise decisions. The CEO
tends to be a compromise maker rather than a shaper of the firm under
a clear objective (Tirole, 2002). The implied consensual decision model in
co-determination means that the firm pursues stability and predictability
instead of bold new moves (Siebert, 2005).
Furthermore, Pistor (1999) and Hopt (1998) point out that employees’
monitoring may not be truthfully revealed, as in economising on the sup-
ply of internal information to the board, and also in leakage of sensitive
board information. Employees may also use moral arguments against for
instance plant closures or high management pay. The shareholder elected
directors may have trouble withstanding such arguments, since they may
experience large personal costs and small personal gains from taking ad-
verse employee decisions (Baker et al., 1988). Thus, even though the em-
ployees are in a minority position in the board, they may influence board
decisions to their advantage.
When shareholders fear such effects of co-determination, they may ad-
just governance mechanisms in order to neutralize the codetermination
impact imposed through regulation by placing a heavier weight on the
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unregulated (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962). The employee directors vari-
able’s effect upon board characteristics is one such neutralizing action, an-
other is to increase leverage so as to give the CEO less scope for wastage
(Easterbrook, 1984 and Jensen, 1986). These previously unexplored indi-
rect effects make a simultaneous equations approach necessary. I term this
relationship the co-determination hypothesis.
The model tests the hypothesis that codetermination is negatively re-
lated to firm performance, but it has relevance for the endogeneity debate
as well (see Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003 and Bhagat and Black, 1999).
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) suggest that governance mechanisms are
endogenously determined by former firm performance. Thus, a reverse
causation is proposed, since the lagged firm performance should have a
negative relationship to governance mechanisms. With good firm perfor-
mance, the CEO has bargaining power to reduce monitoring intensity. A
rival endogenous hypothesis is that good firm performance induces even
better monitoring, since the firm needs to improve its governance to main-
tain good performance. I test for this, and term this the reverse causation
hypothesis.
Finally, a link between the board index and the leverage reveals whether
the governance variables are complements or substitutes (Agrawal and
Knoeber, 1996).
Instead of using individual board characteristics, I construct a board
index from significant variables in the AID essay. The variables directors’
ownership, network, board size, and gender receive equal weights in the
index, and they keep their estimated sign from the AID essay paper. Fol-
lowing Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), the variables are standardised
to have zero mean and standard deviation of one in order to add them.
The econometric estimation is carried out with simultaneous equa-
tions regressions using the three-stage least squares (3SLS)4 methodology
(Greene, 2003). I use fixed effects estimation (Woolridge, 2002) in regres-
sions for the whole sample and for sub-samples of co-determined and
shareholder determined firms, and for co-determined firms with more
than 200 employees. I also perform robustness tests.
First of all, the co-determination hypothesis finds confirmation in the
negative, direct effect upon form performance, and in the indirect im-
pact upon the board index and average wage, which are both positive.
4The 3SLS is an instrumental variable estimation method. The instruments are the pre-
dicted values of the dependent variable from a regression on all the explanatory variables
in the system (Greene, 2003, p. 398). Thus, regressions are undertaken in several steps, or
stages, hence the name.
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Thus, shareholders try to adjust board characteristics so as to neutralize
the harmful direct effect of co-determination. But the indirect effect of the
board index turns out to be economically weaker than the direct effect of
employee directors, so that the shareholders are only partially able to neu-
tralize the negative direct effect. The overall effect of co-determination is
therefore negative. The results become progressively stronger in regres-
sions from the overall sample to the sub-sample of co-determined firms
and then to co-determined firms with more than 200 employees.
I also confirm the positive impact of employee directors upon leverage.
On the other hand, higher leverage means lower firm performance, a fact
that is often found in the empirical literature (Barclay et al., 1995; Rajan
and Zingales, 1995; and Brick et al., 2005), but contradicts predictions in
theory (Easterbrook, 1984 and Jensen, 1986) that a higher leverage brings
better firm performance. Thus, the employee director impact upon firm
performance is even more negative when leverage is taken into account.
How do the results for governance mechanisms in co-determined firms
compare to those in shareholder determined? It turns out that the board
index is positive, and leverage negative, as before. However, leverage
is no longer significant. The fewer and weaker results for shareholder
determined firms indicate that governance mechanisms are set closer to
equilibrium than in co-determined firms.
The reverse causation hypothesis finds confirmation, too. However,
these are weak, and contrary to the Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) sug-
gestion. Thus, governance mechanisms are only weakly endogenously
determined by former firm performance. Their overall effects upon firm
performance are very low. Thus, I find evidence of reverse causation, but
the effects are almost negligible.
Robustness tests generally confirm the results. Replacing Tobin’s Q
as a measure of firm performance with the book return on assets (ROA)
and the stock return does not materially upset former findings. I also try
the dividend payout rate instead of leverage, but find the variable to have
little explanatory power. Dropping the lagged firm performance does not
upset coefficient values in other variables much. In general, the robustness
tests are very satisfactory.
Finally, I test the Fauver and Fuerst (2006) finding that co-determination
plays a positive role in information intensive industries. These are indus-
tries requiring high knowledge content, but also firms running complex
logistic operations, such as retailing. Estimations are carried out in sub-
samples of information industries and other industries. It turns out that
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the same qualitative pattern of impacts from employee directors turns up
in both estimations, although the impact of employee directors is some-
what weaker in the information industries. A Chow test of different coef-
ficient values in the two sub-samples can not be confirmed.
In conclusion, the idea that employee directors could add value to the
company does not find support in the data. Co-determination, mandated
in law, has costs for the firms, both in shareholder attempts to neutral-
ize the effects, and probably also in terms of a slower, consensus-oriented
decision process.
1.4 Board control, turnover and turbulence
The co-determination paper deals with the relationship between owners
and employees, and this paper looks at the relationship between owners
and the CEO. Agency problems stand at the center of this relationship
(Berle Jr. and Means, 1932 and Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and the pro-
tection of minority shareholders has come to be seen as a way to reduce
the extent of agency costs (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In this paper, I argue
that the timing of CEO departure relative to board enlargements and direc-
tor substitutions can shed light on the relationship, since different board
control types give diverging predictions on the relative timing of depar-
tures. The present essay is related to the Goyal and Park (2002) study
of CEO turnover when the CEO holds the joint office of chairman, and
Falaye (2007) who investigates the CEO turnover for staggered boards.
CEO-chairman duality and staggered boards may be seen as CEO pro-
tection from shareholders’ discipline. The Norwegian company law does
not allow such protection (Aarbakke et al., 1999). Since the protection of
minority shareholders is high, CEO turnover and board changes may be
studied unhampered by CEO or director protection.
By itself, CEO turnover is important, since this is one of the board’s
primary functions (Monks and Minow, 2001, p. 200). Board changes are
likewise important. The Berle Jr. and Means (1932) claim is that share-
holders have lost control over the company, since they are dispersed, and
because the CEO controls the appointment of new directors.
I differentiate between three board control types. The first is the Berle
Jr. and Means (1932) CEO control, where the CEO in effect elects his own
directors. The Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) model of the “endogenously
determined” board shows the CEO in control. Upon turning in good firm
performance, the CEO is rewarded a reduction in monitoring intensity,
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which they interpret to be a less independent board. This is achieved ei-
ther by independent directors leaving, to be replaced by inside directors,
or by an inside director board enlargement. The implication is that direc-
tors leave during the CEO tenure.
One could expect that the Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) model pre-
dicts a board independence increase following weak firm performance.
Yet the authors disregard shareholders due to the US institutional fact that
shareholders are dispersed. But this points to a rival explanation involving
the concentration of ownership. The Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Bolton
and von Thadden (1998) proposition says that the higher outside owner-
ship concentration, the higher is monitoring effort. From this it follows
that director turnover is higher as well. Given CEO control, outside own-
ership concentration should have no association with director turnover.
Under the second control type, the board fulfils its primary function of
hiring and firing the CEO. I call this “shareholder control”. In this case, the
turnovers of CEO and directors are unrelated, but board changes should
be related to outside ownership concentration and CEO turnover should
be unrelated. The third control type is “joint control”, when the board and
the CEO together form a team, and are jointly responsible for firm perfor-
mance. Since they are jointly responsible, a prediction is that the CEO and
director turnovers will be simultaneous. Thus, the fact that the three con-
trol types imply different patterns of timing in CEO turnover and board
changes can be used to examine whether the typical director election is
under shareholder or CEO control. Also, the three types of board control
give different predictions regarding outside ownership concentration.
No earlier authors have utilised the relative turnover timing of CEOs
and directors to investigate the potential for agency problems. In recent
papers, Farrell and Whidbee (2000); Yermack (2004), and Fich and Shiv-
dasani (2006) all show that outside directors are more likely to leave when
a new CEO takes office. But none of the authors make the timing of CEO
and director departures the central issue of study.
Besides simultaneity and outside ownership I include variables that
often appear in turnover studies, such as CEO and director ownership,
board independence, and firm performance. I also include the board net-
work. A board with better network connections may be less likely to ex-
perience turnover, since such a board turns out create value (Ferris et al.,
2003 and Bøhren and Strøm, 2007). However, Fich and Shivdasani (2006)
point out that a board with many outside directorships is less likely to dis-
charge the CEO. Besides these, three variables that may be seen as proxies
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for either CEO entrenchment or information are in the independent vari-
able set. These are exported CEO, imported CEO, and CEO director, see
the AID essay in section 1.2.
Board changes comprise director turnover and board enlargements. I
join these in a single measure, called board turbulence. I am unaware if
such a measure is already in use. Moreover, CEO turnover is defined in
three different ways. The first is all CEO turnovers, the second the CEO
departures that coincide with a chairman departure, and the third is the
forced departures from Bøhren et al. (2002). The common practice is to
use the forced departures, but Yermack (2004) is an example of a study
employing all CEO turnovers.
I include all CEO turnovers for the following two reasons. First, the
timing of CEO turnover and board turbulence may reveal board control
type, for whatever reason the departing CEO left the company. Thus, for
this reason alone, all CEO changes belong to the data set. Second, public
information on dismissals is likely to emerge only in a minority of cases,
probably where the conflict is the most acute, since both the firm and the
departing CEO want to defend their reputational capital. Using only this
sub-sample of turnovers is, consequently, likely to result in a seriously
biased sample.
The panel data structure of Norwegian boards from 1989 to 2002 offers
the opportunity to study departures around the time of CEO turnover. I
run three types of regressions. In the first, CEO turnover is the dependent
variable and a lagged and simultaneous board turbulence are dependent.
The second group of regressions comprises the chairman as the dependent
variable, and in the third, board turbulence is taken as the dependent,
while the lagged and simultaneous CEO turnover are independent. The
regressions for the chairman is done due to the position’s importance. In
addition to the CEO, chairman, and board turbulence variables, the above-
mentioned variables enter the regressions.
When the CEO turnover is the dependent variable, I use the so-called
probit regression technique. Probit regressions are necessary because CEO
turnover is a binary variable. Since the method does not remove firm het-
erogeneity, I have added 14 year and 19 industry dummies in order to
control for as much of the firm’s fixed effects as possible. Furthermore,
with panel data it is not possible to standardise the variables, although
the slope coefficients may be observed at the average of the distribution.
These are called average partial effects (APE). Furthermore, the same pro-
bit methodology is used in regressions with the chairman departure as
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dependent variable.
When board turbulence is the dependent variable, I use GMM estima-
tion in the same manner as in section 1.2, with the exception that lagged
explanatory variables enter the regressions.
I focus upon the simultaneity of CEO departure and board turbulence
in the three regression groups as well as the role of outside ownership.
When the CEO turnover is the dependent variable, I find that the simulta-
neous and lagged board turbulence are both significant and positive, but
the simultaneous is higher than the lagged, that is, the simultaneous APE
is higher than the lagged. Thus, the CEO board control type receives little
support. Furthermore, the outside ownership concentration is not signifi-
cant, as is expected under shareholder and joint control. These results hold
across various definitions of CEO turnover, and for firm performance be-
ing either stock return or return on assets.
The same conclusions emerge when using the chairman as the de-
pendent variable. Now, the CEO turnover variable is simultaneous and
lagged. The chairman is removed in the board turbulence measure, and
the regression using joint CEO and chairman turnover is removed from
the estimations.
The third regression group comprises the board turbulence as the de-
pendent variable. Here, the simultaneous and lagged CEO turnover are
both significant, but the lagged is more important. This should indicate
CEO control. However, now the outside ownership concentration is sig-
nificant and positive, as expected when shareholder control is the case.
My main conclusion is that the control type between CEO and direc-
tors is one of joint control, that is, the CEO and directors together consti-
tute a team. This supports the friendly board hypothesis of Adams and
Ferreira (2007).
Thus, the data do not support the Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) hy-
pothesis that board composition is endogenously determined. It seems
that CEO control can only be realised if some protection is given, for in-
stance in the form of CEO-chairman duality or a staggered board, as Goyal
and Park (2002) and Falaye (2007) report. The results in this paper show
that when such protection is not in place, shareholders are important in
choosing directors. By implication, for the CEO to gain control over the
board, regulations must favour CEO protection.
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1.5 Looking back
Looking back at the essays, three main conclusions seem to emerge. The
first is that the board matters for firm performance. Board characteristics
play a role for the success of companies, and firms are advised to keep
boards small, well informed, and aligned with shareholder interests. The
second main conclusion is that endogeneity exists, but compared to the
effects of board characteristics, it is of minor importance. The third con-
clusion is that government regulations matter. This is obvious for the neg-
ative effects of co-determination, but also for the strong protection of mi-
nority shareholders. This protection allows shareholder discipline to be
exercised in the relation to the CEO.
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2Aligned, informed, and decisive
Øyvind Bøhren and R. Øystein Strøm1
Abstract
This paper explores how board composition influences the conflict of in-
terest between principals and agents, the production of information for
monitoring and advice, and the board’s effectiveness as a decision-maker.
Paying particular attention to the board’s independence, information pro-
duction, and diversity, we exploit unusually rich data from an unexplored
institutional environment to estimate models that control for endogeneity.
We find that the firm’s performance is higher when its directors own eq-
uity in the firm, have wide information networks to other firms, and when
the board has low gender diversity, no employee directors, and small size.
No association is found between performance and independence. Board
mechanisms are often endogenously determined, both by each other and
by the firm’s performance. These characteristics of value-creating boards
are consistent with theoretical predictions and the limited evidence from
other institutional regimes, but lend no support to popular opinion and
the current politics of corporate governance.
Keywords: Corporate governance, Board composition, Regulation, En-
dogeneity
JEL classification codes: G34, G38
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2.1 Introduction
The corporate governance literature argues that the fundamental concerns
in board design are to align the interests of principals and agents, to pro-
vide information for monitoring and advice, and to foster decision-making
effectiveness (Becht et al., 2003 and Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). How-
ever, constructing aligned, informed, and decisive boards involves a num-
ber of difficulties. In particular, the task involves a wide set of board mech-
anisms, but we lack both theory and evidence of how these mechanisms
relate to each other and to economic performance (Becht et al., 2003)2. This
also means that when regulators currently restrict the admissible range
of board mechanisms like independence and diversity, they do so with-
out knowing the impact of their actions neither on other board mecha-
nisms nor on the firm’s performance. If anything, the limited empirical
research mostly questions the validity of the current regulatory practice or
has nothing to say about it.
Our paper addresses the board design problem empirically by ana-
lyzing an unusually rich set of board mechanisms in an unexplored reg-
ulatory regime, using a methodological approach that controls for endo-
geneity. Because the directors’ independence, network, and diversity are
often debated in the public, we pay particular attention to these mecha-
nisms, constructing new empirical proxies for independence and network
that are more consistent with the existing theory. The regulatory environ-
ment of our sample firms allows us to study the economics of compulsory
law in place (such as mandatory employee directors), of recent comply-
or-explain regulation (such as the OECD codes and national codes for
director independence), and the economic rationale for introducing new
mandatory rules in the future (such as a minimum fraction of board seats
per gender).
The economics of the boardroom involves a wide range of mecha-
nisms, their potential endogeneity is difficult to handle both theoretically
and empirically (such as feedback from performance to alignment or from
alignment to decisiveness), some of the mechanisms are hard to opera-
tionalize (such as independence and network), and the access to high-
quality data is limited (such as directors’ equity holdings, tenure, and net-
2Becht et al. (2003) argue that “. . . formal analysis of the role of boards of directors and
how they should be regulated is almost non-existent. . . . In sum, the formal literature on
boards is surprisingly thin given the importance of the board of directors in policy debates.
This literature mainly highlights the complexity of the issues. There is also surprisingly
little common ground between the models.”
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work). This environment has produced empirical research which often
relates corporate performance to a narrow subset of board mechanisms,
assumes board mechanisms are exogenous or that endogeneity is limited,
and uses empirical proxies with low validity and reliability.
The current politics of board design is driven by governance scandals
in a few firms, such as Ahold, Enron, Parmelat, and Skandia. This has pro-
duced a series of regulatory restrictions on owners’ control rights in the
board room, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley act in the US and corporate gov-
ernance codes in more than 50 countries worldwide. The problem is that
these attempts at avoiding what politicians consider the worst outcome (i.
e., governance scandals) in a few firms may prevent owners from attaining
their best outcome (maximum firm value) in the typical firm, where gov-
ernance breakdown is an improbable event. First, Hermalin and Weisbach
(2006) show theoretically that board regulation can only improve welfare
if there is either information asymmetry at the contracting stage, externali-
ties to non-contracting parties, or if regulators have remedies that contract-
ing parties do not have. It is not obvious whether any of these conditions
are met in practice. Second, the research literature lends little support to
enrouraging more board independence. In fact, Adams and Ferreira (2007)
show theoretically that more independence reduces information produc-
tion, hurts the board’s advice function, and may also reduce the value of
monitoring. Also, Bhagat and Black (1999) conclude that the US evidence
finds no clear link between independence and performance. If anything,
the relationship is negative. Third, research on the relationship between
performance and board diversity is very sparse and mostly inconclusive.
Overall, the limited existing research provides no convincing support for
neither current nor planned board regulation.
We try to improve on this situation in four ways. The first contri-
bution is based on the fact that our data set includes an unusually wide
set of governance mechanisms. We analyze three alignment mechanisms
(inside ownership concentration, outside ownership concentration, and
director independence), four information mechanisms (director network,
having the firm’s CEO on the firms’s board, having the firm’s CEO on
other firms’ boards, and having other firms’ CEO on the firm’s board),
and four decisiveness mechanisms (board size, gender mix, age disper-
sion, and employee directors). The sample covers all non-financial firms
listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange from 1989 to 2002, which is a long time
series of board data by international standards. This panel of up to four-
teen observations per firm allows us to study board dynamics over exten-
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sive periods, and to control for unobserved determinants by fixed effects
estimation, which is uncommon in the literature. Our ownership structure
data are unusually detailed, accounting for every equity holding by every
owner in every firm at every year-end.
Our second contribution is new empirical proxies for board indepen-
dence and for director network. Important parts of the board literature
and most countries’ corporate governance codes classify directors as de-
pendent if they are affiliated, i.e., have past or present business or fam-
ily relations to the firm. A possible reason why the literature has pro-
duced inconclusive evidence on how performance relates to board inde-
pendence is that the independence proxy is theoretically ad–hoc. Accord-
ing to the Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) model, what matters for director
independence is not affiliation. Rather, it is the relative timing of entry,
i.e., whether the director was appointed before or after the current CEO
took office. Our independence proxy reflects this characteristic. Similarly,
the existing literature measures director network simply by the number of
board seats directors hold in other firms. This definition assumes every
board seat is equally important as an information source, and it double-
counts when more than one of the firm’s directors sit on the same outside
board. Our network proxy avoids double-counting and treats each seat in-
dividually according to its information centrality, accounting for both the
direct information effect of sitting on another firm’s board and the indi-
rect effect of meeting directors on that board who hold seats in still other
boards.
Third, we try to control for endogeneity as efficiently as possible. The
endogenous relationship between performance and independence was mo-
deled theoretically by Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), who recently used
this framework to show how board design by owners can be understood
as a response to regulatory change (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2006). How-
ever, whereas endogeneity is difficult to control for with the classic sim-
ultaneous equations methodology, equation-by-equation estimation with
GMM is a more robust alternative for two reasons. First, because the true
system of simultaneous equations is unknown, the coefficients will be bi-
ased if the simultaneously estimated system is misspecified. In particular,
if one equation is misspecified, the estimates of the remaining equations
in the system will be contaminated as well. Unlike in the classic simul-
taneous equations approach, estimating each regression separately with
GMM keeps the misspecification local (Woolridge (2002)). Second, GMM
can handle correlation between the error term and the independent vari-
2.1. INTRODUCTION 25
ables, which is typical in endogenous relationships.
Our final contribution comes from the regulatory setting, which offers
an opportunity to explore the role of three board mechanisms that are of-
ten addressed by regulators and public opinion. These are independence,
employee directors, and gender diversity. First, Norwegian corporate law
rules that the firm’s CEO cannot be its chairman. Thus, decisions on the
CEO-chairman duality have been moved from owners to regulators, who
mandate separation for all firms. Although not by law, it is an empirical
fact that non-CEO members of the management team are never directors
in their firm. Even the CEO is not on the board in roughly two thirds of our
sample firms. Thus, regulation and a voluntary restriction on board com-
position jointly produce boards that are at least formally less controlled
by management than most boards in other countries. These exogenous
restrictions increase the power of tests that relate corporate performance
to board independence. The second unusual characteristic is that when
a listed Norwegian firm employs more than 200 people, the employees
choose one third of the directors. Since roughly 40% of our sample firms
have employee directors, the cross-sectional variation of this board char-
acteristic allows us to analyze the performance effect of mandatory em-
ployee directors, which is quite unexplored in the literature.3 Finally, both
independence and gender diversity in the boardroom were heavily dis-
cussed in the second half of our sample period, and gender diversity was
mandated two years after its end.4 Since we know each director’s gen-
der, we can explore whether gender diversity has unexploited economic
potential that owners will not capture unless regulators mandate it.
We find that corporate performance as measured by Tobin’s Q is sig-
nificantly higher when insider ownership is high (i.e., aligned) and when
directors have wide networks through seats they hold in other firms (in-
formed). Firms with small boards, low gender diversity, and no employee
directors are more valuable than others (decisive). These relationships are
statistically significant at standard levels, and the economic significance
is stronger for the alignment and information mechanisms than for deci-
siveness. In contrast, we find no evidence that independence relates sys-
tematically to performance. These results, which control for endogeneity,
3Firms in the newspaper, shipping, petroleum extraction, and financial service indus-
tries are exempted. 62% of the sample firms have more than 200 employees, and two thirds
of them have employee directors.
4A corporate governance code for listed firms issued in 2004 recommends at least 50%
independent directors. A law passed in 2004 mandates at least 40% directors of each gen-
der in listed firms from 2006 on.
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are robust to alternative model specifications. Consistent with theoretical
predictions, we do find that board design mechanisms are endogenous,
both relative to each other and to performance. For instance, higher gen-
der diversity increases board size (i.e., mechanisms drive each other), and
directors with strong information networks both improve performance
and gravitate towards well-performing firms (two-way causation between
mechanisms and performance). Moreover, board mechanisms are comple-
ments rather than substitutes. For instance, the decisiveness mechanisms
show that boards with low gender mix are smaller and have less age di-
versity, which all contribute to more homogeneity. Also, and as expected,
board-external firm characteristics matter for board composition. For in-
stance, higher risk generates lower insider holdings, more networked di-
rectors, and less gender diversity. Finally, the finding that several board
mechanisms relate significantly to performance in an endogenous system
apparently shows that owners do not design their board optimally (Dem-
setz and Lehn, 1985). Such a conclusion may be premature, since the reg-
ulator does not allow the owners of our sample firms to freely design the
optimal board. Mandatory employee directors in large firms is an example
of such an exogenous, binding restriction on board design.
These findings imply that well-functioning directors are not necessar-
ily independent of the CEO, which runs counter to conventional wisdom
behind recent corporate governance regulation. However, it is line with
most existing empirical results and also consistent with the theoretical
model of Adams and Ferreira (2007). The evidence suggests that own-
ers are able to trade off a director’s role as hands-off monitor against the
role as hands-on adviser, and that stronger emphasis on independence
may hurt not just the advice function, but also the value of monitoring,
which is the only function captured by the Hermalin and Weisbach (1998)
model and also the one receiving all the attention in current board regu-
lation. Similarly, it seems directors have multiple seats not because they
elbow themselves into the board room, but due to the valuable informa-
tion network they bring along. Also, the negative association between
performance and diversity in terms of more gender mix, larger board size,
and the use of employee directors does not support the claim that direc-
tor heterogeneity is an underexploited resource, and that owners will not
capture its economic value unless regulators help them. Finally, the endo-
geneity of board mechanisms is a real-world phenomenon, making both
research and regulation of board design more difficult.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the lit-
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erature and explains how our methodology deviates from the one used by
others. Section 2.3 describes the institutional framework, explains the data
selection procedure, and presents the descriptive statistics. We formally
test the relationship between board design and economic performance in
section 2.4, whereas section 2.5 provides robustness checks. Section 2.6
summarizes and concludes.
2.2 Theory, evidence, and methodology
Becht et al. (2003) recently concluded that the theory of board design is
grossly underdeveloped. This characteristic of a young, immature para-
digm is problematic for empiricists. Although the board design problem
is multidimensional, each theory is partial and addresses one or a few
board design mechanisms. Thus, theory cannot predict what the full set
of value-creating board mechanisms looks like in equilibrium. Neither can
it specify the expected internal relationship between major mechanisms,
such as the endogeneity between insider equity holdings and board size.
Consequently, estimated relationships between the mechanisms and how
they drive performance should be considered stylized facts rather than
tests of well-founded hypotheses.
In the following, we explain our choice of focus and methodology by
reviewing the existing literature. We organize the discussion around the
three major concerns underlying the choice of any specific board design
mechanism, which are to align the interests of principals and agents (sec-
tion 2.2.1), provide information for monitoring and support (2.2.2), and to
enhance the board’s effectiveness as a decision-maker (2.2.3).
2.2.1 Interest alignment
Interest alignment in a board context concerns the firm’s ownership struc-
ture and the degree of independence between monitoring directors and
monitored officers.
The theory of corporate governance argues that ownership concentra-
tion matters for interest alignment by influencing the principal’s incen-
tives and power to monitor the agent (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Both
properties are stronger the higher the ownership concentration, and in-
side ownership concentration (equity holdings by officers and directors) is
more powerful than outside concentration because inside owners are bet-
ter informed and have direct access to the firm’s decision-making. How-
ever, because powerful insiders may entrench themselves and exploit their
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outside co-owners, the expected relationship between inside ownership
concentration and market value is positive at low concentration levels and
declining after a certain point which generally cannot be specified ex ante.
The empirical evidence on the relationship between outside concentra-
tion and firm performance is mixed and inconclusive (Gugler, 2001). As
for inside concentration, which is the more relevant ownership character-
istic in a board setting, the predicted curvilinear relationship has received
consistent support by studies that mostly ignore other board design mech-
anisms than insider ownership. However, this clean result does not carry
over to the board literature, where the models include more board charac-
teristics than just insider holdings. Hermalin and Weisbach (1991); Byrd
and Hickman (1992); Yermack (1996); Cotter et al. (1997) and Bhagat and
Black (2002) all find a positive relationship, but it is only significant in
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and Yermack (1996). Thus, adding more
mechanisms to a board design model than just ownership structure may
easily blur the mostly clean empirical relationship between insider own-
ership and firm performance found in simpler models. Our comprehen-
sive model allows us to study this issue more closely. We measure out-
side ownership concentration by the Herfindahl index based on all out-
side owners5. Insider ownership is proxied for by the directors’ aggregate
equity fraction in the firm.
The board literature and existing corporate governance codes argue
that monitoring quality is higher the stronger the independence between
directors and managers. Such independence is generally thought to reflect
the directors’ ability to monitor without feeling pressure from the moni-
tored CEO. Arguing that this issue involves more than just outside vs.
inside directors, Byrd and Hickman (1992) introduce a finer partition by
distinguishing between inside, affiliated outside, and independent outside
directors. Only the latter type has no past or present business or family ties
to the firm.
The empirical evidence on the relationship between such independence
measures and firm performance is inconclusive. Baysinger and Butler
(1985) estimate a ten-year lagged positive effect, Hermalin and Weisbach
(1991) find no significant link, while the relationship is negative and signif-
icant in Yermack (1996); Agrawal and Knoeber (1996); Klein (1998); Bhagat
and Black (1999), and Bhagat and Black (2002). One possible reason for this
5The Herfindahl index for outside ownership concentration is the sum of squared own-
ership fractions across all the firm’s outside owners. Its maximum value is one (a single
investor owns every share held by the outsiders), approaching its minimum value of zero
as the ownership structure gets increasingly diffuse.
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low consistency is the missing theoretical justification for the affiliation-
based independence measure. To increase the power of the test, we base
our independence measure on the Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) model,
where the CEO’s ability to recruit dependent directors increases with the
firm’s past performance. This model predicts that the longer the history of
good performance under the current CEO, the less independent the cur-
rent board. Thus, the key independence criterion is not affiliation, but
whether the director was appointed before or after the CEO took office.6
Consistent with the Hermalin-Weisbach model, we measure a board’s in-
dependence as the difference between the average tenure of its non-CEO
directors and the tenure of the CEO:
Independence≡ 1
n
n
∑
i=1
non-CEO director tenurei −CEO tenure (2.1)
where non-CEO director tenurei is the number of years since non-CEO di-
rector i entered office, and n is the number of shareholder–elected direc-
tors. The average director has longer (shorter) tenure than the CEO when
expression (2.1) is positive (negative). According to Hermalin and Weis-
bach (1998), the board is more independent the higher the value of (2.1)7.
Carter and Lorsch (2004) argue that board independence is driven by
the director’s absolute rather than relative tenure, and that independence
decreases rather than increases as tenure grows.8 This happens because
directors become emotionally more attached to the firm and its manage-
ment the longer the directors stay. Under this logic, a higher value of (2.1)
means less independence rather than more. However, since (2.1) also re-
flects the tenure of the CEO, which is irrelevant under the Carter-Lorsch
hypothesis, we will alternatively use board tenure, CEO tenure, and chair
tenure as proxies in our robustness tests.
A very different reason why a positive relationship between indepen-
6A second reason for questioning the conventional independence definition in our set-
ting is the institutional framework. The CEO of our sample firms is also a director in just
one third of the cases, the CEO cannot chair the board by law, and other members of the
management team are never on the board. Thus, although most directors in our sample
are independent in the Byrd-Hickman sense, they may not be so according to Hermalin
and Weisbach (1998).
7Although not based on an underlying theoretical model, Westphal and Fredrickson
(2001) did in fact use the fraction of directors appointed after the CEO took office as one of
several independence measures.
8Absolute rather than relative CEO tenure has also been used as an independence proxy
in the strategic management literature (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989).
30 CHAPTER 2. ALIGNED, INFORMED, AND DECISIVE
dence and performance is not found in the data is that it simply does
not exist. That is, the predictions tested so far may come from theories
that miss key components of the full picture. In particular, although di-
rectors provide both monitoring and advice, the Hermalin and Weisbach
(1998) model only captures monitoring. This means the directors’ role as
advisors is assumed to be independent of their role as monitors. Simi-
larly, regulation mandating more independence ignores the point made
by Bhagat and Black (1999, p. 264) that “Inside directors are conflicted,
but well informed. Independent directors are not conflicted, but are rela-
tively ignorant about the company”. Adams and Ferreira (2007) formal-
ize this idea in a setting where the quality of both monitoring and advice
increases with the information received from the CEO, who dislikes mon-
itoring and likes advice. They show that if independent directors have
stronger monitoring incentives than dependent directors, increased inde-
pendence may hurt the stockholders. This happens because information
provision is endogenous to independence: The CEO responds to increased
board independence by providing the directors with less information. In
fact, the value of both monitoring and advice may decrease as indepen-
dence grows. Thus, an inverse or no relationship between independence
and performance is consistent with a model that captures both the moni-
toring and advice functions of the board, recognizes the conflict between
the two, and lets information provision relate endogenously to indepen-
dence.
2.2.2 Information
The quality of the board’s monitoring and support functions depends on
the quality of the information used. Information sources that can be influ-
enced by board design are CEO directorship, the CEO’s directorships in
other firms (which we call exported CEO director), another firm’s CEO on
our firm’s board (imported CEO director), and non-CEO directors holding
board seats in other firms (director network).
Agency theory suggests that due to the value of independence for
monitoring quality, the CEO should not be on a board which is supposed
to monitor him9. In contrast, Carter and Lorsch (2004) posit that since
the CEO has superior information about the firm and its environment, he
should be a fully voting member in order to increase incentives for infor-
9Because the CEO director mechanism involves both alignment and information, it may
be classified under either the alignment or the information heading. We choose the latter,
but with no implicit assumption about relative importance.
2.2. THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND METHODOLOGY 31
mation production. Because the CEO is a member in about every third
of our sample firms, we can explore the validity of these two competing
predictions. While the CEO-chairman duality has been analyzed earlier,
we are not aware of existing studies of CEO directorships.
Similarly, whereas the agency logic may suggest that the CEO should
pay full attention to his firm, the information perspective would argue that
the firm may benefit when the CEO is on other firms’ boards. We use the
exported CEO director variable to capture this design characteristic. Perry
and Peyer (2005) show that when agency costs are high, the announce-
ment of a new outside directorship for the CEO is followed by a negative
share price reaction. Correspondingly, a CEO from another firm on our
board (imported CEO director) may contribute little if he is already a fully
committed CEO. Also, Gilson and Kraakman (1991) argue that imported
CEO directors are bad monitors because they have the same role in the
principal-agent setting as the CEO they are supposed to monitor. Again,
the counterargument is the information idea that the imported CEO direc-
tor brings new perspectives and makes all directors better informed. The
net impact of these alignment and information effects can only be deter-
mined empirically.
Just like the CEO, non-CEO directors with multiple directorships may
bring back information, but may also become overstretched monitors (Fer-
ris et al., 2003, and Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). Fama (1980) argues that the
average number of outside directorships held by the firm’s directors prox-
ies for the market value of the board’s monitoring quality. This simple
measure, which is predominant in finance-based board research, is poten-
tially problematic. Although the information benefit may be positively
related to the number of directorships, the measure is noisy because it ig-
nores the uniqueness of each seat. Also, it does not distinguish between
n direct director links to just one other firm and one direct link per firm
to n different firms. Moreover, the Fama measure neglects indirect links
created when the firm’s director is on a second firm’s board with someone
who holds a seat in a third firm.
We avoid these problems by applying an information centrality con-
cept from social network analysis (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). This mea-
sure captures the firm’s direct and indirect links to directors in other firms,
treats each seat individually, and avoids double counting. The central-
ity score increases with the number of direct and indirect paths from our
board to other boards, and is higher the shorter the indirect path10. The
10Network theory uses concepts such as nodes and lines. In our setting, a node is a
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higher the board’s centrality score, the stronger the predicted information
effect of its directors’ network.
2.2.3 Decisiveness
The decisiveness mechanisms are supposed to improve the board’s effec-
tiveness as a decision-making unit. The mechanisms we explore are board
size, director gender, director age, and employee directors.
Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg et al. (1998) document that performance
decreases with increasing board size. This is consistent with Gjølberg and
Nordhaug (1996), who show theoretically that increased board size is valu-
able only when new members bring new insights. If not, larger boards
take longer time to decide and make more conventional decisions than
smaller boards. Thus, performance suffers when increased board size re-
duces creativity and decisiveness.
A larger board may also produce more diversity, which Cadbury (2002)
considers a valuable characteristic. This is why public choice theory tells
board designers to trade off the negative effect of longer decision time and
stronger pressure on consensus against the positive impact of a wider op-
portunity set generated by a more diverse board (Buchanan and Tullock,
1962). Thus, the issue is not just whether board size grows, but whether
it does with new directors who differ sufficiently from the existing ones.
Gender and age are potential ways to create such diversity.
firm, and a line between two firms represents a joint director in the two firms. We define
geodesic gjk as the shortest path between two nodes j and k, and G as the total number
of nodes. The node i is designated as ni. Using Wasserman and Faust (1994, p. 192-197),
our information centrality measure is constructed in the following way: Form the G × G
matrix A with diagonal elements aii = (1+ sum of values for all lines incident to ni) and
off-diagonal elements aij, where
aij =
{
0 if nodes ni and nj are not adjacent
1− xij if nodes ni and nj are adjacent
xij is the value of the link from firm ni to firm nj, that is, 0 or 1. The inverse of A, which is
C = A−1, has elements
{
cij
}
, where we define T = ∑Gi=1 cii and R = ∑
G
j=1 cij. The informa-
tion centrality index for firm ni is:
Ci (ni) =
1
cii + (T − 2R)/G
The index measures the information content in the paths that originate and end at a specific
firm.
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The empirical evidence on how firm performance correlates with gen-
der is scant and conflicting. Shrader et al. (1997) and Smith et al. (2006)
document a negative relationship between female directors and firm per-
formance, whereas Carter et al. (2003) find the opposite. As far as we
know, age has not been studied in this setting. We will use the fraction of
female directors and the variance of the directors’ age to proxy for gender
diversity and age diversity, respectively.
The use of employee directors is potentially a mechanism for both
alignment, information, and decisiveness. Because employees are stake-
holders with contractual claims on the firm’s cash flow, the hold-up prob-
lem suggests that shared control with employees investing in firm-specific
human capital may benefit owners (Hansmann, 1996 and Becht et al., 2003).
However, Williamson (1996) posits that since employees have a contrac-
tual claim, they should not be residual claimants as well. Because employ-
ees will defend their sunk human capital investments, they may oppose
decisions which threaten their job security. This is the alignment dimen-
sion of employee directorships.
As for information provision, Raheja (2005) argues that inside directors
may be valuable because outside directors are better monitors when firm-
internal information comes through several channels. Thus, employee di-
rectors may supplement the CEO as an internal information source. Em-
ployee directors may also matter for decisiveness, as the conflict of inter-
est between owners and employees may increase decision complexity and
make the board a less effective decision maker. This is why Cadbury (2002)
thinks boards should be unitary.
The limited empirical evidence suggests the net effect of employee di-
rectors on owner wealth is negative. FitzRoy and Kraft (1993) and Schmid
and Seger (1998) show that German firms with employee directors are less
profitable than other firms. Falaye et al. (2006) find that Canadian firms
where shareholding employees hold director positions in their company
spend less on new assets, take fewer risks, grow more slowly, create fewer
new jobs, deviate more from value maximization, have more serious cash
flow problems, and are less productive. 41% of our sample firms have
employee directors. We measure board-driven co-determination by the
fraction of the firm’s directors employed by the firm.
To summarize, we want to investigate the following relationship be-
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tween economic performance and board design mechanisms:
Q = Constant+ β1Directors’ holdings+ β2(Directors’ holdings)2
+ β3Outside concentration+ β4Independence
+ β5CEO director dummy+ β6Exported CEO+ β7Imported CEO
+ β8Network+ β9Size+ β10Gender+ β11Board age dispersion
+ β12Fraction employee directors+ γ1Firm size+ γ2Risk+ uit
(2.2)
The empirical proxies are defined in table 2.1, which is organized ac-
cording to the three major concerns in board design.
Table 2.1
Because the descriptive statistics will show that insider ownership by
non-CEO officers and by the CEO are strongly correlated, we use only
the directors’ aggregate holdings in (2.2). By removing employee direc-
tors from the proxies for independence, age diversity, network, size, and
gender, we avoid multicollinearity problems and make it easier to sepa-
rate the effects of shareholder–elected directors from those of employee–
elected directors. On the other hand, some predictions do not distinguish
between director types, such as the relationship between board size and
decisiveness. We return to that issue in section 2.5 by including employee
directors in the size, independence, and gender proxies. Our control vari-
ables are firm size and risk, which we measure by the log of sales revenues
and the equity beta, respectively. Size is included due to its consistent cor-
relation with observed returns in asset-pricing tests (Hawawini and Keim,
2000). Correspondingly, risk controls for the impact of cash flow uncer-
tainty on firm value.
2.2.4 Endogenous board design mechanisms
A board mechanism may be endogenously determined by other variables
in our model for two reasons. First, the firm’s performance may drive its
board composition. Such reverse causation occurs in the Hermalin and
Weisbach (1998) model, where the board becomes less independent the
better the firm performs. Similarly, Palia (2001) posits that insider own-
ership increases when performance grows, as equity-based compensation
instruments are more often exercised when performance is strong.
Second, a board mechanism is endogenous if it is influenced by other
board mechanisms in the model. An early example is Demsetz and Lehn
(1985), who argue that when value-maximizing owners can freely choose
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their firm’s corporate governance system, equilibrium occurs when each
governance mechanism’s marginal impact on performance equals zero
across all mechanisms. This implies that the mechanisms are internally
related and that the optimal set is determined by exogenous factors such
as the firm’s industry, risk, and the stage of the business cycle. A more re-
cent example is Adams and Ferreira (2007), where information provision
by the CEO responds to exogenous changes in board independence.
The theory of corporate governance cannot yet offer a comprehensive
system of well-specified board design equations. Therefore, we analyze
endogeneity by first studying what happens to the relationship between
current performance and current board mechanisms when we include past
performance as an additional determinant of current performance. Next,
letting insider holdings, board independence, director network, gender
mix, and board size be alternative dependent variables in addition to con-
temporaneous performance, we relate these board mechanisms to each
other and to contemporaneous performance. Since our panel data gives
repeated observations of the relationship between firm performance and
governance mechanisms, utilizing the panel structure increases the possi-
bility of revealing stable relationships. Also, since our panel data allows
for estimation with fixed effects, we need no instruments to control for
unobserved firm characteristics that are stable over time.
2.3 Descriptive statistics
Our sample is all non-financial firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange
(OSE) at year-end at least once over the period 1989–200211. To reduce
censoring bias in the tenure measures, we start collecting director data in
1986. The ownership structure data covers every equity holding by every
investor in every sample firm.12
Table 2.2 summarizes key properties of the frequency distributions for
each board design mechanism. It shows that officers as a group hold on
average 6.4% of the equity, and the CEO owns 3.6%. These figures show
11The OSE had an aggregate market capitalization of 68 bill. USD equivalents by year-
end 2002, ranking the OSE sixteenth among the twenty–two European stock exchanges
for which comparable data is available. During our sample period, the number of firms
listed increased from 129 to 203, market capitalization grew by 8% per annum, and market
liquidity, measured as transaction value over market value, increased from 52% in 1989 to
72% in 2002 (sources: www.ose.no and www.fibv.com).
12The public securities register (VPS) provided the ownership data, accounting and
share price data is from the OSE, and board data was collected manually from Kierulf’s
Håndbok and a public electronic register.
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that powerful owners are mostly absent as inside monitors13. The three
largest owners as a group have on average simple majority. The average
largest outside owner has less than one third of the equity, which means
he cannot alone block a charter amendment. This pattern reflects that the
ownership concentration of Norwegian firms is low by European stan-
dards14. The key implication in our setting is that the resulting separation
between ownership and control makes the board a potentially important
vehicle for reducing agency costs.
Table 2.2
The average value of the independence proxy as defined in expression
(2.1) is -0.301, reflecting that the average CEO has slightly longer tenure
than the firm’s average director. This figure also follows from the differ-
ence between the separate tenure figures reported for these two insider
types, which are 2.2 and 1.9 years, respectively. Still, the large difference
between the extreme values of the tenure variables and the high standard
deviation of the independence proxy reflect considerable cross-sectional
variation in (2.1), which is necessary to validly test the independence hy-
pothesis. For instance, the average director took office almost 13 years be-
fore the CEO in the strongest independence case and more than 10 years
after in the strongest dependence case.
As for the board’s information function, the CEO is not a director in
the firm in 70% of the cases. Every third CEO sits on another listed firm’s
board (exported CEO), but the median CEO has no outside directorships.
13Although not shown in the table, more than 40% of the CEOs do not own shares in
the firm they run. The average holdings when the CEO (the directors) does (do) own is
6% (13%). Neither the directors nor the CEO holds equity in 36% of the firms, whereas
both do in 44% of the cases, when their average aggregate holding is 20%. Because inside
ownership increases the directors’ incentives to monitor the CEO, it also reduces outside
owners’ need to monitor the board. Thus, unlike what would be expected from an agency
logic, the observed pattern suggests that the two insider ownership characteristics are used
as complementary rather than substitute ways of reducing agency costs. This may reflect
a tendency to either overinvest or underinvest in these two alignment mechanisms.
14Norwegian firms have a less concentrated ownership structure than in any other Euro-
pean country except the UK. For example, the average largest owner holds close to 50% of
voting equity in a continental-European listed firm, and 15% in the UK. The corresponding
US figure is 3% (Barca and Becht, 2001). Norway has a civil law regime, which is gener-
ally considered less investor–protective than common law. Nevertheless, La Porta et al.
(2000) find that Norway’s regulatory environment provides better protection of share-
holder rights than the average common law country. According to their theory of institu-
tionally determined ownership structures, the strong investor protection is a major reason
why Norway’s ownership concentration is so low.
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Although not reported in the table, it turns out that a CEO sits consider-
ably more often on other firms’ boards when he is also a director in the
firm he runs (31%) than otherwise (21%). Thus, a potentially problematic
principal-agent relationship inside the firm (the agent monitors himself)
may make the CEO create the same problem in other firms (one agent by
profession monitors another agent by profession).
The director network measure reflects that more direct and indirect
links to other boards makes the firm better connected to key parts of the
information network. For instance, we find that 66% of the sample firms
in 1997 had at least one direct link to another firm through overlapping
directorships. The mean score on the network variable in table 2.2 is 0.184,
varying between 0.069 and 0.320.
The third section of the table, which deals with mechanisms for influ-
encing the board’s decisiveness, reports summary statistics for board size,
gender, age, and employee directors. Because employee directors may be-
have differently than other directors, we measure board size both with and
without employee directors (SizeAll and Size, respectively). The average
board has six members, and one less if we ignore employee directors. This
is a very small board by international standards15. The average fraction of
women is 4.7% (GenderAll), dropping to 3.4% if we exclude employee di-
rectors (Gender). Although not shown in the table, we find that employees
elect women considerably more often than the owners (15% vs 3%, respec-
tively). This may suggest that the fraction of women in the workforce is
considerably higher than the fraction of women considered qualified for
owner-elected directorships. The proportion of female directors increases
with board size, and the substitution of male directors by females for given
board size occurs over the whole sample period and is particularly strong
after 1995. The fraction of female directors is roughly three times higher
in the end of the sample period than in the middle.
Like gender, age is a potential source of board diversity. The average
CEO is 47 years old and roughly three years younger than the average
director. Average age per board varies between 27 and 74 years, and the
standard deviation of director age per board is eight years on average,
15Wymeersch (1998, p. 1105-1109) reports an average board size of 10.07 in the UK, 12.05
in France, 10.44 in Belgium, 12.00 in Italy, and 6.54 in the Netherlands. The average size
of the German supervisory board is 13.25 (Hopt, 1998, p. 248). Carter and Lorsch (2004)
find that the average US board has about 12 directors, which is down from 16 in the 1980s.
Although the largest boards in our sample become less common over time, the average
size is quite stable. For instance, the 25% largest boards have on average 8.97 members in
the first half of the sample period and 8.67 in the second.
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varying between zero (every director has the same age) and 22 years. As
for employee directors, there is about one per board on average when we
consider all boards regardless of whether or not they have employee di-
rectors. There is at least one employee director in 42% of the firms, de-
clining from a typical value of 50% in the first half of the sample period to
less than 40% in the second. This decline may be due to a higher propor-
tion of firms in exempted industries, a relative increase in the fraction of
small firms, or a larger proportion of firms organized as holding compa-
nies. When employees are represented, they have between one and four
seats.
We measure performance by Tobin’s Q and operationalize it as the
market value of assets per unit book value. The market value of debt is
set equal to its book value. Since we will later regress Q on board charac-
teristics while controlling for firm size, we use sales rather than assets to
measure firm size16.
Summarizing the descriptive statistics, outside and inside ownership
concentration in our sample firms is low. The board’s average indepen-
dence of the CEO is medium in the sense that the CEO and the average
director have roughly the same tenure. The CEO is a director in the firm
he manages in less than one third of the cases, and those who are sit on
other listed firms’ boards more often than others. The information cen-
trality measure shows that boards differ considerably in their information
access through their directors’ links to other boards. The average board
has six directors, female directors are rare, average director age per board
varies by almost fifty years across the sample, and there is large age het-
erogeneity within the board. Less than half the firms have employee di-
rectors.
16Although many bivariate correlation coefficients in table 2.2 differ significantly from
zero at the 5% level, a rule of thumb says the coefficient must exceed 0.7 before multi-
collinearity causes problems in regressions. Moreover, Hsiao (2003, p. 3-4) argues that
multicollinearity problems are unlikely in panel data settings, since this normally involves
more data points and larger data variability than a cross-section. Also, our regressions will
use definitions of size and gender that exclude employee directors. To illustrate, the Pear-
son correlation between board size and the fraction of employee directors is 0.65 when
employee directors are included in the size measure (SizeAll), dropping to 0.07 when the
size measure ignores employee directors (Size). This suggests multicollinearity is not a po-
tential problem in our regressions unless employee directors are included in the size and
gender proxies.
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2.4 Statistical tests
Since our data set involves repeated observations of the same firm for up
to fourteen years, we use the firm level fixed effects (FE) model to han-
dle this panel data setting17. The general structure of our FE model as
expressed in the logic of Woolridge (2002, p. 251) is:
Qit = θ +β(Board mechanisms)it +γ(Controls)it + ci + vit
{
i = 1,2, . . . , N
t = 1,2, . . . , T
(2.3)
Here, i is the firm, t is the time period, θ is a constant, β and γ are the
coefficient vectors for board mechanisms and controls, respectively, ci is
the unobserved, time-independent and random fixed effect of firm i, and
vit is the idiosyncratic error, which varies randomly across firms and time
periods. We observe Qit and the explanatory variables representing gov-
ernance mechanisms and controls, and want to estimate β and γ while
holding the unobserved individual effect ci constant. The error term vit is
assumed to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables and ci.
Since the unobserved ci is constant over time per firm, the term dis-
appears when we time-demean the variables. Although this FE approach
handles unobserved time-independent firm heterogeneity by eliminating
it from the data before estimation starts, we include firm size and risk to
control for observed firm heterogeneity which varies over time.
We will apply the FE approach in several settings. The basic FE model
(2.3) as specified in (2.2) is estimated in section 2.4.1. Section 2.4.2 ana-
lyzes endogeneity explicitly by first estimating a dynamic FE model where
lagged performance allows for feedback from past performance to current
board mechanisms. Subsequently, we estimate a FE model with six equa-
tions where the dependent variable is performance, directors’ holdings,
independence, director network, gender mix, and board size, respectively.
As discussed earlier, we prefer GMM to alternative estimation methods
17If we ignore the time-series nature of the data and instead use a pooled cross-
section approach, we would disregard possible correlation between observable and non-
observable variables in general and unobserved heterogeneity between firms in particular.
The pooled approach may still try to capture firm heterogeneity by adding control vari-
ables such as the firm’s age and industry, but this is normally insufficient to control for
fixed effects. For instance, two shipping firms founded in the same year may still have
different optimal board design mechanisms if the firms have different exogenous charac-
teristics such as location of headquarters, age of the fleet, and stage in their life-cycle. A
further advantage of panel methods is that the moments needed for GMM estimation are
readily available from the data structure. This property becomes particularly important
when analyzing mechanism endogeneity in section 2.4.2.
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because it is more suitable for handling endogeneity. Also, it does not
require assumptions such as homoscedasticity, serial independence, and
normality.
2.4.1 The basic model
Table 2.3 shows the results of estimating model (2.2). The first column re-
ports unstandardized (regular) coefficient estimates, and the second shows
the estimates based on the standardized variables. The p-value for statis-
tical significance in the third column is identical for both coefficient types,
but the standardized coefficient expresses economic significance in a more
transparent way. Because the standardized variable has an expected value
of zero and a standard deviation of one, its regression coefficient shows by
how many standard deviations performance is expected to change if the
board mechanism changes by one standard deviation. Thus, the higher
the absolute value of the standardized coefficient, the stronger the eco-
nomic significance of the board mechanism. We only report standardized
coefficients in the following.
Table 2.3
The Hansen J statistic shows that the instruments used to identify the
coefficients are relevant, and the overidentification test statistic reflects
that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term. We limit the
attention to estimated coefficients with a p-value of 10% or less18.
For the alignment mechanisms, there is a positive, significant relation-
ship between performance and insider ownership. This is consistent with
the extant governance literature, although the familiar, negative sign on
the squared insider holdings is not statistically significant. Also, the in-
significant effect of outside ownership concentration is in line with sev-
eral studies in the board literature, which often find that when more board
mechanisms than just ownership are included in a regression model, the
18The assumption underlying the GMM model in the table is that all board mecha-
nisms and control variables are strictly exogenous. That is, E (vit|Xi1, . . . , XiT , ci) = 0 when
t= 1, . . . , T. These are the moment conditions, from which instruments may be constructed
to identify the coefficients. We use the Amemiya and MaCurdy (1986) procedure, which
involves the raw, the time-demeaned, and the squared time-demeaned explanatory vari-
ables. Furthermore, we include the Breusch et al. (1989) instruments, which are the aver-
age and standard deviation of firm-demeaned explanatory variables. Our choice of instru-
ments illustrates the advantage of panel data that modified versions of variables included
in the model can also be used as instruments. Variables not included in the model, such as
CEO age and chairman tenure, are not used as instruments.
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significant relationship between ownership and performance becomes we-
aker.
The insignificant relationship between board independence and per-
formance is consistent with the hypothesis that although more indepen-
dence increases monitoring incentives, it reduces the CEO’s willingness
to share information. The net effect in our sample is zero, suggesting
that most boards have optimal independence, reflecting that most boards
strike the proper balance between being a hands-off monitor and a hands-
on management resource. This finding lends no support to the argu-
ment that value creation will improve when board independence is made
mandatory by law or strongly recommended by code. The same conclu-
sion follows from board research in other institutional regimes based on
different independence proxies. These studies find almost without excep-
tion that the relationship between independence and performance is neg-
ative or zero.
The information centrality measure, which reflects direct and indirect
information links created when the firm’s directors meet directors on other
boards, is supposed to pick up information sources for the board with
beneficial economic effects. According to the table, it does so in terms of a
positive association between director network and performance.
Every coefficient estimate under board decisiveness is negative and
significant except for age dispersion. Although the inverse relationship
between board size and performance is in line with the existing literature,
it is remarkable that this pattern turns up in our sample as well, which has
very small boards by international standards. This result suggests that
optimal board size is indeed very moderate. Adding the finding that gen-
der diversity is inversely associated with performance, it seems that the
homogeneous, small board is superior to the heterogeneous, large one.
Finally, the use of employee directors is negatively associated with perfor-
mance. This finding supports the theoretical arguments and also the em-
pirical findings from Germany and Canada that employee directors suc-
cessfully defend their interests at the expense of owners and creditors. It
also shows that from the capital providers’ point of view, mandating em-
ployee directors causes an over-optimal use of them.
In terms of economic significance, the standardized coefficients show
that among the estimates with a p-value of 10% or less, insider ownership
is the most powerful variable, followed by network, employee directors,
size, and gender. To illustrate, table 2.2 shows that the average firm has
a Tobin’s Q of 1.482 and directors’ holdings of 6.4%, the standard devi-
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ations being 1.105 and 19%, respectively. Along with the standardized
coefficients from table 2.3, this implies that if insider holdings increase
by one standard deviation from its mean value of 6.4% to a new level of
25.4%, expected Tobin’s Q increases from 1.482 to 1.655, i.e., by 12%. Re-
ducing gender diversity by one standard deviation from the sample mean
increases expected Q from 1.482 to 1.542, i.e., by 4%19.
2.4.2 Endogeneity
We explore endogeneity explicitly by means of two different models, which
we call the dynamic performance model and the integrated mechanism
model, respectively.
The dynamic performance model rests on the idea that reverse causa-
tion between performance and board mechanisms (i.e., performance drives
board design) can be partially captured by including lagged performance
as a determinant of current performance in (2.2). The required assump-
tion is that lagged performance and the other explanatory variables are
predetermined relative to current performance (Arellano, 2003, p. 144)20.
Since this assumption allows for feedback from past performance to cur-
rent board design, it means that if the dynamic model produces different
coefficient estimates for board mechanisms than the basic model in table
2.3, these board mechanisms are at least partially driven by performance.
19To explore whether panel data estimation is required in our setting, we used OLS to
estimate (2.2) on the pooled (i.e., un-demeaned) sample. This approach ignores both indi-
vidual effects and time effects by assuming that the error term is identical across all firms
and time periods. We found several noticeable differences. First, unlike our panel data
model, pooled OLS reproduces the classic result in the ownership structure literature of a
positive and quadratic relationship between insider holdings and corporate performance.
Also, outside ownership concentration is inversely related to performance in a significant
way. Second, the negative exported CEO effect becomes significant, and the significant
coefficient of the network effect is higher. Third, only employee directors is significant
among the decisiveness mechanisms, but its sign is reversed and its significance weaker.
As expected, the importance of the control variables increases considerably, and the R2 is
below one fifth. Overall, these findings show that unless we can ignore the panel structure
in our data set, the pooled model is seriously misspecified. ANOVA analysis of the the
pooled OLS regression shows that the pooled model is indeed misspecified. 54% of the
sum of squares in the estimated OLS error term is driven by fixed firm effects, 4% is due to
time effects, and 40% is random. The remaining 2% is driven by joint individual and time
effects.
20Thus, lagged performance may be correlated with the lagged error term, but not with
the contemporaneous and future error terms. This assumption is the so-called sequential
moment condition, which can be expressed as E (vit|Xi1, . . . , Xit, ci) = 0 when t = 1, . . . , T,
where lagged performance is one of the explanatory variables.
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We specify the dynamic model as:
Qit = θ + αQi,t−1 + β(Board mechanisms)it + γ(Controls)it + ci + vit (2.4)
where α is the coefficient of lagged performance andβ and γ are the coeffi-
cient vectors of the board mechanisms and control variables, respectively.
The standardized coefficient estimates of the dynamic performance
model are shown in the first column of results in table 2.4. The results
strongly support the findings in the static model in table 2.3, whose esti-
mates are repeated in the second column of results in table 2.4. The only
difference is that the linear insider holding term becomes more signifi-
cant both statistically and economically and that its non-linear component
becomes statistically significant. These results show that endogeneity in
terms of reverse causation from past performance matters because past
performance influences the effect of current board mechanisms on current
performance. However, this reverse causation from past performance is
still moderate, as every result from the base-case model survives.
Table 2.4
The second model consists of six equations and is called the integrated
mechanisms model in table 2.4. The first equation is the static model from
table 2.3. Each of the five other equations have a board mechanism as de-
pendent variable, which is Directors’ holdings, Independence, Network,
Gender, and Size, respectively.
The estimates of the integrated mechanisms model reflect two-way
contemporaneous causation between performance and four of the five
mechanisms. The performance equation shows that boards with high di-
rectors’ holdings, networked directors, low gender diversity, and small
size produce higher performance. As shown by the directors’ holdings,
network, gender, and size equations, respectively, better performance feeds
back to these four board mechanisms by producing lower insider hold-
ings, more networked directors, less gender diversity, and reduced board
size. Thus, directors with high equity stakes improve the firm’s expected
performance (from the performance equation), but tend to sell off or be re-
placed by non-owning directors as performance improves (from the direc-
tors’ holdings equation). Busy directors improve performance (the perfor-
mance equation), but are also attracted to well-performing firms (the net-
work equation). Lower gender diversity reduces performance (the perfor-
mance equation), but high-performing firms tend to establish boards with
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less gender diversity (the gender equation). Finally, smaller boards im-
prove performance (the performance equation), but firms with high per-
formance tend to reduce board size (the size equation). Overall, these find-
ings show that improved performance makes boards less aligned, better
informed, and more homogenous.
Turning to the internal relationship between board design mechanisms
within each of the three groups (i.e., the alignment, information, and de-
cisiveness mechanisms), five of the six significant coefficients are positive.
This means mechanisms are mostly complements rather than substitutes.
Firms with high inside ownership concentration also have high outside
ownership concentration (alignment), boards with well networked direc-
tors also export their CEO to other boards (information), and boards with
low gender diversity are smaller and have less age diversity (decisive-
ness). The relative economic significance of the mechanisms resembles
what we found for the determinants of performance: Ownership and net-
work mechanisms are not only the strongest drivers of performance, but
also of other board mechanisms.
Four of the five mechanisms modeled in the table are significantly
related to either firm size, firm risk, or both, which are the two board-
exogenous determinants in our model. Large firms have better networked
directors, and risky firms have lower insider holdings, better networked
directors, and lower gender diversity. The negative association between
risk and gender mix is consistent with Adams and Ferreira (2004), who
find that firms more often choose male directors when uncertainty in-
creases. This is in line with the argument that higher uncertainty makes
firms rely more on the trust inherent in homogenous teams than on the
more noisy performance-based incentives in heterogenous teams (?).
The finding that several board design mechanisms are internally re-
lated and driven by board-external variables supports the equilibrium hy-
pothesis of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) that governance mechanisms are op-
timally adjusted to each other. On the other hand, the equilibrium hypoth-
esis is apparently falsified by our finding that several mechanisms are also
significant variables in a performance equation that controls for endogene-
ity. We hesitate to conclude this way, since the institutional environment
of our sample firms does not allow owners to freely design the board.
Mandatory employee directors in firms with more than 200 employees is
the most obvious example of such a restriction.
Summarizing, the empirical tests in this section have shown that own-
ers on the board as well as multiple directorships are positively related to
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performance. This is consistent with the hypotheses that directors with
high ownership stakes have stronger monitoring and advice incentives
than other directors and that well-connected directors create extra value
through the network they bring along to the boardroom. In contrast, more
diversity produced by larger board size, more gender mix, and more em-
ployee directors is always negatively associated with performance. This
suggests heterogenous boards are less effective decision makers than ho-
mogeneous boards. All these relationships are statistically significant, and
the economic significance is stronger for insider ownership and networked
directors than for the decisiveness mechanisms.
Several board design mechanisms are endogenous, both relative to
performance and to each other. For instance, directors with wide net-
works produce high performance and gravitate towards well-performing
firms, and networking declines when gender diversity increases. More-
over, board mechanisms are much more often complements than substi-
tutes.
In terms of policy implications, these findings provide no economic
argument for mandating more independence or more diversity, such as
requiring by law or recommending by code that a minimum fraction of
directors be independent, employees, or of a particular gender. The fact
that the relationship to performance for employee directors and gender
diversity is statistically and economically significant may reflect that these
mechanisms are not at their optimal level, whereas the insignificance for
the independence mechanism reflects that it is. This means that if any-
thing, the regulatory implication is the opposite of what has been argued
in the public: Regulators should mandate more director owners and more
networked directors, less employee directors, less gender diversity, and
smaller boards. The independence mechanism needs no regulatory assis-
tance.
2.5 Robustness
Whereas table 2.1 specifies alternative empirical proxies for several the-
oretical concepts, every regression model in section 2.4 uses just one set.
This section explores the robustness of our findings to alternative ways of
empirically measuring the theoretical constructs of board independence,
director network, gender mix, and board size.
The independence measure defined in expression (2.1), which we de-
veloped from the Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) logic, is based on the
46 CHAPTER 2. ALIGNED, INFORMED, AND DECISIVE
tenure of non-CEO directors vs. the tenure of the CEO. As discussed, how-
ever, Carter and Lorsch (2004) argue that board independence is a matter
of absolute rather than relative tenure, and that independence decreases
rather than increases as tenure grows. We test this competing hypothe-
sis by alternatively operationalizing independence as board tenure, CEO
tenure, and chairman tenure. Under the Carter-Lorsch hypothesis, the ex-
pected relationship to performance is negative for board and chairman
tenure and zero for CEO tenure.
The second alternative operationalization is for the director network
variable. Unlike our more elaborate proxy, existing papers simply use the
average number of outside directorships. We expect the estimated coeffi-
cient of this more coarse measure to have the same sign as our proxy, but
to be less significant both economically and statistically.
Table 2.5 shows the results of re-estimating the fixed effects model (2.2)
under alternative proxies for independence (models (1)-(3)), director net-
work (model (4)) and for one combination of the two (model (5)). Model
(6) is the base–case model from table 2.3.
Table 2.5
Comparing the estimates of the base-case model (6) to those using al-
ternative empirical proxies in models (1)-(5), the results are almost iden-
tical. According to the five statistically significant mechanisms in (6), the
estimated sign and statistical significance for four of them (directors’ hold-
ings, network, gender, and employee directors) are fully consistent across
the models. The only difference is the loss of significance for board size
when network is measured by the number of outside seats rather than
information centrality. Notice also that this conventional definition of net-
work reduces the economic significance of the network effect on perfor-
mance by 45%. This suggests the economic content of our measure and
the conventional measure is indeed different.
It may be argued that if we are concerned with the performance effect
of board size or gender diversity, it does not matter whether the direc-
tors are elected by shareholders or employees. Due to potential multi-
collinearity and the desire to distinguish between stockholder-driven and
employee-driven explanations, however, we have so far ignored employee
directors in the gender and board size variables. To explore the effect of
lifting this restriction, table 2.6 reestimates the base-case model from table
2.3, letting these two board characteristics reflect all the board’s directors
rather than only those elected by stockholders.
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Table 2.6
Two changes occur. Under alignment, the importance of directors’
holdings becomes slightly weaker. The p-value increases from 8.8% to
12.7%, but the economic significance remains the largest of all the mecha-
nisms. The second change occurs for the decisiveness mechanisms, where
employee directors and gender both become insignificant, and the signif-
icant size variable becomes slightly weaker. This is as expected, since the
performance effect of what used to be in the employee directors variable
only (model A) is now spread out over three variables (model B), water-
ing out the separate effects of employee directors, gender, and size. Thus,
including employee directors in the definition of size and gender prevents
us from telling whether it is these board characteristics per se that interact
with performance or whether we measure the effect of employee direc-
tors working indirectly and mixed up with stockholder elected directors
through size and gender.
Overall, the robustness tests have shown that alternative ways of op-
erationalizing independence, information network, gender diversity, and
board size have no fundamental effect on the interaction between perfor-
mance and board composition. This strengthens our belief in the base-case
model in table 3 and the integrated mechanisms model in table 4.
2.6 Summary and conclusions
We find that board composition matters for value creation because it in-
fluences the alignment of interest between principals and agents, the pro-
duction of information for monitoring and advice, and the board’s effec-
tiveness as a decision-maker. Owners on the board and directors with
multiple directorships relate positively to performance, suggesting that di-
rectors with high ownership stakes have stronger monitoring and support
incentives and that well-connected directors bring a valuable network into
the boardroom. Increased diversity produced by larger board size, more
gender mix, and more employee directors is always negatively associated
with performance. This is consistent with the argument that heterogenous
boards are less effective decision makers, and that employees successfully
protect their interests in the boardroom at the expense of capital providers.
All these relationships are statistically significant, and the economic sig-
nificance is stronger for insider ownership and networked directors than
for size, gender, and employee directors. In contrast, we find no signif-
icant link between independence and performance, which supports the
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hypothesis that although more independence increases monitoring incen-
tives, it reduces management’s willingness to share private information
with the board. The net effect of these two opposing forces for the typical
firm is zero, which means most firms in the sample have boards with opti-
mal independence. That is, owners design boards with the proper mix of
hands-off monitors and hands-on advisers.
Many board design mechanism in our sample firms are endogenously
determined, both by performance and by each other. For instance, direc-
tors with wide networks produce high performance and gravitate towards
well-performing firms, and networking declines when gender diversity
increases. However, such endogeneity does not invalidate the estimated
relationship between board mechanisms and performance as summarized
above, since our methodology controls for endogeneity in single-equation
estimation. Nevertheless, endogeneity makes it more difficult to separate
cause from effect, which is a well-known, chronic problem in corporate
governance research. Moreover, endogeneity makes regulation more chal-
lenging because restrictions which are supposed to limit the admissible
range of one board mechanism, such as independence, influences the use
of unregulated mechanisms, such as board size.
Several of our findings are politically controversial (such as the ques-
tionable role of diversity in the boardroom), run counter to key compo-
nents of most countries’ current corporate governance regulation (such
as the problematic role of independent directors), and point to directions
for board research that differ from those implied by conventional wisdom
(such as the importance of having stockholders rather than other stake-
holders on the board). In particular, we find no economic argument for
mandating independence or diversity, such as requiring by law or code
that a minimum fraction of directors be independent, be employees or be
of a given gender. If anything, regulatory implications are the opposite of
what is argued in the public domain: Regulators should encourage more
owners in the boardroom, more directors with multiple seats, fewer em-
ployee directors, less gender diversity, and smaller boards. Independence
is already at its optimal level and needs no regulatory pressure of the type
which is currently introduced worldwide. In fact, regulation aimed at pre-
venting costly scandals in a small number of firms may end up destroying
more value in the vast majority of firms.
It seems to us that board design has been shaped rather strongly by
practitioners and regulators based on their personal experience, political
agendas, and more recently by a concern with the prevention of corporate
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governance scandals. This suggests a need for more academic research
and less popular opinion on the characteristics of value-creating boards.
Our findings support such a claim, which is also in line with the observa-
tion by Becht et al. (2003) that board research is still in its infancy.
Bibliography
Adams, R. B. and D. Ferreira (2004, nov). Gender diversity in the board-
room. ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 57/2004.
Adams, R. B. and D. Ferreira (2007, Feb). A theory of friendly boards.
Journal of Finance 62(1), 217–250.
Agrawal, A. and C. R. Knoeber (1996, Sep). Firm performance and mecha-
nisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholders.
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 31(3), 377–397.
Amemiya, T. and T. E. MaCurdy (1986). Instrumental-variable estimation
of an error-components model. Econometrica 54, 869–880.
Arellano, M. (2003). Panel Data Econometrics. Oxford, UK: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
Barca, F. and M. Becht (2001). The Control of Corporate Europe. Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press.
Baysinger, B. D. and H. N. Butler (1985, Spring). Corporate governance
and the board of directors: Performance effects of changes in board com-
position. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 1(1), 101–124.
Becht, M., P. Bolton, and A. Röell (2003). Corporate governance and con-
trol. In G. Constantinides, M. Harris, and R. Stulz (Eds.), Handbook of
the Economics of Finance, Volume 1A, Chapter 1, pp. 1–109. Amsterdam:
North-Holland.
Bhagat, S. and B. Black (1999, May). The uncertain relationship between
board composition and firm performance. The Business Lawyer 54, 921–
963.
Bhagat, S. and B. Black (2002). The non-correlation between board in-
dependence and long term firm performance. Journal of Corporation
Law 27(2), 231–274.
50 CHAPTER 2. ALIGNED, INFORMED, AND DECISIVE
Breusch, T. S., G. E. Mizon, and P. Schmidt (1989). Efficient estimation
using panel data. Econometrica 57(3), 695–700.
Buchanan, J. M. and G. Tullock (1962). The Calculus of Consent. Logical Foun-
dations of Constitutional Democracy. The University of Michigan Press.
Byrd, J. W. and K. A. Hickman (1992). Do outside directors monitor man-
agers? Journal of Financial Economics 32, 195–221.
Cadbury, A. (2002). Corporate Governance and Chairmanship. A Personal
View. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Carter, C. B. and J. W. Lorsch (2004). Back to the Drawing Board. Boston,
Mass.: Harvard Business School Press.
Carter, D. A., B. J. Simkins, and W. G. Simpson (2003). Corporate gover-
nance, board diversity and firm value. Financial Review 38, 33–53.
Cotter, J. F., A. Shivdasani, and M. Zenner (1997). Do independent direc-
tors enhance target shareholder wealth during tender offers? Journal of
Financial Economics 43, 195–218.
Demsetz, H. and K. Lehn (1985, Dec). The structure of corporate owner-
ship: Causes and consequences. Journal of Political Economy 93(6), 1155–
1177.
Eisenberg, T., S. Sundgren, and M. T. Wells (1998). Larger board size and
decreasing firm value in small firms. Journal of Financial Economics 48,
35–54.
Falaye, O., V. Mehrotra, and R. Morck (2006). When labor has a voice in
corporate governance. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 41(3),
489–510.
Fama, E. F. (1980, Apr). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Jour-
nal of Political Economy 88(2), 288–307.
Ferris, S. P., M. Jagannathan, and A. Pritchard (2003, Jun). Too busy to
mind the business? Monitoring by directors with multiple board ap-
pointments. Journal of Finance 58(3), 1087–1111.
Fich, E. M. and A. Shivdasani (2006, Apr). Are busy boards effective mon-
itors? Journal of Finance 61(2), 689–724.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 51
Finkelstein, S. and D. C. Hambrick (1989). Chief executive compensation:
A study of the intersection of markets and political processes. Strategic
Management Journal 10(2), 121–134.
FitzRoy, F. R. and K. Kraft (1993). Economic effects of codetermination.
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 95(3), 365–375.
Gilson, R. J. and R. Kraakman (1991, Apr). Reinventing the outside direc-
tor: An agenda for institutional investors. Stanford Law Review 43.
Gjølberg, O. and O. Nordhaug (1996). Optimal investment committee size.
Journal of Portfolio Management 22(2), 87–94.
Gugler, K. (2001). Corporate governance and performance: The research
questions. In K. Gugler (Ed.), Corporate Governance and Economic Perfor-
mance, Chapter 1, pp. 1–67. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Hansmann, H. (1996). The Ownership of Enterprise. Cambridge, MA: Har-
vard University Press.
Hawawini, G. and D. B. Keim (2000). The cross-section of common stock
returns: A synthesis of the evidence and explanations. In W. T. Ziemba
and D. B. Keim (Eds.), Security Market Imperfections in World Equity Mar-
kets, Chapter 2, pp. 3–43. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hermalin, B. E. and M. S. Weisbach (1991). The effect of board composition
and direct incentives on firm performance. Financial Management 21(4),
101–112.
Hermalin, B. E. and M. S. Weisbach (1998, Mar). Endogenously chosen
boards of directors and their monitoring of the CEO. American Economic
Review 88(1), 96–118.
Hermalin, B. E. and M. S. Weisbach (2003, Apr). Boards of directors as an
endogenously determined institution: A survey of the economic litera-
ture. Economic Policy Review 9(1), 7–26.
Hermalin, B. E. and M. S. Weisbach (2006, nov). A framework for assessing
corporate governance reform. NBER Working Papers 12050, National
Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Hopt, K. J. (1998). The German two-tier board: Experience, theories, re-
form. See Hopt et al. (1998), Chapter 4(a), pp. 227–258.
52 CHAPTER 2. ALIGNED, INFORMED, AND DECISIVE
Hopt, K. J., H. Kanda, M. J. Roe, E. Wymeersch, and S. Prigge (Eds.) (1998).
Comparative Corporate Governance: The state of the art and emerging research.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hsiao, C. (2003). Analysis of Panel Data (2. ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Klein, A. (1998, Apr). Firm performance and board committee structure.
Journal of Law and Economics 46, 275–303.
La Porta, R., F. L. de Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny (2000, Oct/Nov).
Investor protection and corporate governance. Journal of Political Econ-
omy 58(1-2), 3–28.
Palia, D. (2001). The endogeneity of managerial compensation in firm val-
uation: A solution. Review of Financial Studies 14(3), 735–764.
Perry, T. and U. C. Peyer (forthcoming 2005). Board seat accumulation by
executives: A shareholder’s perspective. Journal of Finance.
Raheja, C. G. (2005). Determinants of board size and composition: A
theory of corporate boards. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Anal-
ysis 40(2), 283–306.
Schmid, F. A. and F. Seger (1998). Arbeitnehmermitbestimmung, Alloka-
tion von Entscheidungsrechten und Shareholder Value. Zeitschrift fur
Betriebswirtschaft 68(5), 453–473.
Shleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny (1986). Large shareholders and corporate
control. Journal of Political Economy 94(3), 461–486.
Shrader, C. B., V. B. Blackburn, and P. Iles (1997). Women in management
and firm financial performance: An exploratory study. Journal of Man-
agerial Issues 9(3), 355–372.
Smith, N., V. Smith, and M. Verner (2006). Do women in top management
affect firm performance? A panel study of 2300 Danish firms. Interna-
tional Journal of Productivity and Performance Management 55(7), 569–593.
Wasserman, S. and K. Faust (1994). Social Network Analysis: Methods and
Applications. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Westphal, J. D. and J. W. Fredrickson (2001, Dec). Who directs strategic
change? Director experience, the selection of new CEOs, and change in
corporate strategy. Strategic Management Journal 22(12), 1113–1137.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 53
Williamson, O. E. (1996). The Mechanisms of Governance. Oxford, UK: Ox-
ford University Press.
Woolridge, J. M. (2002). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data.
Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
Wymeersch, E. (1998). A status report on corporate governance rules and
practices in some continental European states. See Hopt et al. (1998),
Chapter 12(d), pp. 1045–1200.
Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small
board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics 40, 185–212.
54 CHAPTER 2. ALIGNED, INFORMED, AND DECISIVE
2.7 Tables
Table 2.1 The empirical proxies.
Variable Definition
Alignment
Dir.s’ holdings Fraction of equity owned by the board of directors
CEO holdings Fraction of equity owned by the firm’s CEO
Ownership concentra-
tion
Measured by the Herfindahl index, which is the sum of squared equity
fractions across all the firm’s outside owners
Largest owner Fraction of equity held by the firm’s largest outside owner
Three largest owners Fraction of equity held by the firm’s three largest outside owners
Independence The average tenure of the non-employee directors minus the tenure of
the CEO
Board tenure The average number of years since non–employee directors took office
CEO tenure The number of years since the CEO took office
Chair tenure The number of years since the chairman took office
Information
CEO director Dummy variable which equals 1 if the CEO is a member of his com-
pany’s board and zero otherwise
Exported CEO The number of outside directorships held by the firm’s CEO
Imported CEO The proportion of CEOs from other companies on the board
Outside directorships A director’s average number of directorships outside the firm
Network Non-CEO director information centrality as defined in footnote 10
Decisiveness
SizeAll The number of directors
Size The number of non–employee directors
GenderAll The proportion of female directors
Gender The proportion of shareholder elected female directors
Board age dispersion The standard deviation of board age
Employee directors The fraction of employee directors, measured as the number of em-
ployee directors divided by the number of directors
Controls
Firm size The natural logarithm of sales revenues
Risk The firm’s equity beta, estimated as the standardized covariance with
the OSE total index, using daily stock returns data over the past two
years
Performance
Q Market value of assets divided by its book value
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Table 2.2 Summary statistics for board design mechanisms, controls, and perfor-
mance in all non-financial firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange 1989-2002.
Variable Mean Stdev Median Min Max N
Alignment
Directors’ holdings 0.064 0.190 0.000 0.000 1.000 1861
CEO holdings 0.036 0.140 0.000 0.000 1.000 1865
Ownership concentration 0.176 0.201 0.111 0.003 1.000 1784
Largest owner 0.293 0.233 0.220 0.003 1.000 1718
Three largest owners 0.498 0.220 0.478 0.047 1.000 1735
Independence -0.301 2.110 0.000 -12.857 10.333 2205
Board tenure 1.886 1.695 1.500 0.000 11.333 2204
CEO tenure 2.161 2.445 1.000 0.000 16.000 2205
Chair tenure 1.874 2.321 1.000 0.000 16.000 2205
Information
CEO director 0.296 0.457 0.000 0.000 1.000 2207
Exported CEO 0.348 0.747 0.000 0.000 6.000 2207
Imported CEO 0.281 0.538 0.000 0.000 4.000 2207
Outside directorships 0.536 0.547 0.400 0.000 4.333 2207
Network 0.184 0.077 0.203 0.069 0.320 2207
Decisiveness
SizeAll 6.024 1.961 6.000 2.000 15.000 2207
Size 5.087 1.330 5.000 2.000 15.000 2207
GenderAll 0.047 0.097 0.000 0.000 0.556 2207
Gender 0.034 0.090 0.000 0.000 0.667 2207
Board age dispersion 8.004 3.163 7.789 0.000 21.920 2207
Number of employee directors 0.938 1.206 0.000 0.000 4.000 2207
Employee directors 0.123 0.155 0.000 0.000 0.500 2207
Controls
Firm size 13.313 2.029 13.074 5.366 23.006 1635
Risk 0.772 0.657 0.709 -0.994 8.127 1733
Performance
Q 1.482 1.105 1.138 0.361 9.465 1678
The table shows descriptive statistics for the board design mechanisms, the control variables,
and the performance measure. The board design mechanisms are classified according to their
primary function (interest alignment, information provision, and decisiveness) as discussed in
section 2.2. The variables are defined in table 2.1.
56 CHAPTER 2. ALIGNED, INFORMED, AND DECISIVE
Table 2.3 Firm performance explained by board design mechanisms and controls
in the base-case model.
Coefficient estimate
Unstand- Stand-
ardized ardized p-value
Directors’ holdings 0.916∗ 0.157 0.085
Directors’ holdings sqrd -0.806 -0.124 0.139
Ownership concentration 0.159 0.031 0.202
Independence -0.005 -0.010 0.754
Information
CEO director 0.009 0.004 0.870
Exported CEO -0.001 -0.001 0.867
Imported CEO -0.008 -0.001 0.992
Network 1.387∗∗ 0.126 0.000
Decisiveness
Size -0.049∗∗ -0.058 0.005
Gender -0.672∗∗ -0.054 0.001
Board age dispersion 0.004 0.011 0.590
Employee directors -0.814∗∗ -0.116 0.005
Controls
Firm size -0.209∗∗ -0.163 0.000
Risk 0.033 0.020 0.377
N 1515 1515
p-value, J 0.972 0.972
p-value, over-ID 0.943 0.943
The table shows estimates of the base-case fixed effect regression model in expressions (2) and
(3) as estimated with GMM. The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q, which we measure as the
market value of the firm over its book value. Every variable is time demeaned by subtracting a
given firm’s observation in a given year from the firm’s overall mean across the years.
Instruments are the raw, the time-demeaned, and the squared time-demeaned explanatory
variables, the average and standard deviation of firm-demeaned explanatory variables. The first
column reports unstandardized (regular) coefficient estimates. The second column shows the
estimates based on the standardized variables, which we construct by deducting each
observation from its mean value and dividing by its standard deviation. The p-values in the
third column are identical for both coefficient types.
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Table 2.4 Endogeneity of board design mechanisms.
Dynamic
performance
model Integrated mechanisms model
Per- Per- Directors’ Inde-
Variable formance formance holdings pendence Network Gender Size
Alignment
Directors’ holdings 0.224∗∗ 0.157∗ 0.024 0.091 -0.152∗∗ 0.019
Directors’ holdings sqrd -0.163∗∗ -0.124 0.001 -0.089 0.163∗∗ 0.031
Ownership concentration 0.010 0.031 0.100∗∗ -0.037 -0.140∗∗ 0.033 -0.078
Independence 0.008 -0.010 0.003 -0.015 0.021 0.663∗∗
Information
CEO director 0.004 0.004 -0.030 -0.039 -0.047∗ -0.043∗∗ 0.131∗∗
Exported CEO -0.001 -0.001 0.031∗ -0.130∗∗ 0.044∗∗ 0.029 0.006
Imported CEO -0.017 -0.001 -0.005 -0.032 -0.005 -0.035∗∗ -0.003
Network 0.115∗∗ 0.126∗∗ 0.097∗∗ -0.006 -0.041∗∗ 0.784∗∗
Decisiveness
Size -0.062∗∗ -0.058∗∗ 0.014 -0.094∗∗ 0.101∗∗ 0.057∗∗
Gender -0.035∗∗ -0.054∗∗ -0.022 0.022 -0.091∗∗ 0.087∗∗
Board age dispersion 0.020 0.011 -0.054∗∗ 0.092∗∗ 0.000 0.059∗∗ 0.024
Employee directors -0.097∗∗ -0.116∗∗ -0.066 -0.029 0.062 -0.065 -0.476
Controls
Firm size -0.186∗∗ -0.163∗∗ -0.062 -0.047 0.093∗ 0.025 0.172
Risk -0.004 0.020 -0.056∗∗ 0.041 0.052∗ -0.054∗∗ -0.055
Past performance
Tobin’s Q lagged 0.108∗∗
Performance
Tobin’s Q -0.689∗∗ -0.015 0.204∗∗ -0.056∗∗ -0.191∗∗
N 1294 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515
p-value, J 0.091 0.972 0.987 0.858 0.233 0.628 0.266
p-value, over-ID 0.128 0.943 0.920 0.790 0.716 0.492 0.412
The table explores mechanism endogeneity by means of two models. In the dynamic
performance model in the first column of results, firm performance is the dependent variable,
and lagged performance is added as an independent variable to the basic model in (2.2). The
second model, termed the integrated mechanisms model, consists of five equations. The first
equation is the base-case performance model (2.2) from table 2.3. Each of the five other
equations have a board mechanism as the dependent variable, which is Directors’ holding,
Independence, Network, Gender, and Size, respectively. The six equations in the second model
are estimated one by one. The instruments correspond to those used table in 2.3. Performance
is measured as Tobin’s Q , which we operationalize as the market value of the firm over its
book value. All variables in all models are time-demeaned, which means that for each firm and
each variable, we subtract a given year’s observation from the firm’s overall mean across the
years. The table shows the estimates based on the standardized variables, which we construct
by deducting each observation from its mean value and dividing by its standard deviation.
Significant results at the 5% (10%) level are marked with ∗∗ ( ∗ ).
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Table 2.5 Alternative empirical proxies for board independence and director net-
work.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Board CEO Chair BT Base
tenure tenure tenure OD OD case
Alignment
Directors’ holdings 0.156∗ 0.157∗ 0.164∗ 0.159∗ 0.161∗ 0.157∗
Directors’ holdings sqrd -0.124 -0.123 -0.129 -0.120 -0.123 -0.124
Ownership concentration 0.033 0.032 0.031 0.031 0.032 0.031
Independence -0.008 0.004 -0.015 -0.015 -0.017 -0.010
Information
CEO director 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.004
Exported CEO 0.001 0.003 0.000 -0.030 -0.027 -0.001
Imported CEO -0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.025 -0.026 -0.001
Network 0.124∗∗ 0.126∗∗ 0.125∗∗ 0.138∗∗ 0.136∗∗ 0.126∗∗
Decisiveness
Size -0.056∗∗ -0.057∗∗ -0.057∗∗ -0.032 -0.031 -0.058∗∗
Gender -0.056∗∗ -0.056∗∗ -0.056∗∗ -0.062∗∗ -0.063∗∗ -0.054∗∗
Board age dispersion 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.015 0.012 0.011
Employee directors -0.114∗∗ -0.115∗∗ -0.112∗∗ -0.089∗∗ -0.084∗∗ -0.116∗∗
Controls
Firm size -0.147∗∗ -0.164∗∗ -0.153∗∗ -0.167∗∗ -0.144∗∗ -0.163∗∗
Risk 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.020 0.020
N 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515
P-value, J 0.956 0.962 0.959 0.994 0.984 0.972
P-value, over-ID 0.906 0.930 0.927 0.997 0.992 0.943
The table shows the results of using alternative operationalizations for board independence in
models (1)-(3), director network in model (4), and a combination of the two in model (5).
Model (6) is the base-case model from table 2.3. OD is the average number of outside
directorships held by the firm’s board members, and BT is the board tenure proxy from model
(1). The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q, which we measure as the market value of the firm
over its book value. Each variable is time demeaned in the regressions. For each firm and each
variable, we time demean by subtracting a given year’s observation from the firm’s overall
mean. The regressions use the same instrument set as in table 2.3, but with new variable
definitions. The table shows the estimates based on the standardized variables, which we
construct by deducting each observation from its mean value and dividing by its standard
deviation. Significant results at the 5% (10%) level are marked with ∗∗ (∗).
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Table 2.6 Including employee directors in the empirical proxies for board size and
gender diversity.
(A) p-value (B) p-value
Alignment
Directors’ holdings 0.138 0.127 0.157 0.085
Directors’ holdings sqrd -0.136 0.098 -0.124 0.139
Ownership concentration 0.036 0.140 0.031 0.202
Independence -0.007 0.580 -0.010 0.754
Information
CEO director -0.002 0.910 0.004 0.870
Exported CEO 0.006 0.699 -0.001 0.867
Imported CEO 0.002 0.920 -0.001 0.992
Network 0.120 0.000 0.126 0.000
Decisiveness
Size -0.049 0.068 -0.058 0.005
Gender -0.029 0.213 -0.054 0.001
Board age dispersion 0.011 0.516 0.011 0.590
Employee directors -0.050 0.223 -0.116 0.005
Controls
Firm size -0.173 0.000 -0.163 0.000
Risk 0.011 0.593 0.020 0.377
N 1515 1515
P-value, J 0.691 0.972
P-value, over-ID 0.873 0.943
The table shows estimates of the base-case model from table 2.3 when including (model (A))
and not including (model (B)) employee directors in the definition of board size, gender
diversity, and board independence. The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q, which we measure as
the market value of the firm over its book value. Each variable is time demeaned in the
regressions. For each firm and each variable, we time demean by subtracting a given year’s
observation from the firm’s overall mean. The instrument set is as in table 2.3, except that the
new variable definitions replace the ones from table 2.3. The table shows the estimates based
on the standardized variables, which we construct by deducting each observation from its mean
value and dividing by its standard deviation.
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rm performance with employees on the board?
Abstract
This paper1 explores the relationship between employee directors and firm
performance. Shareholders recognise that employee directors bring more
heterogeneity to the board, and try to neutralise their value-reducing ef-
fects by adjusting the board characteristics and the leverage. Board charac-
teristics and leverage are then endogenously determined by the presence
of employee directors. The lagged firm performance represents another
endogeneity influencing board characteristics and leverage. The relations
are modelled in a simultaneous equations framework, allowing an esti-
mation of the relative importance of the endogeneity effects relative to
the direct effects of the variables. Panel data of all non-financial Norwe-
gian listed firms from 1989 to 2002 enter the fixed effects estimation. The
negative employee director association with firm performance comes out
very clearly, and shareholders’ compensatory actions to neutralise the em-
ployee director influence are clearly visible. Reverse causation running
from the lagged firm performance to the board characteristics and the
leverage is confirmed. Yet the endogeneity effects are economically small
compared to the direct effects of board characteristics and leverage. Over-
all, the paper rejects any beneficial effects of one group of stakeholders –
the employees – on company boards.
Keywords: Corporate governance, Employee directors, Board compo-
sition, Regulation, Endogeneity
JEL classification codes: G34, G38
1I have benefited from comments from Øyvind Bøhren, Ole Gjølberg, Roswitha King,
Gudbrand Lien, participants at the 7th workshop on Corporate Governance and Invest-
ment, Jönköping 2006, and the 2nd International Business Economics Workshop, Majorca
13-14 September 2007. Pål Rydland and Bernt Arne Ødegaard have guided me to data.
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3.1 Introduction
This paper deals with the impact of co-determination2 upon firm perfor-
mance. Two conflicting views on the benefits of co-determination exist.
One says that co-determination increases firm performance, either because
employee directors supply outside directors with information they would
otherwise not have access to (Freeman and Reed, 1983 and Blair, 1995), or
because co-determination is a safeguard against dismissal inducing em-
ployees to invest in firm-specific human capital (Zingales, 2000 and Becht
et al., 2003). The other view is that owners’ and employees’ interests are
not aligned, and therefore, allowing employees into the boardroom means
that conflicting goals are pursued. When decision makers with different
objectives share in the board’s decisions, its focus may become unclear (Ti-
role, 2001), its decision time longer (Mueller, 2003), and its decision qual-
ity inferior3. The prediction is that firm performance will be lower than it
could otherwise be.
Even though co-determination is important in many European coun-
tries4, few firm-level studies have been made of its firm performance im-
pact. This paper is an attempt to bring more academic research to the
still under-researched (Goergen, 2007) comparison of firm performance in
shareholder determined companies and co-determined companies. Ear-
lier studies give mixed results, showing a negative impact in German
firms (FitzRoy and Kraft, 1993; Schmid and Seger, 1998; and Gorton and
Schmid, 2000), Canadian (Falaye et al., 2006), and Norwegian (Bøhren and
Strøm, 2007), but a positive impact in a later German study (Fauver and
Fuerst, 2006).
Compared to former literature the simultaneous equation estimation
of the relationship between firm performance and explanatory variables
2Co-determination is defined as employee board representation (Jensen and Meckling,
1979 and Furubotn, 1988).
3Tirole (2002, p. 118) argues that these “. . . (c)onflicts of interest among the board gen-
erate endless haggling, vote-trading and log-rolling. They also focus managerial attention
on the delicate search for compromises that are acceptable to everyone; managers thereby
lose a clear sense of mission and become political virtuosos.” In a similar vein, Hansmann
(1996, p. 44) states that “. . . because the participants [i.e. stakeholders] are likely to have
radically diverging interests, making everybody an owner threatens to increase the costs
of collective decision making enormously.”
4According to the European Industrial Relations Observatory On-line full employee
representation is found in Austria, the Nordic countries, and Germany, while the Nether-
lands and France have systems closer to a consultative function for employee representa-
tives.
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is the distinctive feature of this paper. The need for simultaneous mod-
elling arises from the fact that the presence of employee directors may in-
duce shareholders to adjust other governance mechanisms, notably board
composition and leverage, in order to neutralize the co-determination ef-
fects (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962). Employee directors may have a di-
rect impact upon firm performance, but also an indirect effect. This also
means that board composition is at least partly determined by employee
directors. Thus, the paper necessarily also relates to the board endogene-
ity issue (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). And since the data cover several
periods, it is possible to test the reverse causation hypothesis that firm per-
formance determines board composition (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998).
The simultaneous equation setup allows not only the discovery of endo-
geneity in governance mechanisms, but also a quantification of its impor-
tance compared to direct effects. I am unaware of former literature con-
taining a measure of the endogeneity effects.
The paper’s results come from a panel data set of non-financial firms
spanning the fourteen years from 1989 to 2002, containing financial in-
formation, data on ownership, and board composition data. Employee
representation was mandated by law in 1972 in Norway, and regulations
have remained almost unchanged since (Aarbakke et al., 1999). The data
on employee directors seems to be superior to those pulled from Ger-
man and Canadian institutional frameworks. While the employee direc-
tor in a German board may be elected from the national labour union, and
the Canadian evidence is from firms where employees have considerable
shareholdings, in Norway the employee director must be employed in the
company. Furthermore, because the mandatory employee director rules
only apply to certain firms, some firms have employee directors, others
have none. Thus, the study avoids the Dow (2003, p. 87) objection that
empirical investigations on the effects of employee directors suffer from a
lack of control group. Thus, unlike previous studies, the Norwegian in-
stitutional framework allows comparison between similar firms with and
without employee directors. This setting allows for sharper estimates of
the co-determination effects.
The paper has relevance for the emerging regulation literature on boards
(Hermalin, 2005). Because the sample includes both co-determined (by
regulation) and the shareholder determined kind, I can study the effects
of governance regulation by comparing the two sub-samples.
Compared to the related Bøhren and Strøm (2007), I introduce a num-
ber of new features. I construct a board structure index that captures
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many standard board characteristics in the same manner as Bertrand and
Mullainathan (2001), I add financial leverage and average wage as new
explanatory variables, perform a system estimation rather than a single-
equation estimation, and I make separate regressions for various sub-sam-
ples, for instance employee-director firms only. These steps should yield
better estimations of the employee director impact than the partial re-
gressions in Bøhren and Strøm (2007), and should also, subject the co-
determination hypothesis to more severe robustness tests. Furthermore,
I confirm their results when using individual board characteristics instead
of the board index.
In order to fully utilize the information in the panel data, I use the fixed
effects model (Woolridge, 2002), employing a three-stage least squares
(3SLS) methodology in system estimations. With the fixed effects method,
I am able to remove firm heterogeneity as did Palia (2001). Therefore, few
(if any) control variables are needed.
Using Tobin’s Q as the measure of firm performance, the results con-
firm the employee directors’ negative relationship to firm performance in
earlier studies, but also show a positive indirect effect to the board in-
dex and leverage. This reflects endogeneity, but the economic significance
of the indirect effects turn out to be much smaller than the direct. The
reverse causation hypothesis also finds confirmation, since lagged firm
performance is significant both regarding the board index and leverage.
But again, the indirect effects of the lagged firm performance are low com-
pared to the direct. I find clear differences in the various board characteris-
tics’ impact upon firm performance in sub-samples of co-determined and
shareholder determined firms. This means that regulations have costs,
both in relation to firm performance, and in the remaking of boards. The
results stand up to a number of robustness tests, including alternative per-
formance measures (stock return and accounting return on assets), and
also to dividends replacing leverage.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, a brief review of
the literature is given. Then, in section 3.3 testable implications are spelled
out. Section 3.4 contains data sources and institutional background, while
the following section, 3.5, discusses estimation methodology. Then section
3.6 shows results, in 3.7 robustness checks are undertaken, and the final
section, 3.8, concludes.
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3.2 Literature review
Few empirical studies of co-determination have been undertaken. Evi-
dence in FitzRoy and Kraft (1993); Schmid and Seger (1998) and Gorton
and Schmid (2000) shows that co–determination has a negative economic
effect upon firms in Germany, where employees have the right to equal
representation in the Aufsichtsrat with shareholders. Recently, Fauver and
Fuerst (2006) find a positive relationship to performance in a 2003 sample
of German companies in information intensive industries. In the regres-
sions with all industries, however, the relationship is not significant. The
German data often contain two kinds of employee directors, some elected
from among the employees in the company, while others may be national
union representatives. In contrast, the Norwegian system is such that only
persons employed in the company may be elected. Thus only a company
and not a national, union representative may sit on a Norwegian board.
Presumably, company employed persons are more authentic stakeholders
than their national union representatives.
Using Canadian data, Falaye et al. (2006) find that firms giving em-
ployees a greater voice in corporate governance spend less on new cap-
ital, take fewer risks, grow more slowly, create fewer new jobs, deviate
more from value maximisation, show greater cash flow problems, exhibit
lower labour and total factor productivity. This paper is set in a different
institutional environment. The Canadian employee directors are elected
in their capacity as owners of company shares. The influence of these di-
rectors on firm performance thus picks up two effects, one as a supplier of
labour services, the other as owner. None of these studies use panel data
or simultaneous data estimations.
Using Norwegian data, Bøhren and Strøm (2007) show that the em-
ployee director variable has a negative impact upon Tobin’s Q. They also
find evidence of interdependencies among board characteristics. How-
ever, they do not explore the indirect effects of co-determination, neither
do they carry their analyses into sub-samples of co-determined and share-
holder determined firms. In this paper, the analysis is extended to in-
clude effects upon average wage, leverage is a new governance variable,
the board index defined; I employ simultaneous equations modelling, and
perform regressions in sharply defined sub-samples. The robustness tests
are also more extensive, as I use return on assets and stock return as new
dependent variables, and also vary the definition of the board index.
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3.3 Theory and hypotheses
3.3.1 Stakeholder or interest group?
Board decisions include the formulation and control of strategy, larger in-
vestments and disinvestments, and the determination of the company’s
organization. Employee directors’ influence upon these decisions may
have long-time impact upon firm performance. Therefore, an analysis
over a long period of time is needed to detect the effects. The impact upon
firm performance could be positive, non-significant, or negative.
One possibility may be that the firm performance and employee link
is positive. Blair and Stout (1999) view stakeholders as members in a team
production. Since stakeholders invest in firm-specific investments, it is in
their interest to co-operate. The firm-specific human capital investments
make the employees residual claimants to much the same extent as share-
holders (Zingales, 2000 and Becht et al., 2003). The upshot is that employ-
ees should be represented on the board, and that this co-determination
will lead to improved firm performance. The conclusion rests on the ar-
gument that the stakeholders’, including the shareholders’, interests are
aligned.
How could this be manifested in the board? Employee directors could
have a dual informational role in bringing inside information to the board
Blair (1995, p. 16), but also in relating board information to the employ-
ees (Freeman and Lazear, 1995). Since employees are in the middle of the
day-to-day running of the company, they may bring valuable operational
knowledge to the board. The information may expand on or contrast with
information from the CEO. Thus, the information set available to the out-
side directors is enlarged. This comes close to viewing the employee di-
rector in the same role as the insider in the Raheja (2005) theory, although
in this model the insider is willing to furnish the outside directors with
information only if this furthers his own career interests. Secondly, the
role as messengers of board information to the employees at large could
be of particular value in the case of personnel reductions or plant closures,
when the board may want to instil an understanding for the need for dras-
tic measures among employees. The dual informational role of employee
directors should lead to better firm performance (Fauver and Fuerst, 2006).
Another possibility is that co-determination has no significance for
firm performance. This may come about through co-optation (Pfeffer,
1981, p. 166-173). In the board employee directors are exposed to fiduciary
duties and conformity pressures to accept the shareholder value logic.
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Also, by making the employee director co-responsible for decisions with
adverse outcomes for employees, the decisions carry higher legitimacy
among employees. If co-optation is the case, interests are again aligned,
but this time because employee directors have taken on the views of share-
holders. The effect upon firm performance should be non-significant.
The third possibility is that the co-determination impact upon firm per-
formance is negative. It may be hard to accept the premise that stake-
holder interests are aligned. If this were so, co-determination would be an
efficient economic organisational mode, and firms would adopt this mode
voluntarily (Jensen and Meckling, 1979 and Hansmann, 1996). But while
shareholders seek to maximize residual income, employees want to maxi-
mize pay and the protection of firm-specific human capital5, that is, a part
of the residual income. The inconsistency of these two objectives makes
the board decision process longer and more difficult (Mueller, 2003). The
firm’s objectives may become unfocussed, and the CEO may develop ca-
pabilities as a compromise maker rather than a shaper of the firm under a
clear objective (Tirole, 2001, 2002). The implied consensual decision model
in codetermination means that the firm pursues stability and predictabil-
ity instead of bold new moves (Siebert, 2005). If employee directors are
successful, they should influence the average wage positively. The unfo-
cussed decision structure should result in weaker firm performance. I call
this the interest conflict model for reference, and hypotheses stemming
from the model are set forth in the next section.
When objectives diverge, shareholders and employees may game aga-
inst each other so as to further their own interests. Employees may furnish
information strategically to further their own interests (Pistor, 1999 and
Hopt, 1998), and they may use moral arguments in parallel. Information
strategising could take the form of economising on the supply of internal
information to the board. For instance, employee directors may not in-
form of low productivity units in the organisation. Another form could
be information leakage from the board6. Employee directors will hardly
inform their fellow workers only on matters that owners and manage-
ment find in their interests to inform about. Stakeholder theorists seem to
assume only the beneficial information dissemination through employee
5In a recent booklet, the long-time employee director Svein Stugu (2006) says that the
main objective is to prevent plant closures. Mergers, takeovers, and outsourcing must also
be prevented.
6Stugu (2006, p. 63) says that opposition to plant closures was organized in co-
operation with representatives of the local community, but that this could only be done
effectively if labour representatives had access to internal information.
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directors. Furthermore, moral arguments against for instance plant clo-
sures or high management pay may be put forward, too. The shareholder
elected directors may have trouble withstanding such arguments, since
they may experience large personal costs and small personal gains from
making decisions that affect employees adversely (Baker et al., 1988). Tak-
ing the issue to the public attention could make the decision even harder
for the shareholder elected directors. Thus, even though the employees
are in a minority position in the board, they may influence board deci-
sions to their advantage. Their access to board information seems to be
vital in this respect.
But the presence of employee directors may have indirect effects upon
the use of other governance mechanisms as well. Shareholders may ad-
just governance mechanisms in order to neutralize the co-determination
impact. This is analogous to the situation Buchanan and Tullock (1962)
point out, that when an exogenous regulation is imposed upon a (politi-
cal) committee, it will try to compensate for the regulatory effect by plac-
ing a heavier weight on the unregulated. These previously unexplored
indirect effects make a simultaneous equations approach necessary. In the
remainder of this section governance mechanisms and hypotheses about
interactions are explained.
3.3.2 Simultaneity and endogeneity
In a simultaneous equations system some variables are endogenous, oth-
ers exogenous. In the present setup, the exogenous variables are the frac-
tion of employee directors, the lagged firm performance, the firm size, and
firm risk. Since employee directors are imposed from outside the firm,
they must constitute an exogenous variable. These variables determine
firm performance and average wage, but also the intervening governance
variables, the board characteristics and leverage. Thus, the intervening
governance variables and the average wage are at least partly determined
by the employee directors and lagged firm performance. The simultane-
ous setup gives the researcher the opportunity to recognise the governance
variables’ endogeneity, but at the same time also to measure the magni-
tude of the effect relative to their direct effects upon firm performance.
Specifically, the co-determination hypothesis says that the mechanism of
employee directors has a negative relationship to firm performance, but
a positive to average wage, the board characteristics, and leverage. The
reverse causation hypothesis says that lagged firm performance is associated
with governance variables and average wage, but that signs are uncertain.
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The remainder of this section concerns explanations of variables and their
relationships.
In this paper, shareholders may adjust the board characteristics and
the leverage. In order to achieve a reliable measure, and in the interest
of economy, I build an index by including board characteristics that have
proven to be important in board studies. The index is7:
Board index=Directors’ holdings+Board network−Board size−Gender (3.1)
The board index construction follows the Bertrand and Mullainathan
(2001) procedure, as each index variable in (3.1) is standardized to have av-
erage zero and standard deviation 1 before summation. The sum is then
standardised. This gives a continuous variable, in contrast to the Gompers
et al. (2003) type of index. Their governance index is based upon a sub-
jective allocation of categorical points for reasons that restrict shareholder
rights, and then summed over all characteristics. Since all variables in (3.1)
are continuous, the resulting index is continuous as well, and this is an ad-
vantage in estimations. Another advantage is that the index is likely to be
more stable in sub-samples than the individual variables. The interpreta-
tion is that the higher the board index, the better is the board structure. It
should be positive towards firm performance and negative towards aver-
age wage. If it is complementary to leverage, a positive sign will appear.
The choice of variables in the index reflects important board charac-
teristics that are decision variables for shareholders. Directors’ ownership
represents the need for the board to be aligned with shareholders, the net-
work variable the need for the board to be informed, the board size and
gender diversity the need for the board to be decisive. The signs in (3.1)
are common findings in the literature. The ownership literature (Morck
et al., 1988 and McConnell and Servaes, 1990) confirms the positive sign on
directors’ ownership share, and so does studies taking other board charac-
teristics into account, e.g. Bøhren and Strøm (2007)8. The network variable
is little used in studies of boards, but Bøhren and Strøm (2007) find a posi-
7The variables are defined as follows. Directors’ holdings is defined as the fraction
of equity owned by the board of directors; Board network is the information centrality,
constructed from network theory (Wasserman and Faust, 1994), see footnote 9; Board size
is the number of shareholder elected directors; Gender is the proportion of shareholder
elected female directors.
8I keep only a linear specification in the board ownership relation, despite evidence in
Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) pointing towards a concave rela-
tionship. The Bøhren and Strøm (2007) study finds no significance in the squared term,
may be due to the inclusion of other board characteristics.
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tive sign9. It comprises direct and indirect connections to other listed non-
financial firms stemming from directors’ multiple board seats. A variety of
studies, e.g. (Yermack, 1996 and Eisenberg et al., 1998), document that per-
formance decreases with increasing board size. The relationship between
gender and firm performance may be more controversial, as Shrader et al.
(1997); Smith et al. (2006), and Bøhren and Strøm (2007) report a negative
relationship, whereas Carter et al. (2003) find the opposite. I perform ro-
bustness tests with other definitions, described in section 3.5, to test the
choice of index.
Next, I include leverage. A higher leverage will decrease the firm’s free
cash flow, and will, therefore, limit the potential for agency costs (Easter-
brook, 1984 and Jensen, 1986). Perotti and Spier (1993) model how the
lower free cash flow may be used as a bargaining tool against employees,
implying better firm performance and lower average wage. Both effects
should point to higher firm performance from higher leverage.
However, the complexity of leverage leads to an indeterminate predic-
tion. On the one hand, given the presence of employee directors, owners
may fear higher debt may bring even higher decision costs. If, as Easter-
brook (1984) supposes, higher leverage brings the lender into closer over-
sight of the firm, the firm may end up with three decision makers with
potentially divergent interests. Furthermore, if the leverage is also used to
signal investment prospects (Myers, 1977), a high leverage used to disci-
pline employees can be taken to signal weak investment opportunities in
9Network theory uses concepts such as nodes and lines. In our setting, a node is a
firm, and a line between two firms represents a joint director in the two firms. We define
geodesic gjk as the shortest path between two nodes j and k, and G as the total number
of nodes. The node i is designated as ni. Using Wasserman and Faust (1994, p. 192-197),
our information centrality measure is constructed in the following way: Form the G × G
matrix A with diagonal elements aii = (1+ sum of values for all lines incident to ni) and
off-diagonal elements aij, where
aij =
{
0 if nodes ni and nj are not adjacent
1− xij if nodes ni and nj are adjacent
xij is the value of the link from firm ni to firm nj, that is, 0 or 1. The inverse of A, which is
C = A−1, has elements
{
cij
}
, where we define T = ∑Gi=1 cii and R = ∑
G
j=1 cij. The informa-
tion centrality index for firm ni is:
Ci (ni) =
1
cii + (T − 2R)/G
The index measures the information content in the paths that originate and end at a specific
firm.
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the firm. Another aspect is that, as Tirole (2006, p. 51-53) points out, higher
leverage may cause costs related to illiquidity and bankruptcy. This com-
plexity of leverage means that the sign is uncertain. It could be the case
that shareholders in co-determined firms adjust the leverage in an effort
to neutralize employee directors to a greater extent than they do in share-
holder determined firms. In a simultaneous equations setup, Brick et al.
(2005) find a negative relationship.
Thus, I expect employee directors to be associated with better board
composition and higher leverage. If these are successful from the share-
holder point of view, a positive indirect effect may compensate for the
negative direct employee director effect upon firm performance. In the
stakeholder theory, the employee director should be a welcome addition
to the board, and thus carry a positive sign to firm performance, while the
indirect effects should not appear.
In addition to the endogeneity induced by employee directors, the re-
verse causation hypothesis says governance mechanisms may be at least
partly determined by past performance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998,
2003). The signs on the board index and the leverage may be difficult to
set out. In the Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) bargaining model the CEO
bargains over pay and monitoring intensity. Good past firm performance
gives the CEO a better bargaining position, which he would use to reduce
monitoring. This means that the association between past firm perfor-
mance and governance mechanisms should be negative. However, it may
well be that governance mechanisms are improved after a good perfor-
mance, for instance, since the firm learns good practices. Since sharehold-
ers may adjust either board composition or leverage, or both, leverage and
board composition may be either complements or substitutes (Agrawal
and Knoeber, 1996). Thus, the sign is ambiguous.
I study the direct and indirect effects of employee directors in a simul-
taneous setup. Since the lagged firm performance is included, the system
is dynamic. Taken together, and with constants suppressed, this results in
the system of equations
FP = p1
(+)
FPt−1 +w1
(−)
W + b1
(+)
BI + l1
(+)
DE + d1
(−)
ED + f1FS + r1FR
W = p2
(+)
FPt−1 + b2
(−)
BI + l2
(−)
DE + d2
(+)
ED + f2FS + r2FR
BI = p3
(+/−)
FPt−1 +w3
(−)
W + l3
(+/−)
DE + d3
(+)
ED + f3FS + r3FR
DE = p4
(+/−)
FPt−1 +w4
(−)
W + b4
(+/−)
BI + d4
(+)
ED + f4FS + r4FR + uit
(3.2)
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where FP is firm performance, and FPt−1 indicates one period lag; W
stands for the average wage, BI is the board index, DE is the leverage
(debt to equity), ED is employee director, FS is firm size, and FR is firm
risk. uit is the error term. The main hypotheses are summarized below the
coefficients. Thus, the co-determination hypothesis is set out in the ED
column.
3.4 Data and institutional background
The sample comprises all non-financial firms listed on the Oslo Stock Ex-
change (OSE) at year-end at least once during the period 1989 to 2002.10
Board data is collected from the handbook Kierulfs Håndbok for the first
years, and from the national electronic register at Brønnøysund from 1995.
The register provides information on name, date of birth, and director sta-
tus (chairman, vice-chairman, ordinary member, and employee director).
The CEO’s name and date of birth are recorded as well. The CEO or direc-
tor name gives gender information. Data on board and CEO ownership, as
well as outside ownership concentration is pulled from the public securi-
ties register, while share price and accounting data come from OSE’s data
provider (Oslo Børs Informasjon). The ownership structure data covers ev-
ery equity holding by every investor in each sample firm. By international
standards, the size and quality of the data are considerable.
The data for this paper spans the period from 1989 to 2002. During
this period, the law regulating the governance of the companies is from
1972, with amendments in 1987 (“Aksjeloven”), and a new law in 1997
(“Allmennaksjeloven”). The regulations for representation have been un-
changed since 1987. In this respect, there is no before-and-after situation,
as with the “Cadbury committee” report in the UK, in the sample period.
As a general rule, firms with more than 200 employees must have at
least two employee directors, or at least one third of the board11. In the
size brackets 31 to 200 employees, the firm must have labour board seats
if a majority of the employees vote in favour, first with one representative
10The OSE had an aggregate market capitalization of 68 bill. USD equivalents by year-
end 2002, ranking the OSE sixteenth among the twenty–two European stock exchanges
for which comparable data is available. During the sample period from 1989 to 2002, the
number of firms listed increased from 129 to 203, market capitalization grew by 8% per
annum, and market liquidity, measured as transaction value over market value, increased
from 52% in 1989 to 72% in 2002 (sources: www.ose.no and www.fibv.com).
11The main sources are Bråthen (1982); Aarbakke et al. (1999) and NOU 1985:1. In order
to maintain readability, specific references have been dropped in tables and text.
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in the 31 to 50 bracket, then two in the 51 to 200. The employee director
must be employed in the company. A number of important Norwegian
industries are exempted from these rules, that is, the employees have no
rights of representation in these industries. These include newspapers,
news agencies, shipping, oil and gas extraction and financial firms. The
characteristics of employee board representation mean that some firms
have employee directors, others do not, and also that co-determined firms
have different fractions of employee directors. Thus, an implication of the
regulations is that comparisons of two sets of differently governed, but
otherwise similar firms can be made, and that further analyses can be car-
ried out in sub-samples of, say, co-determined firms with more than 200
employees. This data property answers the Dow (2003, p. 87) objection
that the study of co-determined firms lacks a proper control group. I de-
fine the employee director variable as the fraction of employee directors,
unlike most former studies that only use employee directors as a dummy
variable.
This institutional framework offers advantages over the German and
Canadian studies referred to in section 3.2, since the Norwegian employee
directors represent an authentic stakeholder group. The German regula-
tions are such that one third of the employee representatives on German
boards need to be labour union officials (Siebert, 2005). Presumably, the
union officials are supposed to look after the interests of workers in gen-
eral, not only those in the firm. No such minimum is required in Norway,
and the employee directors need to be employed in the firm. The Cana-
dian co-determination comes about when workers are also shareholders in
the company. This might cause a conflict of interest, when the optimal pol-
icy from the shareholder point of view is detrimental to the optimal policy
for workers. In Norway, employee directors are elected in their capacity
as workers in the firm, not their shareholdings.
The initiative for employee representation came from a joint commit-
tee of the Labour Party and the major employee union (LO) in the early
’60s. However, concurrent to this initiative, LO and the employer associa-
tion (NAF) ran a “co-operative project” together with researchers to study
co-determination in selected companies. This was in the consensus and co-
operation spirit that arose from common war-time experience. The ques-
tion was not only about co-determination, but also about new production
methods. Later, the need for co-determination in order to improve pro-
ductivity was the guiding principle of the official document NOU 1985:1,
whose recommendations were unanimous, as opposed to the original 1971
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report. The insider information argument was behind the codification of
employee board representation in Norway. Thus, it seems as if the law-
makers were familiar with stakeholder theory. Bråthen (1982, p. 14) in-
terprets the law on co-determination to imply that profit maximisation is
no longer the single objective of the company. Employees’ interests now
become one of several objectives the firm has to consider. Thus, a har-
mony of interests model is behind the regulations on co-determination in
Norway.
Next, I report some descriptive statistics on employee directors. Table
3.1 shows the number of employee directors in firms according to employ-
ment size.
Table 3.1
The table shows the percentage of firm-year observations of employee
directors in various employment sizes. It turns out that in firms where em-
ployees may demand representation, few do so. In the 101-200 employees
category, 61.5 per cent do not have employee directors. Furthermore, in
the highest category, where representation is compulsory, if the industry
is not exempted, employees have no board seats in about one third of the
companies. Among the firms that do have employee directors, the law’s
minimum, two representatives, is found in the majority of cases. Very few
have four employee board seats. Thus, the Jensen and Meckling (1979)
conjecture that co-determination requires law backing seems to be sup-
ported in our Norwegian data.
Next, table 3.2 shows the distribution of employee directors according
to industry, and also the percentage of firms with no employees on the
board in each year.
Table 3.2
Exempted industries such as Energy and Transport (including ship-
ping) have no employee directors to a higher degree than average. The
low representation in Hotels, Restaurants and Entertainment is perhaps
due to high labour turnover. The two industries Health Care Equipment
and Supply as well as Software and Services also have a lower than aver-
age representation. These are industries where the human capital element
should be above average, and co-determination of extra value, according
to stakeholder theory. Yet obviously, employees do not demand board
seats to a great extent. The time trend is that firms with no employee
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directors increase in relative importance. Thus, nothing in the overall
descriptive statistics shows that co-determination is a preferred organisa-
tional mode. Firms seem to avoid it if they can, and keep it to a minimum
if they cannot.
Variable definitions are shown in table 3.3, which also shows the main
characteristics of variables in the analysis in the two main sub-samples of
co-determined and shareholder determined firms.
Table 3.3
The table shows that a large number of variables are distributed dif-
ferently in the two sub-samples. The firm performance variables Tobin’s
Q and stock return are not significantly different, while the ROA in co-
determined firms is significantly higher than in shareholder determined.
Apart from directors’ holdings, all other variables are significantly differ-
ent at the 5.0% level or better. Obviously, the two types of firms are differ-
ent.
The table shows that the fraction of employee directors is 0.301, or
slightly below the minimum requirement for the 200+ employee size group.
Similarly to findings in table 3.2, this is evidence that the firms attempt to
minimize the employee director importance.
The two firm groups differ in background variables, notably firm size.
The co-determined firms are larger on average. This warrants paying a
particular attention to the largest firm size groups in regressions, in order
to control for firm size biases.
3.5 Estimation and method
I estimate the relationships in (3.2) with simultaneous equations regres-
sions on the full samples as well as sub-samples. The equations spell
out behavioural relationships between variables. Since the equilibrium
model of governance is not known, reduced form estimation is not pos-
sible (Greene, 2003, section 15.2). The equations are behavioural, but not
structural in the sense of belonging to an equilibrium model.
The fixed effects methods (Woolridge, 2002) is common to all regres-
sions. Fixed effects estimation amounts to removing the individual het-
erogeneity of firms contained in the fixed effect ci12. Remember the error
12For every individual firm, an overall average is constructed. Then, from each company
observation the overall, individual average is subtracted.
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term in the system (3.2) is uit, which contains the fixed effect ci and a id-
iosyncratic effect vit, which varies over time and companies. i refers to
firm number i, and t is the time period. When demeaning the variables,
the fixed effect element disappears. So does the constant term.
I use the three-stage least squares (3SLS) methodology in estimations.
The 3SLS is an instrumental variables estimation method where the instru-
ments are the predicted values of the dependent variable in a regression
on all the explanatory variables in the system (Greene, 2003, p. 398). The
predicted values are found from GLS regressions, and iterations are taken
until convergence is achieved. Meaningful overall measures, such as R2 in
OLS regressions, are not available. Instead, I include a Wald test (Greene,
2003, p. 107) to study whether all coefficients in a given equation are zero.
The danger in simultaneous equation estimation lies in the model spec-
ification (Greene, 2003). If, for instance, a misspecification has occurred in
the first equation, the mistake may contaminate all other equations as well.
To investigate if this propagation of misspecification is a serious problem,
I perform several robustness tests, see below.
I perform estimations in the full sample and for sub-samples. First, the
model (3.2) is estimated on the full sample with Tobin’s Q as firm perfor-
mance, and then on sub-samples of co-determined and shareholder deter-
mined firms. The sub-sample tests will reveal whether results from the
overall sample really apply to co-determined firms alone, or if the em-
ployee director effect is merely due to difference in sampling. I further
partition the sample to include only firms with more than 200 employees,
when co-determination is compulsory. This will remove firm size effects.
In robustness tests, I perform an estimation with all index variables
included individually (the right hand side of (3.1)), as well as an estima-
tion of a wider definition of the board index13, this time including non-
significant effects in Bøhren and Strøm (2007) as well. Further robustness
tests include replacing Tobin’s Q with ROA and stock return as dependent
variable, and replacing leverage with the dividend payout rate. Also, I re-
move the lagged firm performance in order to investigate whether param-
13In addition to the variables in (3.1), I include Outside owner concentration, Indepen-
dence, CEO director, Exported and imported directors, and board age dispersion. Outside
owner concentration is the sum of squared equity fractions across all the firm’s outside
owners; Independence is the board tenure of the non-employee directors minus the tenure
of the CEO; CEO director equals 1 if the CEO is a member of his company’s board and
zero otherwise; Exported CEO is the number of outside directorships held by the firm’s
CEO; Imported CEO is the proportion of CEOs from other companies on the board; Board
age dispersion is the standard deviation of board age.
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eter estimates remain stable. The last robustness test is a test of the Fauver
and Fuerst (2006) information hypothesis, which I interpret to mean that
in information intensive industries firm performance is improved with co-
determination. This regression should show if their positive employee di-
rector result is also the case in Norway.
The explanatory variables are assumed to be simultaneous with firm
performance. Since board members are predominantly elected in the late
spring, the new board should also have had some time to make a notice-
able impact upon firm performance, measured at year-end. This assump-
tion is reasonable given some market efficiency.
3.6 Econometric evidence
Do employee directors improve firm performance, and are governance
mechanisms at least partly endogenously determined?
This section reports simultaneous regression results of the model (3.2).
I estimate for the whole sample and then turn to sub-samples of co-deter-
mined and shareholder determined companies, and for firms with more
than 200 employees. All regressions are done with standardized values.
This means that comparisons of economic importance can be read off from
coefficient values.
I start with estimations of the model (3.2) for the entire sample. Table
3.4 shows the estimation results.
Table 3.4
The Wald tests show that no equation supports the null hypothesis that
all coefficients are zero. Comparing the two sections of the table, signs and
coefficient values are very much the same. Thus, I restrict comments to the
case of systematic risk in the upper section.
The co-determination hypothesis says that the employee director vari-
able is negative to firm performance, and positive to the board index and
leverage. Table 3.4 confirms this except for the leverage, where only the
sign is as predicted. Furthermore, the co-determination hypothesis im-
plies a positive impact on average wage. Here too, only the sign is con-
firmed. This weaker result may be due to pay being determined by ex-
ternal market conditions. Thus, the direct and indirect effects of co-deter-
mination are partly confirmed. Consequently, employee directors carry a
negative association with firm performance, and shareholders tend to take
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compensatory actions to alleviate the influence of employee directors. The
board index is at least partly endogenously determined.
Are the board index and the leverage positively related to firm per-
formance and negatively to average wage? For the board index, this is
confirmed for firm performance, but only the sign is as expected for aver-
age wage. Thus, a better composed board will improve firm performance.
On the other hand, leverage is against the free cash flow hypothesis ex-
pectations in both firm performance and average wage. A higher leverage
indicates a lower firm performance and higher average wage. In conclu-
sion, the governance hypothesis is not fully confirmed.
The negative association between leverage and firm performance con-
firms findings in empirical studies ( Barclay et al., 1995; Rajan and Zin-
gales, 1995; and Brick et al., 2005). I offer two alternative explanations to
the free cash flow hypothesis; the fear of higher decision costs in a situ-
ation with three decision makers, that is, shareholders, employees, and
banks; and the negative signalling effect of a high leverage (Myers, 1977).
Also note the complementarity between the board index and leverage
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). The sign is negative and significant. Thus,
the two governance mechanisms are substitutes rather than complements.
The Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) reverse causation hypothesis is only
partly confirmed, as the board index is positive and leverage is negative.
Lower leverage should bring lower monitoring intensity. The results are
significant, indicating that good performance leads to a better board in-
dex, and to an easier debt burden. In all, endogeneity is confirmed, as
both the board index and the leverage are at least partly determined from
the presence of employee directors and from past performance.
Are shareholders able to neutralize the employee director by adjust-
ments in the board index and the leverage, taking the employee director
relationship to average wage into consideration as well? Since the vari-
ables are standardised to have average zero and standard deviation 1.0
in regressions, coefficients can be compared. They show that the direct
effect is stronger than the indirect to the board index. For the negative di-
rect employee director effect is now 0.119, while the indirect effect upon
the board index is positive and 0.314. Since the board index is now 0.122
to firm performance, the positive, indirect impact of employee directors
through the board index is only 0.038 (= 0.122 × 0.314), or 31.1% of the
direct board index effect. The shareholders are able to compensate 31.9%
of the negative direct effect of employee directors through adjustments
to board characteristics. Furthermore, the employee director also impacts
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positively upon average wage, which is negatively related to firm perfor-
mance. Even though the average wage is not significant in the overall sam-
ple, it is for co-determined firms, as I shortly report. The same applies to
leverage. Likewise, the economic significance of the indirect effects from
the lagged firm performance is very low, being 0.01 for both the board
index and the leverage.
Thus, the economic magnitude of the indirect effects from employee
directors or past firm performance upon firm performance is small com-
pared to the direct effect of the board index and the leverage. Endogeneity
matters, but not very much.
The volatility measure in the lower section of table 3.4 gives two inter-
esting relationships in the board index and the leverage equations. It turns
out that only leverage has the expected positive and significant sign. The
Raheja (2005) theory of board composition implies that the board index is
positively related to firm risk. For volatility the opposite sign obtains.
Next, the model is studied in sub-samples. If regulation plays a role,
a less than optimal board composition is likely to follow. Therefore, we
should observe stronger and more significant coefficients in the co-deter-
mined firms than in the shareholder determined. Table 3.5 is a report on
the two sub-samples of firms.
Table 3.5
Note that the Wald test shows rejection of the null hypothesis that all
variables have zero significance. Furthermore, a Chow dummy variable
test rejects the hypothesis that the coefficients of the sub-samples are equal
to the those in the overall sample. Thus, there is a difference between co-
determined and shareholder determined firms.
In the co-determination sub-sample the employee director effects are
even more pronounced than in the overall sample. The negative employee
director impact upon firm performance is about 45% higher than in the
overall sample and the indirect effect on the board index increases even
more. Now, the employee director variable is significant in relation to
leverage and to average wage. Thus, the co-determination hypothesis is
even more strongly confirmed in the sub-sample of only co-determined
firms than in the overall sample.
The board index and the free cash flow hypotheses come out more in
line with expectations in the co-determined firms too. Now a significant
result for the board index towards average wage appears. Leverage turns
out to be negative and significant towards average wage, while positive in
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the overall sample. In shareholder determined firms, significant results are
fewer and of different sign. Leverage is positively correlated with average
wage, in contrast to the co-determined firms.
In both sub-samples the board index and leverage are negatively re-
lated. Thus, the substitution result from the overall sample is confirmed
in sub-samples. We also see that the past firm performance endogeneity
hypothesis gains less support in the sub-samples than in the overall. In
fact, only the negative leverage result in the co-determined sub-sample is
significant.
Another difference exists for firm size. Firm size is negative and signif-
icant in the firm performance equation in shareholder determined firms,
while positive in co-determined. Also, in the leverage equation the signs
are reversed, and significant in shareholder determined firms only. The
latter confirms “stylized facts” about the positive relationship between
firm size and leverage (Harris and Raviv, 1991).
An interpretation of the difference in sub-samples is that in shareholder
determined firms the board composition is closer to the optimal, and there-
fore, exogenous characteristics such as firm size play a larger role. The
large differences between samples confirm the Buchanan and Tullock (1962)
theory.
Are the results arrived at so far driven by a firm size effect? Table 3.6
shows regressions for all firms with more than 200 employees in the upper
part, while the lower part is limited to the largest co-determined firms.
Table 3.6
The 200+ employee sample shows results very similar to those in the
entire sample in table 3.4 in the upper part, and for the co-determined in
table 3.5 in the lower. Thus, the former results are not due to some firm size
effect. In fact, even among firms where co-determination is compulsory,
the main co-determination hypothesis is confirmed.
Looking back, the co-determination and governance hypotheses are
confirmed. Tests in sub-samples do not overturn these conclusions, on the
contrary, they add to their strength. For instance, while the employee di-
rector is negative for leverage in the overall sample, it is positive in the
co-determined sub-sample, as the hypothesis predicts. Thus, having rep-
resentatives of one stakeholder group, the employees, in addition to share-
holders on the board does not improve firm performance, as a stakeholder
(Freeman and Reed, 1983; Blair, 1995) or a new economy position (Zin-
gales, 2000; Becht et al., 2003) implies. Instead, the results point to conflict
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of interests among the stakeholders. Furthermore, evidence of substitu-
tion between the board index and leverage is present in all regressions.
I also find evidence of endogeneity (or reverse causation) from past firm
performance, but with opposite signs to those predicted in Hermalin and
Weisbach (1998). However, the indirect effects of employee directors and
past firm performance upon firm performance through the board index
and leverage are small compared to the direct effects from the board index
and leverage. Endogeneity counts, but has low economic significance.
The negative relation between employee directors and firm perfor-
mance is in agreement with FitzRoy and Kraft (1993); Schmid and Seger
(1998); Gorton and Schmid (2000); Falaye et al. (2006) and Bøhren and
Strøm (2007), but at odds with Fauver and Fuerst (2006). None of these
studies contain simultaneous equations models, and only the Bøhren and
Strøm (2007) paper investigates the endogeneity of board mechanisms. I
will return to the Fauver and Fuerst (2006) and Bøhren and Strøm (2007)
articles in the following robustness section.
3.7 Robustness checks
I perform robustness checks on the definitions of the board index, firm
performance, and leverage. In addition, I check for the absence of serial
dependence of the firm performance, that is, whether lagged firm perfor-
mance is zero. Finally, I check the Fauver and Fuerst (2006) results in two
sub-samples of information industries and other industries. With simulta-
neous equations, changes in one place are likely to propagate throughout
the system. Thus, different coefficient values and significance from the
original formulation are quite likely to appear. Fortunately, the results
largely confirm those in section 3.6.
Do the co-determination results survive when the individual board
mechanisms are used in place of the board index? Table 3.7 shows simul-
taneous regressions results when all four board characteristics making up
the board index enter the regressions individually.
Table 3.7
Former results for co-determination largely apply. The employee di-
rector variable is negative to Tobin’s Q, and positive to average wage and
leverage. For the board characteristics, only the relation to board size is
significant. On the other hand, the hypotheses on governance variables
are upheld for all board characteristics but the gender variable. It turns
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out to be non-significant in the Tobin’s Q relation. The other variables
are as expected, and their coefficients are close to those Bøhren and Strøm
(2007) find in partial GMM estimations. They also discuss endogeneity.
Even though the estimations are not directly comparable, none of the sig-
nificant results in table 3.7 conflict with the endogeneity results in Bøhren
and Strøm (2007). The second endogeneity effect from lagged firm perfor-
mance is significant in the leverage, but not in any of the board variables.
However, the signs on the individual board variables conform to the pos-
itive sign of the board index in earlier tables.
Besides these main points, table 3.7 contains many new details, which
it is beyond this paper to explore. For instance, the substitution effect
between the board index and leverage in former tables now turns out to
concern network, while leverage is a complement to board size and gen-
der. Thus, overall the results are well in line with former findings, except
for the lagged firm performance relationship to governance variables.
In the next table 3.8 I have modified the board index to include all
board variables used in Bøhren and Strøm (2007) as specified in footnote
13 to check if the board index is sensitive to the selection of board charac-
teristics.
Table 3.8
The overall Wald tests are strong and the significance of the coefficients
are almost similar to what earlier full sample results in table 3.4 show. We
note that the impact of the employee director variable is less in the new
board index, and is now significant in its positive relationship to average
wage. Thus, the co-determination hypothesis is supported with this new
board index, although with lower coefficient values. The endogeneity ef-
fect of a lagged firm performance loses significance in the board index
relation. The same happens when individual board characteristics replace
the board index, and also disappear in the shareholder determined sub-
sample. Thus, a preliminary conclusion is that the reverse causation in the
board index relation seems to be sensitive to the specification of the index
and in sub-samples.
The conclusion from the discussion of the two last tables is that the
results are upheld, in particular, the co-determination hypothesis is con-
firmed.
Now I turn to variations on firm performance, using the stock return
and ROA instead of Tobin’s Q. The stock return and ROA may be seen as
two extremes in performance measurement, the one only market based,
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the other only accounting based. Bhagat and Jefferis (2002) argue in favour
of accounting measures, noting that market measures may contain an an-
ticipation bias, since accounting numbers may be manipulated during a
given year. Since our data span fourteen years, this accounting manipula-
tion should be a minor concern. These two measures of firm performance
should together provide an adequate framework for robustness tests.
The results for the full sample are given in table 3.9. Since the results
in sub-samples largely parallel those found for the full sample, the sub-
sample results are not reported.
Table 3.9
The results in table 3.9 largely replicate those already found for To-
bin’s Q in table 3.4. The co-determination and the governance hypotheses
show the same confirmations. As before, leverage is negative in the firm
performance equation. Again, the board index and leverage are substi-
tutes. Endogeneity (or reverse causation) is evident in both firm perfor-
mance specifications, although at different variables. For the stock return
the lagged stock return is significant in firm performance and leverage,
as before. One would expect this to happen with accounting numbers
due to earnings management or conservative accounting practices (Watts,
2003), which would induce serial correlation. However, lagged perfor-
mance is significant for only the board index for the accounting measure
ROA. Overall, table 3.9 supports earlier findings.
The upshot is that alternative performance measures do not upset con-
clusions reached with Tobin’s Q. Therefore, further robustness tests may
well proceed with Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable.
Next, table 3.10 shows results when the dividend payout rate replaces
the leverage, and Tobin’s Q is the firm performance in the upper part,
while in the lower part the lagged firm performance is removed. Divi-
dend payout rate is gauged as the annual dividend as a fraction of the
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and accruals (EBITDA). Dur-
ing the period of study, share buybacks were illegal in Norway.
Table 3.10
The striking results are first that the dividend payout rate is nowhere
significant as an independent variable, and second, as a dependent vari-
able no variable in the system is related in a significant way. In fact the
Wald test cannot reject the hypothesis that all coefficients in the dividend
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payout rate equation are zero. An exclusion test (not reported) for the div-
idend payout rate cannot confirm that the variable coefficient is different
from zero. Thus, the dividend payout rate is an inferior substitute for the
leverage. Second, the results for the other variables are not affected, even
though changes in one part of a simultaneous system may bring about
new values in other parts. Therefore, the results in table 3.10 increase the
confidence in the original model.
The lower part of table 3.10 shows results when the lagged firm per-
formance is left out. The reason for the removal is that lagged firm perfor-
mance induces bias (Hsiao, 2003, p. 71-2), since the errors are no longer
independent of the regressors. The smaller the bias, the larger is the num-
ber of periods in the panel and the closer to zero is the auto-correlation
coefficient on lagged firm performance. Furthermore, if the explanatory
variables apart from the lagged firm performance have very persistent el-
ements, the bias will not disappear. This persistence can be a concern in
governance studies. For instance, the firm’s board size is likely to be fairly
stable. To test for the seriousness of this bias, I include static system re-
gressions, that is, with no lagged performance.
Comparing the results from the no lagged firm performance regres-
sion to the original estimates in table 3.4 we see that practically all signs
are maintained, and also that coefficient values are quite similar. The co-
determination hypothesis is confirmed. For average wage on firm perfor-
mance, the variable is significant in the static specification but not in the
dynamic. But overall the results from the dynamic estimations are upheld.
Apparently, the low auto-correlation coefficient, the rather long time pe-
riod and small persistence in the explanatory variables warrants the use
of the dynamic specification in table 3.4.
I also run a regression (not reported) with all explanatory variables
lagged one period for the entire sample. This regression shows far fewer
significant results, and although the signs are the same as before, this spec-
ification is far inferior to the main regression in table 3.4. Again, this points
to a contemporaneity in governance mechanisms.
Finally, I run a test for the Fauver and Fuerst (2006) information hy-
pothesis in sub-samples. The authors assume information significance
to trade, transportation, and manufacturing industries. Using the same
GICS industry classification as in table 3.3, I allocate Capital goods, Trans-
port, Consumer articles, Retailing, Food and staples retailing, Health care
equipment and supplies, and Telecommunications to the information in-
tensive industries, while the rest is in other industries. Co-determined
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firms are distributed in the two sub-samples almost as in the total popula-
tion, with 61.1 per cent without employee directors in the Other industries
category against 57.4 in the full sample. A test for the Fauver and Fuerst
(2006) information hypothesis is that the employee director variable is pos-
itive in the information intensive industries. Table 3.11 shows results.
Table 3.11
The main interest is in the employee director, that is, the co-determination
hypothesis. Both sub-samples show a negative and significant coefficient
on the employee director variable. The Chow test shows that the two sub-
samples are different, but the main Fauver and Fuerst (2006) hypothesis is
not supported.
Overall, the results for the robustness test do not invalidate the results
found in table 3.4.
3.8 Conclusion
In this paper I pose the question whether board representation of one
group of non-owner, the employees, improves firm performance. I con-
clude it does not. The conclusion runs counter to claims from stakeholder
theorists (Freeman and Reed, 1983; Blair, 1995) and some financial econ-
omists (Zingales, 2000 and Becht et al., 2003) that co-determination im-
proves firm performance. Instead the results support most former find-
ings in the empirical literature FitzRoy and Kraft (1993); Schmid and Seger
(1998); Gorton and Schmid (2000); Falaye et al. (2006) and Bøhren and
Strøm (2007) that employee board representation reduces firm performance.
The Norwegian regulations on co-determination provide the institu-
tional framework. Co-determination is required by law for firms with
more than 200 employees, and is an option if an employee majority de-
mands so in firms having between 30 and 200 employees. A number of
industries are exempted, and in all industries employees exercise their
option. Thus, testing can take place using sub-samples, for instance in
co-determined and shareholder determined sub-samples. For the whole
sample, nearly 60 per cent do not have employee directors. The percent-
age has been rising during our period from 1989 to 2002. For firms with
more than 200 employees, two thirds have employee directors. The resul-
tant data set is of a panel nature.
I estimate a system of simultaneous equations where employee direc-
tors, firm size (sales), firm systematic risk, and one period lagged Tobin’s
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Q are the exogenous variables, and Tobin’s Q, average wage, board index,
and the leverage are endogenous. The board index is constructed from im-
portant board characteristics, that is, directors’ holdings, the board’s net-
work, board size and the female fraction. The free cash flow hypothesis
(Easterbrook, 1984 and Jensen, 1986) warrants the use of the leverage.
The setup allows the testing of direct and indirect employee director
effects upon firm performance. The indirect effects constitute a test of en-
dogeneity (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). The lagged firm performance
gives a test of the reverse causation hypothesis (Hermalin and Weisbach,
1998) that past firm performance determines current governance. Further-
more, it allows testing of complementarity between the two governance
variables board index and leverage (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996).
Regressions are performed on the whole sample, the sub-samples of
co-determined and shareholder determined firms, and then for the sub-
samples of firms with more than 200 employees. I use a fixed effects model
implemented in a three-stage least squares (3SLS) estimation.
In all regressions, the estimated coefficients for employee directors is
significantly negative. Moreover, the economic importance becomes larger
as regressions proceed from the overall sample to the sub-sample of co-
determined firms, and then to co-determined firms with 200 employees or
more. The result is at odds with Fauver and Fuerst (2006), who find a pos-
itive relationship when a dummy employee director variable is interacted
with information intensive industries. In sub-samples of information in-
tensive and other industries I confirm the negative employee director cor-
relation to Tobin’s Q. Overall, the results support agency theory and reject
stakeholder theory.
The indirect effects are also present. Employee directors are positively
associated with average wage, the board index, and, in co-determined
samples, with leverage. For the board index, this means that shareholders
improve board composition so as to neutralize the negative employee di-
rector effect, as Buchanan and Tullock (1962) predict. However, this neu-
tralising effect falls far short of the negative direct employee director ef-
fect. The lagged firm performance is significantly positively related to the
board index and negatively to leverage. This result runs counter to the
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) reverse causation theory that earlier firm
performance determines board composition. Thus, the results show en-
dogeneity effects, but the economic significance falls far below the impor-
tance of the direct effect. The negative direct effect of employee directors
is only partially compensated for by a better board. Endogeneity matters,
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but not very much.
Furthermore, leverage turns out to be negatively related to firm per-
formance, contrary to the free cash flow hypothesis (Easterbrook, 1984 and
Jensen, 1986). The negative association to firm performance confirms find-
ings in empirical studies (Barclay et al., 1995; Rajan and Zingales, 1995;
and Brick et al., 2005).
Jensen and Meckling (1979) argue that co-determination can only sur-
vive if supported by law. The long-term data set employed here supports
this view. Evidently, owners have good economic reasons for not choos-
ing the co-determination form of organisation if they can. This also im-
plies that there are costs to maintaining co-determination required by law.
First, I document the negative impact of employee representation upon
firm performance. Second, shareholders try to work around the regula-
tions by strengthening aspects of board characteristics that are left unreg-
ulated. Thus, co-determination, supported by law, has costs. Therefore,
these results are relevant for the emerging literature on board regulation
(Hermalin, 2005).
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3.9 Tables
Table 3.1 The percentage of firms with zero or more employee directors by em-
ployment size
Employee directors
Employees 0 1 2 3 4 N
0-30 98.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0 190
31-50 95.8 2.1 2.1 0.0 0.0 48
51-100 73.5 5.3 18.6 2.7 0.0 113
101-200 61.5 4.5 24.4 9.6 0.0 156
200+ 33.5 8.1 30.0 27.1 1.3 1006
Total 49.5 6.3 24.0 19.3 0.9
N 749 96 363 292 13 1513
The table shows the percentage of firms having employee directors according to employment
categories. N is the number of firms in the employee directors or the number of employees
category. The number of employees category reflects the regulations on co-determination
(Aarbakke et al., 1999). With more than 200 employees co-determination is compulsory. In the
31 to 200 bracket co-determination is realised if an employee majority demands it, with a larger
proportion of representation with a larger workforce. In all categories, including the above 200
employees, firms in some industries are exempted from the rules.
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Table 3.2 The percentage of firms with zero or more employee directors by in-
dustry and the percentage with zero by year. The Global Industry Classification
Standard (GICS) is used
Employee directors % of % No
Industry 0 1 2 3 4 total N Year Empdir N
Energy 77.7 1.1 8.2 12.7 0.3 16.0 354 1989 50.5 95
Materials 17.8 8.5 39.5 34.1 0.0 5.8 129 1990 49.5 99
Capital goods 34.5 2.8 35.3 27.0 0.4 11.4 252 1991 48.4 93
Commercial services 49.4 8.9 25.3 16.5 0.0 3.6 79 1992 45.3 95
Transport 77.1 5.8 5.6 11.6 0.0 18.8 414 1993 48.4 91
Autos and components 0.0 4.3 69.6 26.1 0.0 1.0 23 1994 52.4 103
Consumer articles, clothes 24.0 18.0 48.0 10.0 0.0 2.3 50 1995 61.3 186
Hotels, Rest., Entertainm. 90.9 0.0 9.1 0.0 0.0 2.5 55 1996 60.9 192
Media 24.3 8.1 35.1 21.6 10.8 3.4 74 1997 62.8 215
Retailing 46.2 6.2 24.6 23.1 0.0 2.9 65 1998 59.0 217
Food & Staples Retailing 50.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 8 1999 57.3 213
Beverages 36.4 0.0 36.4 27.3 0.0 3.5 77 2000 58.4 209
Health Care Equip./Supp. 75.0 0.0 5.0 20.0 0.0 0.9 20 2001 60.9 202
Pharmaceuticals Biotech. 55.2 3.4 24.1 13.8 3.4 1.3 29 2002 61.8 199
Real Estate 88.5 3.1 8.5 0.0 0.0 5.9 130
Software & supplies 71.4 5.8 15.3 6.9 0.5 8.6 189
Hardware & equipment 40.2 14.5 23.2 20.7 1.2 10.9 241
Telecom. 15.8 5.3 31.6 47.4 0.0 0.9 19
Total % 57.4 5.7 20.0 16.3 0.7 100.0 2208 57.4 2209
The table shows the distribution of employee directors across industries. Some or whole parts
of the industry may be exempted, for instance the Energy (hydro power and petroleum) sector.
Transport contains the important shipping segment. Media is exempted as well, but in some
firms co-determination comes about through union negotiations.
“Empdir” is short-hand for employee directors.
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Table 3.3 The main statistical properties of various board measures
Shareholder determined Co-determined F
Mean Median Std N Mean Median Std N sign.
Tobin’s Q 1.461 1.105 1.156 867 1.501 1.162 1.064 773 0.459
Stock return 16.109 -1.700 121.515 774 17.666 2.520 78.204 724 0.770
ROA 3.272 6.220 18.840 838 6.531 8.210 13.883 771 0.000
Average wage 558.442 340.878 1516.360 677 355.909 316.306 222.129 762 0.000
Directors’ holdings 0.065 0.000 0.189 966 0.063 0.000 0.187 825 0.828
Network 0.180 0.198 0.115 1264 0.191 0.208 0.075 942 0.015
Size1 4.834 5.000 1.330 1267 5.341 5.000 1.271 942 0.000
Gender1 0.024 0.000 0.078 1267 0.045 0.000 0.101 942 0.000
Board index 0.192 0.233 1.877 965 -0.271 -0.078 1.956 825 0.000
Leverage 2.387 1.165 5.955 857 1.903 1.044 3.216 761 0.046
Div. payout rate 0.197 0.000 0.747 960 0.261 0.085 0.564 822 0.042
Empdir 0.000 0.000 0.000 1267 2.282 2.000 0.707 942 0.000
Empdirfrac 0.000 0.000 0.000 1267 0.301 0.300 0.082 942 0.000
Firm size 5.427 5.462 0.788 905 6.071 6.021 0.725 801 0.000
Systematic risk 0.828 0.724 0.749 888 0.707 0.690 0.535 794 0.000
Volatility 0.918 0.646 1.200 885 0.738 0.584 0.597 788 0.000
Tobin’s Q is market value divided by book value of assets; Stock return is the raw stock return
corrected for dividend and stock split; ROA is accounting profits on book value of assets;
Average wage is the logarithm of total wages divided by the number of employees; Directors’
holdings is the percentage of directors’ ownership; Network is a summary measure of the board’s
direct and indirect relations to other firms through multiple directorships, (see footnote 9);
Size1 is the board size of shareholder elected directors; Gender1 is the fraction of women of the
shareholder elected directors; Board index is a summary measure of the above board variables;
Leverage is the book value of debt on book value of equity; Dividend payout rate is dividends
on net income; Empdir is the number of employee directors divided by the number of directors;
Empdirfrac is the fraction of employee directors in the total board; Firm size is the natural
logarithm of accounting income; Systematic Risk is the company’s exposure to market changes
(equity beta); Volatility is the firm’s total risk measured as its yearly standard deviation.
The “F sign.” shows the significance of the test of the null hypothesis that the two group means
are equal, estimated from an analysis of variance (ANOVA). Low values indicate rejection of
the null hypothesis. The F value is found by dividing the Between Groups Mean Square by the
Error Mean Square (Johnson and Wichern, 1988, p. 235).
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Table 3.4 Is co-determination associated with negative firm performance and posi-
tive governance mechanisms? Full sample (N = 1135) estimations using systematic
and firm specific risk.
Dependent variable
Independent Tobin’s Average Board
variable Q wage index Leverage
Tobin’s Q lagged 0.106∗∗ 0.028 0.065∗ -0.094∗∗
Average wage -0.035 -0.038 0.204∗∗
Board index 0.122∗∗ -0.030 -0.191∗∗
Leverage -0.041∗∗ 0.145∗∗ -0.171∗∗
Employee directors -0.119∗∗ 0.072 0.314∗∗ 0.044
Firm size -0.141∗∗ -0.027 -0.060 0.129∗∗
Systematic risk 0.004 0.030 0.010 -0.035
Wald χ2 test 79.516 39.396 82.612 87.617
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Tobin’s Q lagged 0.105∗∗ 0.032 0.062∗ -0.082∗∗
Average wage -0.031 -0.036 0.181∗∗
Board index 0.119∗∗ -0.029 -0.182∗∗
Leverage -0.034 0.131∗∗ -0.167∗∗
Employee directors -0.123∗∗ 0.066 0.311∗∗ 0.042
Firm size -0.136∗∗ -0.019 -0.066 0.145∗∗
Volatility -0.045∗∗ 0.028 -0.003 0.116∗∗
Wald χ2 test 85.137 36.095 79.369 103.055
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
The table reports the simultaneous equation estimation of the system of equations in (3.2) with
systematic risk (upper part) and firm specific risk (lower part).
The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q, which we measure as the market value of the firm over its
book value. Variables are defined in table 3.3. Each variable is time demeaned in the
regressions. For each firm and each variable, I time demean by subtracting a given year’s
observation from the firm’s overall mean. The table shows the estimates based on the
standardized variables, which we construct by deducting each observation from its mean value
and dividing by its standard deviation.
Fixed effects estimation in 3SLS framework with standardized variables. All non-financial firms
on Oslo Stock Exchange 1989 to 2002.
The Wald test (Greene, 2003, p. 107) is here a test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients
in the given equation are all zero. A low value indicates null hypothesis rejection. If R is the
q× K matrix of q restrictions and K coefficients, γˆ the K vector of coefficients, and r the vector
of the q restrictions, the Wald χ2(q) statistic is χ2(q) = (r− Rγˆ)′ [RΣX R′]−1 (r− Rγˆ), where ΣX
is the estimated covariance matrix of coefficients. The test results show that a hypothesis that
all coefficients are zero must be rejected in all relations at the 1% level.
Significant results at the 5% (10%) level are marked with ∗∗ (∗).
3.9. TABLES 97
Table 3.5 Is firm performance (Tobin’s Q) differently related to governance mech-
anisms in co-determined (upper part) and in shareholder determined (lower part)
firms?
Dependent variable
Independent Tobin’s Average Board
variable Q wage index Leverage
Co-determined firms N = 639
Tobin’s Q lagged 0.303∗∗ 0.011 0.059 -0.069∗
Average wage -0.089 -0.520∗∗ -0.156∗∗
Board index 0.118∗∗ -0.175∗∗ -0.274∗∗
Leverage -0.103∗∗ -0.080∗∗ -0.414∗∗
Employee directors -0.173∗∗ 0.186∗∗ 0.484∗∗ 0.140∗∗
Firm size 0.077 -0.001 -0.210∗∗ -0.083
Systematic risk 0.034 -0.010 0.027 -0.035
Wald χ2 test 112.123 83.056 212.330 89.279
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Shareholder determined firms N = 496
Tobin’s Q lagged -0.072∗∗ 0.030 0.041 -0.101
Average wage -0.023 0.032 0.272∗∗
Board index 0.121∗∗ 0.035 -0.158∗∗
Leverage -0.018 0.208∗∗ -0.109∗∗
Firm size -0.296∗∗ -0.077 -0.021 0.237∗∗
Systematic risk -0.048 0.060 -0.006 -0.028
Wald χ2 test 57.543 30.281 9.986 45.030
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.076 0.000
Chow dummy variable test χ2(7) : 62.160 p-value 0.000
The table reports the simultaneous equation estimation of the system of equations in (3.2) with
co-determined firms in the upper part and shareholder determined firms in the lower part.
The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q, which we measure as the market value of the firm over its
book value. Variables are defined in table 3.3. Each variable is time demeaned in the
regressions. For each firm and each variable, I time demean by subtracting a given year’s
observation from the firm’s overall mean. The table shows the estimates based on the
standardized variables, which we construct by deducting each observation from its mean value
and dividing by its standard deviation.
Fixed effects estimation in 3SLS framework with standardized variables. All non-financial firms
on Oslo Stock Exchange 1989 to 2002.
The Wald test is explained in table 3.4. The test results show that a hypothesis that all
coefficients are zero must be rejected in all relations at the 1% level, except one where a 7.7%
level is required.
The Chow (Greene, 2003, ch. 7) dummy variable test is an exclusion test for the null
hypothesis that variables formed by a co-determination dummy variable interacted with each of
the explanatory variables are all zero. Low value indicates hypothesis rejection. The test result
shows that the hypothesis that the two sub-samples have equal coefficients must be rejected.
Significant results at the 5% (10%) level are marked with ∗∗ (∗).
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Table 3.6 Are the employee director direct and indirect (endogenous) effects up-
held in all firms with more than 200 employees and in co-determined firms with
more than 200 employees?
Dependent variable
Independent Tobin’s Average Board Leverage
variable Q wage index ratio
200+ employee firms N = 814
Tobin’s Q lagged 0.168∗∗ 0.008 0.139∗∗ -0.090∗
Average wage -0.012 -0.101∗ 0.075
Board index 0.094∗∗ -0.041∗ -0.145∗∗
Leverage -0.065∗∗ 0.041 -0.197∗∗
Employee directors -0.107∗∗ 0.049 0.420∗∗ -0.006
Firm size -0.083 0.103∗ -0.093 0.172∗∗
Systematic risk 0.013 0.045 0.025 -0.101∗∗
Wald χ2 test 73.709 13.037 85.068 46.726
p-value 0.000 0.042 0.000 0.000
200+ employees co-determined N = 565
Tobin’s Q lagged 0.358∗∗ 0.025 0.091∗ -0.060
Average wage -0.111∗ -0.478∗∗ -0.359∗∗
Board index 0.047 -0.148∗∗ -0.256∗∗
Leverage -0.126∗∗ -0.180∗∗ -0.413∗∗
Employee directors -0.148∗∗ 0.093∗∗ 0.522∗∗ 0.099∗∗
Firm size 0.008 0.031 -0.248∗∗ -0.028
Systematic risk 0.017 -0.027 0.008 -0.041
Wald χ2 test 110.682 73.992 190.267 99.414
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
The table reports the simultaneous equation estimation of the system of equations in (3.2) with
all firms larger than 200 employees in the upper part and all co-determined firms larger than
200 employees in the lower part.
The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q, which we measure as the market value of the firm over its
book value. Variables are defined in table 3.3. Each variable is time demeaned in the
regressions. For each firm and each variable, I time demean by subtracting a given year’s
observation from the firm’s overall mean. The table shows the estimates based on the
standardized variables, which we construct by deducting each observation from its mean value
and dividing by its standard deviation.
Fixed effects estimation in 3SLS framework with standardized variables. All non-financial firms
on Oslo Stock Exchange 1989 to 2002.
The Wald test is explained in table 3.4. The test results show that a hypothesis that all
coefficients are zero must be rejected in all relations at the 1% level, except one, where a 4.3%
level is required.
Significant results at the 5% (10%) level are marked with ∗∗ (∗).
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Table 3.7 The employee director direct and indirect (endogenous) effects upon
firm performance when the presence of and individual board variables are used
instead of the board index. N = 1135
Tobin’s Average Directors’ Board
Variable Q wage holdings Network size Gender Leverage
Tobin’s Q lagged 0.106∗∗ 0.026 -0.022 0.071 -0.030 -0.027 -0.091∗∗
Average wage -0.039 -0.049∗ 0.127∗∗ 0.043 0.097∗∗ 0.199∗∗
Directors’ holdings 0.051∗ -0.057∗ 0.046 0.131∗∗ 0.024 -0.038
Network 0.091∗∗ 0.061∗∗ 0.019 0.070∗∗ -0.067∗∗ -0.090∗∗
Board size -0.062∗∗ 0.052 0.136∗∗ 0.175∗∗ 0.122∗∗ 0.212∗∗
Gender -0.025 0.124∗∗ 0.026 -0.177∗∗ 0.129∗∗ 0.082∗∗
Leverage -0.041∗∗ 0.140∗∗ -0.023 -0.131∗∗ 0.124∗∗ 0.045∗∗
Employee directors -0.114∗∗ 0.102∗∗ 0.074 0.043 -0.565∗∗ -0.005 0.108∗
Firm size -0.144∗∗ -0.043 0.082 0.044 0.258 0.006 0.089
Systematic risk 0.001 0.022 -0.104∗∗ 0.093∗∗ 0.034 -0.041 -0.032
Wald χ2 test 86.300 65.395 45.170 57.520 301.551 58.640 98.443
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
The table reports the simultaneous equation estimation of the system of equations in (3.2) when
the individual variables making out the board index replace the board index. The board index
consists of directors’ holdings, network, board size, and gender. The definition of directors’
holdings is the fraction of ownership for the board as a whole; network is information centrality
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994), see footnote 9; the board size is the number of shareholder
elected directors; and gender is defined as the number of shareholder elected women over board
size.
The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q, which we measure as the market value of the firm over its
book value. Variables are defined in table 3.3. Each variable is time demeaned in the
regressions. For each firm and each variable, I time demean by subtracting a given year’s
observation from the firm’s overall mean. The table shows the estimates based on the
standardized variables, which we construct by deducting each observation from its mean value
and dividing by its standard deviation.
Fixed effects estimation in 3SLS framework with standardized variables. All non-financial firms
on Oslo Stock Exchange 1989 to 2002.
The Wald test is explained in table 3.4. The test results show that a hypothesis that all
coefficients are zero must be rejected in all relations at the 1% level.
Significant results at the 5% (10%) level are marked with ∗∗ (∗).
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Table 3.8 Does a wide definition of the board index change the relationship be-
tween firm performance, employee directors and governance mechanisms? N =
1135
Dependent variable
Independent Tobin’s Average Board
variable Q wage Index 2 Leverage
Tobin’s Q lagged 0.114∗∗ 0.027 0.009 -0.109∗∗
Average wage -0.031 -0.136∗∗ 0.204∗∗
Board index 2 0.091∗∗ -0.102∗∗ -0.083∗∗
Leverage -0.048∗∗ 0.143∗∗ -0.077∗∗
Employee directors -0.094∗∗ 0.077∗ 0.152∗∗ -0.004
Firm size -0.129∗∗ -0.048 -0.218∗∗ 0.126∗
Systematic risk 0.005 0.030 0.005 -0.037
Wald χ2 test 65.962 54.197 42.933 56.620
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
The table reports the simultaneous equation estimation of the system of equations in (3.2) when
all individual variables enter the board index, and not just directors’ holdings, network, board
size, and gender. The added variables are Outside owner concentration, Independence, CEO
director, Exported and imported directors, and board age dispersion. Outside owner
concentration is the sum of squared equity fractions across all the firm’s outside owners;
Independence is the board tenure of the non-employee directors minus the tenure of the CEO;
CEO director equals 1 if the CEO is a member of his company’s board and zero otherwise;
Exported CEO is the number of outside directorships held by the firm’s CEO; Imported CEO
is the proportion of CEOs from other companies on the board; Board age dispersion is the
standard deviation of board age.
The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q, which we measure as the market value of the firm over its
book value. Variables are defined in table 3.3. Each variable is time demeaned in the
regressions. For each firm and each variable, I time demean by subtracting a given year’s
observation from the firm’s overall mean. The table shows the estimates based on the
standardized variables, which we construct by deducting each observation from its mean value
and dividing by its standard deviation.
Fixed effects estimation in 3SLS framework with standardized variables. All non-financial firms
on Oslo Stock Exchange 1989 to 2002.
The Wald test is explained in table 3.4. The test results show that a hypothesis that all
coefficients are zero must be rejected in all relations at the 1% level.
Significant results at the 5% (10%) level are marked with ∗∗ (∗).
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Table 3.9 The employee director direct and indirect (endogenous) effects when
the stock return and the return on assets (ROA) define firm performance.
Dependent variable
Independent Firm Average Board
variable perform. wage index Leverage
Stock return, N = 1019
Stock return lagged -0.242∗∗ -0.046∗∗ -0.008 -0.072∗∗
Average wage -0.056 -0.057∗ 0.077∗∗
Board index 0.132∗∗ -0.055∗ -0.223∗∗
Leverage -0.232∗∗ 0.056∗∗ -0.169∗∗
Employee directors -0.165∗∗ 0.052 0.302∗∗ 0.039
Firm size -0.112 0.012 -0.026 0.117∗
Systematic risk -0.138∗∗ -0.003 -0.010 -0.043
Wald χ2 test 123.539 15.975 78.542 61.258
p-value 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.000
ROA N = 1135
ROA lagged -0.008 -0.043 0.063∗∗ -0.011
Average wage -0.129∗∗ -0.028 0.106∗∗
Board index 0.066∗∗ -0.022 -0.195∗∗
Leverage -0.170∗∗ 0.077∗∗ -0.183∗∗
Employee directors -0.125∗∗ 0.062 0.322∗∗ 0.060
Firm size 0.033 -0.010 -0.051 0.103
Systematic risk -0.024 0.014 0.025 -0.048
Wald χ2 test 68.694 15.739 86.037 57.564
p-value 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.000
The table reports the simultaneous equation estimation of the system of equations in (3.2) when
the stock return replaces Tobin’s Q in the upper part and the return on assets replaces Tobin’s
Q in the lower part.
The dependent variable is the stock return, defined as the raw stock return adjusted for
dividend and stock splits; alternatively, as the return on assets, gauged as the accounting
profits on book value of assets. Variables are defined in table 3.3. Each variable is time
demeaned in the regressions. For each firm and each variable, I time demean by subtracting a
given year’s observation from the firm’s overall mean. The table shows the estimates based on
the standardized variables, which we construct by deducting each observation from its mean
value and dividing by its standard deviation.
Fixed effects estimation in 3SLS framework with standardized variables. All non-financial firms
on Oslo Stock Exchange 1989 to 2002.
The Wald test is explained in table 3.4. The test results show that a hypothesis that all
coefficients are zero must be rejected in all relations at the 1% level, except for the average
wage, where at least a 1.6% level is needed.
Significant results at the 5% (10%) level are marked with ∗∗ (∗).
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Table 3.10 The relationships between firm performance, employee directors and
governance mechanisms when dividend payout rate replaces leverage ratio (upper
part), and when lagged firm performance is removed (lower part).
Dependent variable
Independent Tobin’s Average Board Dividend
variable Q wage index payout
Dividend payout rate, N = 1150
Tobin’s Q lagged 0.106∗∗ 0.014 0.088∗∗ 0.035
Average wage -0.046∗ -0.075∗∗ -0.025
Board index 0.125∗∗ -0.059∗∗ -0.021
Dividend payout rate 0.005 -0.011 -0.012
Employee directors -0.117∗∗ 0.082∗ 0.317∗∗ 0.092
Firm size -0.178∗∗ 0.004 -0.106∗ 0.022
Systematic risk 0.002 0.028 0.020 -0.066
Wald χ2 test 79.275 8.236 48.154 4.785
p-value 0.000 0.221 0.000 0.572
Tobin’s Average Board
Q wage index Leverage
No lag, N = 1333
Average wage -0.062∗∗ -0.018 0.201∗∗
Board index 0.131∗∗ -0.014 -0.169∗∗
Leverage -0.058∗∗ 0.152∗∗ -0.161∗∗
Employee directors -0.117∗∗ 0.058 0.306∗∗ 0.029
Firm size -0.151∗∗ 0.021 -0.066 0.100∗∗
Systematic risk 0.027 0.015 0.017 -0.031
Wald χ2 test 71.943 45.253 85.976 84.992
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
The table reports the simultaneous equation estimation of the system of equations in (3.2) when
the dividend payout rate replaces leverage in the upper part and the lagged firm performance is
removed in the lower part.
The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q, which we measure as the market value of the firm over its
book value. Each variable is time demeaned in the regressions. For each firm and each variable,
I time demean by subtracting a given year’s observation from the firm’s overall mean. The
table shows the estimates based on the standardized variables, which we construct by
deducting each observation from its mean value and dividing by its standard deviation.
I use fixed effects estimation in 3SLS framework with standardized variables. The sample
comprises all non-financial firms on Oslo Stock Exchange 1989 to 2002.
The Wald test is explained in table 3.4. The test results show that a hypothesis that all
coefficients are zero must be rejected in all relations at the 1% level, except for the average
wage and the dividend payout relations in the upper part, where I cannot reject the hypothesis.
Significant results at the 5% (10%) level are marked with ∗∗ (∗).
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Table 3.11 Is co-determination a positive influence in information intensive in-
dustries? Firm performance, employee directors and governance mechanisms in
sub-samples of information intensive industries (upper part) and other industries
(lower part).
Dependent variable
Independent Tobin’s Average Board
variable Q wage index Leverage
Information industries N = 533
Firm performance lag 0.277∗∗ 0.210∗∗ 0.127 -0.240∗∗
Average wage -0.041 -0.150∗∗ 0.440∗∗
Board index 0.015 -0.093∗∗ -0.040
Leverage -0.024 0.217∗∗ -0.032
Employee directors -0.081∗∗ 0.182∗∗ 0.197∗∗ -0.044
Firm size 0.007 0.167∗ -0.060 0.141
Systematic risk 0.003 0.055 0.062 0.009
Wald χ2 test 60.354 88.323 17.790 61.376
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000
Other industries N = 601
Firm performance lag 0.069∗ -0.040 -0.036 -0.088∗∗
Average wage -0.050 -0.113∗∗ 0.047
Board index 0.153∗∗ -0.131∗∗ -0.040
Leverage -0.081∗∗ 0.044 -0.033
Employee directors -0.117∗ -0.033 0.157∗∗ -0.016
Firm size -0.215∗∗ -0.129∗ -0.145∗∗ 0.131∗
Systematic risk 0.062 0.013 -0.165∗∗ -0.133∗∗
Wald χ2 test 41.646 14.737 35.541 15.583
p-value 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.016
Chow dummy variable test χ2(7) : 28.362 p-value 0.000
The table reports the simultaneous equation estimation of the system of equations in (3.2) when
the full sample is sub-divided into informationally intensive industries in the upper part and
other industries in the lower. Using the same GICS industry classification as in table 3.3,
informationally intensive industries are Capital goods, Transport, Consumer articles, Retailing,
Food and staples retailing, Health care equipment and supplies, and Telecommunications, while
the rest is in other industries.
The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q, which we measure as the market value of the firm over its
book value. Each variable is time demeaned in the regressions. For each firm and each variable,
I time demean by subtracting a given year’s observation from the firm’s overall mean. The
table shows the estimates based on the standardized variables, which we construct by
deducting each observation from its mean value and dividing by its standard deviation.
I use fixed effects estimation in 3SLS framework with standardized variables. The sample
comprises all non-financial firms on Oslo Stock Exchange 1989 to 2002.
The Wald test is explained in table 3.4. The test results show that a hypothesis that all
coefficients are zero must be rejected in all relations at the 1% level, except for a 2.3% level in
the average wage relation in the Other industries estimation.
The Chow dummy variable test is explained in table 3.5. The test result indicates that
coefficient values are different in the two sub-samples.
Significant results at the 5% (10%) level are marked with ∗∗ (∗).

4Board control and departures
Abstract
I empirically explore1 CEO turnover and board changes (substitutions and
enlargements), their simultaneity, and their relation to outside ownership
concentration, firm performance, board independence and to CEO en-
trenchment variables on a 14 year-long panel data set of all listed non-
financial Norwegian firms. The tests may reveal potential agency prob-
lems because the sequence of departures of the CEO relative to directors
is different when the CEO is in control of the election of directors from
the sequence when shareholders are in control. The CEO turnover and
board changes provide a natural setting for studying the board endogene-
ity problem that has not been used earlier. I find little evidence of CEO
control, since CEO turnover and board changes tend to be simultaneous;
outside ownership concentration influences the election of directors, but
not the CEO; and CEO entrenchment variables are either non-significant
or have signs pointing away from CEO control. I conclude that joint con-
trol of CEO and board is the type of control most typically used in Norwe-
gian firms.
Keywords:
JEL Classification codes: G32, G34
1I have benefited from discussions with Øyvind Bøhren. Pål Rydland and Bernt Arne
Ødegaard have guided me to data.
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4.1 Introduction
A primary function of the board is to appoint and dismiss the CEO (Monks
and Minow, 2001, p. 200). When the board is not able to fulfil this function,
it increases the potential for agency costs associated with the separation of
ownership and control (Berle Jr. and Means, 1932). Therefore turnovers
of CEO and directors provide natural settings for studying manifestations
of agency problems. Goyal and Park (2002) exploit this in a study of CEO
turnover when the CEO holds the joint office of chairman, while Falaye
(2007) investigates the CEO turnover for staggered boards. In this pa-
per, I argue that the timing of CEO departure relative to board enlarge-
ments and director substitutions can likewise shed light on agency prob-
lems, since different board control types give diverging predictions on the
relative timing of departures. The data is from Norway, where neither
CEO-chairman duality nor staggered boards are allowed (Aarbakke et al.,
1999). Thus, CEO turnover and board changes are unhampered by CEO
or director protection.
The results in Goyal and Park (2002) and Falaye (2007) indicate that
the regulatory conditions give the CEO control over the board, since the
turnover of CEOs in the firms is lower than in comparable firms. Herma-
lin and Weisbach (1998) present a model where the CEO gradually gath-
ers control over the board’s composition due to former good firm perfor-
mances. A prediction in the model is that directors leave during the CEO’s
tenure, as the CEO is able to negotiate for laxer monitoring. While in the
former case the CEO is entrenched due to board regulations, in the Her-
malin and Weisbach (1998) model the CEO becomes entrenched due to
his former firm performance success. Thus, when regulations favouring
the CEO are not in place, we should observe the Hermalin and Weisbach
(1998) situation. If we still cannot observe the model’s predicted pattern of
CEO departures and board changes, control over the board must lie with
either shareholders or with the CEO and the board together.
Thus, I differentiate between three board control types. The first is the
CEO control, where the CEO in effect elects his own directors. The im-
plication for timing is that board changes occur during the CEO’s tenure
when firm performance is good. Under the second control type, the board
fulfils its primary function of hiring and firing the CEO. I call this “share-
holder control”. In this case, the turnovers of CEO and directors are unre-
lated. The third control type is “joint control”, when the board and the
CEO together form a team, and are jointly responsible for firm perfor-
mance. Since they are jointly responsible, a prediction is that the CEO and
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director turnovers will be simultaneous. Thus, the fact that the three con-
trol types imply different patterns of timing in CEO turnover and board
changes can be used to examine whether the typical director election is
under shareholder, CEO, or joint control.
No earlier authors have utilised the relative turnover timing of CEOs
and directors to investigate the manifestations of agency problems. In
recent papers, Farrell and Whidbee (2000); Yermack (2004) and Fich and
Shivdasani (2006) all show that outside directors are more likely to leave
when a new CEO takes office. But none of the authors make the tim-
ing of CEO and director departures the central issue of study. Of course,
many studies deal with the separate CEO and director turnovers. Typi-
cally, these are related to firm performance and to board or CEO charac-
teristics. For CEO turnover two results stand out. The first is that weak
performance increases the likelihood of CEO dismissals (Coughlan and
Schmidt, 1985; Warner et al., 1988; Weisbach, 1988; Kaplan, 1994a,b) and
Parrino (1997). The second is that an independent board is more likely
to dismiss the CEO than a board filled with corporate insiders (Weisbach,
1988; Borokhovich et al., 1996; Hadlock and Lumer, 1997; Huson et al.,
2001; and Dahya et al., 2002). Thus, a time-based test of board and CEO
turnover timing and its relation to board control is lacking. In this paper, I
deal explicitly with these joint departures.
To do so, data for several periods is needed. Since this paper employs
panel data spanning fourteen years (1989 to 2002), I may study board
changes in relation to CEO turnover. In order to incorporate both board
size changes and director departures, I develop a board turbulence mea-
sure. My approach is to study the matter from two angles. First, the lagged
and contemporaneous turbulence measure is used in a probit study to
predict CEO turnover. Second, director turbulence is regressed against
lagged and contemporaneous CEO turnover. Notice that these tests are
not merely mirror regressions involving the same variables. In the CEO
turnover regression, board turbulence precedes CEO turnover, while in
the second, CEO turnover precedes board turbulence.
The different control types yield predictions not only for timing, but
also for the monitoring role of shareholders. Under CEO control the share-
holders play no role in the election of directors. Thus, if they do the control
type must be of the joint control or the shareholder control type. The mon-
itoring role of shareholders is recognised in models such as in Shleifer and
Vishny (1986) and Bolton and von Thadden (1998), and confirmed in the
empirical literature (Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990).
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Firm performance (ROA and stock return) and board independence
belong to the set of explanatory variables. The Bøhren and Strøm (2007)
proxy for board independence, that is, the tenure difference of board and
CEO, is used. I include a variable for the board’s network from Bøhren
and Strøm (2007) taking account of both direct and indirect links to other
companies’ boards through multiple directorships, relying upon social
network theory (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Last, entrenchment vari-
ables such as the number of CEOs on the board may measure CEO-board
collusion (Tirole, 2006), for instance the existence of friends on the board
(Gilson and Kraakman, 1991). These variables should have a negative re-
lation to CEO turnover in the CEO control type.
The sample comprises all non-financial firms listed on the Oslo Stock
Exchange (OSE) at year-end at least twice during the period 1989 to 2002.
The public securities register provided the ownership data, accounting
and share price data is from the OSE’s data provider, and board data was
collected manually from Kierulf’s Håndbok and a public electronic register
from 1995.
I find that the evidence supports joint control. CEO turnover and board
turbulence are simultaneous; ownership matters in that outside owner-
ship concentration is positively associated with board turbulence, but not
with CEO turnover; and that entrenchment variables are either non-sig-
nificant or have opposite signs to those predicted under CEO control. In
a robustness test, I construct a busy director indicator to follow up Ferris
et al. (2003) and Fich and Shivdasani (2006). I find that when the board is
busy, it is less likely to fire the CEO. Thus, a busy director is a less effec-
tive monitor. The results show little variation across specifications of firm
performance and CEO turnover. I conclude that board control tends to be
of the joint control type.
The paper proceeds as follows. The following section briefly refers to
earlier empirical investigations. Section 4.3 discusses theories behind the
three control types and spells out specific hypotheses. In section 4.4 I ex-
plain the definition of CEO turnover and the construction of the board
turbulence variable. Section 4.5 explains the panel data tobit and GMM
regressions, and also gives an overview of the data used. Then section 4.6
shows descriptive statistics and figures of CEO-director turnovers. Section
4.7 shows results for CEO turnover, chairman turnover and board turbu-
lence. The section also contains tests of differences in board turbulence
between firms that have improved performance after CEO turnover com-
pared to firms that have not. The final section 4.8 presents my concluding
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remarks.
4.2 Former empirical literature
Most empirical work in the area has been done on the CEO turnover or the
top management team. The top management team is usually defined as
CEO and other executives or as CEO and chairman (Warner et al., 1988).
The triggering mechanism is usually weak firm performance, beginning
with the papers of Coughlan and Schmidt (1985); Warner et al. (1988)
and Weisbach (1988), and later Parrino (1997), who controlled for indus-
try homogeneity. The role of the board was taken up in Weisbach (1988);
Borokhovich et al. (1996); Hadlock and Lumer (1997); Huson et al. (2001)
and Dahya et al. (2002). The results are in general that weak firm perfor-
mance leads to CEO turnover, and the more independent the board is, the
more likely it is to dismiss a CEO. Denis and Denis (1995) downplay the
role of the board, observing that over two-thirds of the forced resignations
are due to blockholder pressure, takeover attempts, financial distress, and
shareholder lawsuits. In fact, Barclay and Holderness (1992) document
that only 26% of the original CEOs were retained two years after a block-
holding stake had changed hands. They also find that the chairman is
changed just as often.
In comparison, few studies have been done on director turnover. An
early Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) study of inside and outside direc-
tor departures around the CEO turnover event finds that inside directors
tend to leave, but that the result is not confirmed for outside directors. Ka-
plan (1994a,b) looked at both CEO and director turnovers in Germany and
Japan, but examined both separately, not in conjunction. Other studies of
director turnover are often limited to extraordinary circumstances such as
company distress (Gilson, 1990) and takeovers (Franks and Mayer, 1996;
and Harford, 2003). The Franks and Mayer (2001) study of board turnover
in German companies encompasses both a general study of turnover and
one related mainly to takeovers. The focus in Farrell and Whidbee (2000)
is the career concerns of outside directors who fire a CEO, while Yermack
(2004) includes new directors as a control variable to control for any si-
multaneity effect in CEO turnover. Kaplan and Minton (1994) and Yer-
mack (2004) find that CEO and director turnover are more likely to take
place after weak firm performance. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) use a new
CEO in regressions of director appointments and departures, yet their fo-
cus is not upon directors as such, but upon busy directors. Likewise, they
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include busy directors in regressions of forced CEO departures.
Thus, a study that takes the simultaneity of CEO and director turnovers
as its primary target of investigation seems to be missing. No study has
exploited the information in the sequence of CEO and director departures
to differentiate between various CEO-board control types.
4.3 Theory and hypotheses
CEO and director turnovers constitute a natural setting for studying agency
problems (Goyal and Park, 2002). This applies both individually and for
the relative timing of departures of the CEO and directors. For instance,
a board that is unable to dismiss an underperforming CEO, but is instead
subjected to changes dictated by the same CEO, is clearly a sign of agency
problems. The board is not fulfilling its primary function to “(s)elect,
regularly evaluate, and, if necessary, replace the chief executive officer”
(Monks and Minow, 2001, page 200). Such a situation has implications for
CEO turnover relative to board changes, since directors tend to leave dur-
ing the CEO tenure. But in other cases the board is fulfilling its primary
function, and the timing of CEO turnover relative to board changes is dif-
ferent from the above. Thus, detecting a specific pattern in CEO turnover
relative to board changes may show the existence of agency problems. I
set out the various implications of timing below.
Director changes encompass both turnover and board size. Together
they constitute the measure board turbulence, which is described in sec-
tion 4.4. I first set out hypotheses regarding CEO turnover and board tur-
bulence in section 4.3.1 and add hypotheses concerning other variables in
section 4.3.2.
4.3.1 Board control and timing
In the formal sense, the shareholders elect a board and the board hires
or fires the CEO. The board evaluates the CEO and dismisses him or her
when necessary. The incumbent CEO is compared to alternatives, and if
the rival is judged to be better, the incumbent is replaced. In the Almazan
and Suarez (2003) model the size of the incumbent’s severance pay and
his firm specific investment slow down the decision to replace. A weak
board tends to grant a higher severance pay and to demand less firm spe-
cific investment. The relationship between the CEO and the board may
be termed shareholder control. Here, the CEO leaves independently of
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director turnover. When this is so the CEO’s scope for extracting private
benefits is small.
The other extreme of the CEO-board relationship is CEO control, that
is, the state when the CEO effectively appoints the board of directors. Berle
Jr. and Means (1932, p. 82) state that this comes about when management
appoints the proxy committee that nominates directors. Hermalin and
Weisbach (1998) formalised their theory to explain endogenous determi-
nation of board composition, endogenous in the sense that board compo-
sition comes to depend on the CEO’s success. I give a verbal exposition of
the model and discuss implications.
A fundamental assumption of the model is that shareholders’ influ-
ence is disregarded due to the institutional fact of dissipated ownership.
Therefore the CEO turnover and board changes are the outcome of the in-
teractions of CEO and the board. The model is initiated when the CEO is
hired, and after one period earnings are realised. At this point, the board
updates its judgement of the CEO. If performance is weak, the CEO is
dismissed, if it is good the board and CEO negotiate over a fixed wage
and monitoring intensity, the latter approximated by the fraction of inde-
pendent directors on the board2. If the negotiations fail, the CEO leaves. If
they succeed, the continuing board is less independent than the preceding,
that is, independent directors leave, or the board is enlarged with inside or
gray directors. In the third stage, the board may receive a private signal,
and the CEO may be discharged on this new information. Thus, the CEO
is supposed to leave at three points; after weak performance, after failed
negotiations, and after the board obtains adverse private information. On
the other hand, a board member may leave after successful negotiations,
that is, after good performance. However, the two never leave at the same
time. Alternatively, the CEO uses his negotiating power to enlarge the
board with dependent or gray directors. If the CEO continues to turn in
good performances, board independence is gradually dissipated. In con-
sequence, we should observe a steady stream of director departures or
board enlargements during the CEO’s tenure. The board is then endoge-
nously determined by the CEO’s negotiating power, induced by a string of
good performances. The CEO chooses his own monitors, and is effectively
protected against shareholders’ discipline, that is, he becomes entrenched.
2An independent director is commonly defined as a person without family ties to the
CEO and business ties to the firm. Similarly, a director from management is dependent.
A gray director delivers business advisory and financing services to the firms, such as
management consultants and bankers. An independent board has at least 50 per cent
independent directors.
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Needless to say, the potential for agency costs is high if this is the case.
When performance is weak, but the CEO’s accumulated negotiating
position is strong, the absence of owners means that the CEO stays, and
that board independence is unchanged. Unchanged board independence
is again the outcome when the CEO’s negotiating position is weak, but
then the CEO may be discharged. One might expect that the board would
become more independent after a weak performance, that is, board tur-
bulence would increase after such performance. But the model does not
predict such a result, since this would require a third party intervening in
the director elections. The third party, shareholders, is disregarded. Thus,
the model says that directors leave after the CEO has assumed office, and
that the CEO will be discharged after weak performance and when the
board is independent.
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) make the caveat that the assumed equal
monitoring intensity for all directors does not hold. If directors free-ride
on other directors’ diligence, the old board will have an incentive to want
diligent new directors. Then the board may remain independent, even
though directors leave or the board is enlarged during the incumbent C-
EO’s tenure. However, this caveat does not upset the timing of CEO and
director departures.
The authors arrive at their results on the institutional assumption that
owners are dissipated and therefore unable to exercise their voice alter-
native (Hirschman, 1970). But shareholders may also be prevented by a
regulatory regime allowing such CEO protection as CEO-chairman dual-
ity and a staggered board, studied in Goyal and Park (2002) and Falaye
(2007). If CEO control is observed, it is uncertain whether this is due to
endogeneity in the Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) sense, or if it is due to
CEO protection. However, if CEO protection is not allowed, the endo-
geneity hypothesis of CEO control may be tested. Since Norway has a
low level of CEO protection (Aarbakke et al., 1999), the data in this paper
allows such testing.
A middle position between the extremes of CEO and shareholder con-
trol is the joint control of CEO and the board. The Adams and Ferreira
(2007) model, termed the friendly board, may serve as a point of depar-
ture. They do not model CEO or director turnover, but the information ex-
change between board and the CEO. If the CEO supplies information, the
board responds with better advice, but also better monitoring. The CEO
appreciates advice, but dislikes monitoring. A balance between the two is
found, with the board becoming ‘friendly’ in not requiring too much infor-
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mation. When the CEO and the board share information in this friendly
way, they also become jointly responsible for the firm’s performance. Joint
responsibility should also imply that their departure will be simultaneous.
Under joint control, the board gives up some monitoring in exchange for
CEO information. Thus, a potential for agency costs is allowed for the
greater benefit of a more informed board, and therefore better joint board
and CEO decisions.
However, instead of co-operating for the good of the company, the
CEO and the board may collude for their own private benefit. Tirole (2006,
p. 356) describes collusion as a state when the board is lenient towards the
CEO who reciprocates by tunnelling corporate resources to his monitors.
But if this is the case, outside ownership concentration should have no im-
pact upon board departures. Thus, if such an association does appear, the
joint control is not of the collusion kind.
In summary, under shareholder control the CEO and directors leave
independently of each other; under CEO control directors leave after the
CEO has assumed office; and under joint control CEO and directors leave
simultaneously. Let us look more specifically at CEO turnover. Under
shareholder control we should expect no association between CEO turnover
and board turbulence. In the case of CEO control lagged or simultane-
ous board turbulence should show no effect upon CEO turnover. When it
comes to joint control, however, board turbulence should predict a simul-
taneous CEO turnover.
Now we turn to board turbulence. Under CEO control, directors should
leave after the CEO has entered office. Thus, a lagged CEO turnover
should have a significant impact upon board turbulence. Under board
and joint control, this aspect should be absent. Instead, if joint control is
the case, a simultaneous effect should be apparent.
4.3.2 Ownership and independence
The discussion in the last section concerns not only the timing of CEO
turnover and board turbulence. Also, firm performance, board indepen-
dence, and ownership belong to the determining variables. I look at these
in turn, and then expand my discussion to include related explanations
and to control variables.
For reference, table 4.1 reports variable definitions and main statistical
properties.
Table 4.1
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CEO turnover and board turbulence are explained more fully in sec-
tion 4.4.
An important feature in the Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) model is
the relation between board turbulence and firm performance. Under CEO
control, the better the firm performance, the higher board turbulence is
expected to be. The prediction is unlike the one for shareholder control, as
the better the firm performance, the lower is board turbulence. This last
prediction is common with joint control. For CEO turnover, a weaker firm
performance implies a higher likelihood of departure.
As already noted, in the Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) model the
shareholders play no monitoring role due to the separation of ownership
and control. When this is the case the shareholders’ “voice” alternative
(Hirschman, 1970) is closed. From a shareholder value perspective this
may seem strange, as it removes the ordinary line of authority between
shareholders and the board. Furthermore, the underlying assumption that
dissipated ownership remains fixed if the firm sees continued weak per-
formance is unrealistic. Such a situation would seem to welcome takeover
specialists, who could build a majority stake and then replace the board,
whereupon the board replaces the CEO (Scharfstein, 1988; Jensen and Ru-
back, 1983 and Jensen, 1988). A larger shareholder will internalise more of
the benefits of oversight. Therefore a plausible prediction is that the mon-
itoring intensity of shareholders increases with outside ownership con-
centration as the Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Bolton and von Thadden
(1998) models suggest.
I predict that higher ownership concentration has no effect upon CEO
turnover under any control type. For board turbulence, I predict that un-
der CEO control the effect is insignificant, while it is positive under board
and joint control. The effects of external ownership concentration are,
therefore, important in differentiating between control types.
An independent board may be a monitoring substitute for a large share-
holder (Fama, 1980 and Fama and Jensen, 1983). In the literature on CEO
turnover the more independent the board is the more likely it is to dis-
charge a CEO. Thus, if independence is important in explaining CEO turn-
over, it cannot be CEO controlled. This rather increases the case for share-
holder control. However, if the board is jointly controlled, board indepen-
dence should be insignificant in explaining CEO turnover. It is also likely
that board turbulence decreases with board independence, since the inde-
pendent board will perform the monitoring that shareholders are looking
for.
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Thus, the timing of CEO and director turnover, firm performance, out-
side ownership, and independence may differentiate between control types.
But the CEO and the directors may be entrenched for various reasons. Un-
der CEO control the prediction is that the effects are positive.
First, if the CEO or the board themselves are owners, they are at least
partly shielded from shareholders’ discipline. Thus, a higher CEO owner-
ship is likely to lead to lower likelihood of own turnover, while a higher
board ownership stake should likewise be associated with lower board
turbulence.
Second, CEO entrenchment is associated with lower CEO turnover and
higher director turnover. I use three indicators of CEO entrenchment from
Bøhren and Strøm (2007) to investigate this further. First, independent di-
rectors could be friends of the CEO, or at least, have the same background,
and therefore, will be less effective monitors (Gilson and Kraakman, 1991
and Tirole, 2006). Alternatively, this ‘imported CEO’ may carry informa-
tion from similar business conditions, and as such be a better monitor.
Thus, the first is a colluding interpretation, the second an information in-
terpretation of imported CEOs. Second, the CEO may be a director of
other firms. The direction of effect may be uncertain here as well. Exter-
nal board directorships in isolation are a private benefit to the CEO and
a sign of entrenchment, indicating a lower CEO turnover. But the firm’s
performance may suffer with a busy CEO and increase his likelihood for
dismissal. Third, the CEO may be a member of the board. Goyal and
Park (2002) find that when the CEO holds the dual role of chairman, CEO
turnover is less sensitive to performance. By law, this duality is not al-
lowed in Norway (Aarbakke et al., 1999). Thus, these entrenchment vari-
ables may alternatively be seen as information variables. Under CEO
control we should expect the variables to be negatively related to CEO
turnover and board turbulence.
Third, I would expect that a well networked board would be less likely
to be fired, since such a board has been shown to create shareholder value
(Ferris et al., 2003 and Bøhren and Strøm, 2007), but could be more likely
to fire the CEO, since it is in a better position to compare outside candi-
dates for the CEO post with the performance of the incumbent CEO. Thus,
the networked board is a strong board in the Almazan and Suarez (2003)
sense. Notice that all CEOs are eliminated from the network measure,
which furthermore is constructed from social network theory (Wasserman
and Faust, 1994), and shows direct (to neighbours) and indirect (to neigh-
bours’ neighbours) links to other firms through multiple directorships.
116 CHAPTER 4. BOARD CONTROL
Thus, the measure represents the global properties of the whole board net-
work (Conyon and Muldoon, 2006).
The network variable may gauge director busyness rather than infor-
mation. If this is the case, I expect a higher score on the network variable
to be associated with lower likelihood or CEO turnover. Fich and Shiv-
dasani (2006) find that busy outside directors have a lower tendency to
replace a non-performing CEO than a board with independent, but non-
busy directors. They use the number of other directorships as the mea-
sure of busyness, creating a dichotomous variable with a cut-off point at
three additional directorships. However, this is different from my network
variable. Thus, my variable has more to do with board information than
director overstretching. In order to compare, I include measures of the
number of other directorships similar to the Fich and Shivdasani (2006)
busy directors in separate regressions.
Employees and incumbent managers are natural allies against share-
holders in the models of Coffee (1990); Pagano and Volpin (2005) and also
in Roe (2003). If this is true, employees can be counted among the man-
agers’ friends. In the Norwegian data I may study this aspect, since nearly
half of the observations in the sample have employee representatives on
the board. This representation is due to legislation stipulating that firms
with more than 200 employees are obliged to have employee directors,
in the 30 to 200 range they are obliged only if an employee majority vote
is in favour, and in both cases only if the industry is not exempted (Aar-
bakke et al., 1999). Since further compromises with the functioning CEO
and board are more likely than with a new, employee directors may be op-
posed to change. This implies that CEO turnovers and board turbulence
are less frequent in co-determined firms.
The higher is the age of the CEO and director, the more likely they are
to leave their positions. This variable is routinely included in turnover
studies.
Finally, firm size and systematic risk constitute control variables. In
probit regressions, year and industry dummies are added. This is further
explained in section 4.5.
Thus, the timing of CEO and board turbulence, outside ownership,
firm performance, and independence may differentiate between board con-
trol types, while the remaining variables are neutral in this regard.
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4.4 Variable definitions
I need to define CEO turnover and board turbulence. In table 4.1 three
measures of CEO turnover emerge. First of all, I follow Yermack (2004)
in considering all departures as relevant. Second, I supplement with a
proxy of forced dismissals constructed as the product of CEO and chair-
man turnover. As is evident from table 4.1, CEO and chairman turnovers
are simultaneous in more than 50 per cent of the CEO turnover cases. I
suppose that these cases of coincidence signify dismissals. Third, a mea-
sure of forced departures for CEOs is obtained from previous work on
CEO turnover in Norwegian companies (Bøhren et al., 2002).
I identify four reasons for not concentrating on forced CEO departures
alone. First, the timing of CEO turnover and board turbulence may re-
veal board control type, for whatever reason the departing CEO left the
company. Thus, for this reason alone, all CEO changes belong to the data
set. Second, public information on dismissals is likely to emerge only in
a minority of cases, probably where the conflict is most acute, since both
the firm and the departing CEO want to defend their reputational capital.
Gilson (1990) shows that directors in defaulting firms have trouble obtain-
ing new directorships. This induces them to keep conflicts between CEO
and board, or among board members, out of the public eye. Using only
this subsample of turnovers is, consequently, likely to result in a seriously
biased sample. To top it all, some studies judge a departure as forced if
firm performance in advance has been weak. Then, there is no surprise
in finding weak performance to be associated with CEO or director de-
parture. Third, the often-used Parrino (1997) criteria3 for selecting forced
departures include the explicit dismissals, but then assign a turnover to
the forced category if the departing CEO is less than 60 years old. In prac-
tice, this means that nearly all departures of CEOs less than 60 years of age
are forced. This comes close to the all CEO turnover measure. And even
though the public announcement may be that the CEO or the director has
found new employment or wishes to leave, the protection of reputational
3Parrino classifies turnovers as either forced or voluntary, ascertained from the Wall
Street Journal (WSJ). The turnover is forced in two main cases: (1) If WSJ reported that the
CEO was fired, forced from the position, or departed due to unspecified policy differences;
(2) If the departing CEO is under the age of 60 and the WSJ announcement of the succes-
sion (2a) does not report the reason for the departure as involving death, poor health, or
the acceptance of another position; or (2b) reports that the CEO is retiring, but does not
announce the retirement at least six months before the succession. Searches in other parts
of the business and trade press are undertaken for the second group in order to reclassify,
if necessary.
118 CHAPTER 4. BOARD CONTROL
capital makes all such announcements untrustworthy. Franks and Mayer
(2001) move even one step further, when they define board turnover as the
number of directors leaving the board during the year, for reasons other
than death or retirement.
Fourth, CEO turnovers in my sample show that departing and arriving
CEOs have about the same age distribution, see figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1
As is evident from figure 4.1, almost all departures take place before
the CEO reaches the age of 60. But at the same time, some new CEOs join
the firm even after the 60 year landmark. Thus, even the 60 year limit
seems arbitrary. All in all, I have chosen to keep all turnovers as the main
definition in analyses, and to supplement with definitions that are close to
those commonly used in the literature.
In order to study the timing of CEO and director turnover, I need a
measure that takes into account both the board size changes and the direc-
tor substitutions. I define board turbulence as follows:
Board turbulence = Relative board size change
+ Relative director turnover
=
∣∣∣∣Board sizet+1Board sizet − 1
∣∣∣∣+ Departed directorsBoard sizet
(4.1)
The measure is continuous and always positive and is new to the liter-
ature. A value of zero will signify no replacements and no board size
change. Table 4.1 shows that the average turbulence is 1.43. Looking
ahead, table 4.2 reports that the percentage of new directors on a board
is 26.1 on the average Norwegian board. Thus, the turnover of both CEO
and directors appears to be high in my Norwegian data. I return to this
point in section 4.6.
This paper employs two measures of firm performance; one is the stock
return, a market measure, and one accounting measure, the return on as-
sets (ROA). Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) argue that the board will have
a greater faith in the accounting measure than in a market measure. The
Bøhren and Strøm (2007) measure of independence, that is, tenure differ-
ence between the shareholder elected directors and the CEO, is employed.
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4.5 Data and methods
4.5.1 Data
My sample comprises all non-financial firms listed on the Oslo Stock Ex-
change (OSE) at year-end at least twice over the period 1989 to 20024. To
reduce censoring bias in the tenure measures, I start collecting director
data in 1986. The ownership structure data covers every equity holding
by every investor in every sample firm. The public securities register pro-
vided the ownership data, accounting and share price data is from the
OSE’s data provider, and board data was collected manually from Kierulf’s
Håndbok and a public electronic register from 1995.
4.5.2 Methods
Since the CEO turnover is a discrete event, taking two values, 1 for a new
CEO and 0 for the continuation of the incumbent, and the board turbu-
lence measure is continuous, different estimation methods are employed.
For the CEO turnover the probit model is the estimation vehicle, and I use
the general methods of moments (GMM) for the board turbulence. Both
relationships are estimated with panel data methods.
I first set out the GMM method. Since the measure of board turbulence
is continuous, I may then use fixed effects panel data estimation (Wool-
ridge, 2002). In a panel of firms, the specific firm’s heterogeneity will cause
residuals to be dependent. Therefore data pooling will lead to biased es-
timates. Fixed effects estimation has the advantage of removing the de-
pendency in residuals, since each firm’s overall average on a particular
variable is subtracted from the given year’s observation. The transformed
observations will be independent. With firm heterogeneity thus removed,
the fixed effects method makes it unnecessary to include a host of control
variables in regressions. In ordinary least squares estimation on pooled
data the objective for the inclusion of control variables is, of course, to re-
move firm heterogeneity. In the regressions that follow, I retain only the
control variables firm size and risk.
4The OSE had an aggregate market capitalization of 68 bill. USD equivalents by year-
end 2002, ranking the OSE sixteenth among the twenty–two European stock exchanges
for which comparable data is available. During my sample period from 1989 to 2002, the
number of firms listed increased from 129 to 203, market capitalization grew by 8% per
annum, and market liquidity, measured as transaction value over market value, increased
from 52% in 1989 to 72% in 2002 (sources: www.ose.no and www.fibv.com).
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The fixed effects estimations are implemented with GMM, whose great
advantage over other methods is that few assumptions are needed. For in-
stance, OLS needs assumptions of homoskedasticity and absence of serial
independence. The consistency of the GMM estimator follows only from
the fact that it satisfies certain moment conditions (Davidson and MacKin-
non, 1993, page 585). When these are satisfied, instruments are given nat-
urally. In this paper, the instruments are constructed from the explanatory
variables. Using Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, page 584), the expected
value of the dependent variable yt given the information set Ωt is written
E (yt|Ωt) =Xtβ t = 1, . . . ,n (4.2)
where Xt is a vector of explanatory variables, and β the vector of k corre-
sponding coefficients. Since (4.2) provides the conditional moment condi-
tion E (ut|Ωt) = 0, it follows that for any vector W with elements wt; t =
1, . . . ,n such that wt ∈Ωt, the unconditional moments E (wt (yt −Xtβ)) =
0. Now, the regressors Xt belong to the information set Ωt, and there are
precisely k of them. The practical implication is that the k regressors de-
fine k unconditional moment conditions. I have gone one step further and
added transformations of the explanatory variables as instruments (see
below). This means that I have more than the necessary k instruments for
identification.
The transformations are as follows. First, I use the raw (Amemiya and
MaCurdy, 1986), the time-demeaned, and the squared time-demeaned ex-
planatory variables. Furthermore, I include the average and standard de-
viation of firm-demeaned explanatory variables (Breusch et al., 1989). Fi-
nally, the panel data structure allows the inclusion of contemporary as
well as lagged instruments. Since explanatory variables are lagged, I use
lagged instruments.
Next, I want to estimate the probability that the CEO is new. For this
purpose, the probit method, applied to panel data, is used. Early studies
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988 and Kaplan and Minton, 1994) employ the
logit model on pooled data. Panel data methods for the study of CEO and
director turnover have only recently come into use, one example being
Fich and Shivdasani (2006).
With panel data, the unobserved effects probit model is in general
P (CEO Turnoverit) = 1|(Explanatory variables)it, ci
= Φ ((Explanatory variables)itβ+ ci) t = 1, . . . , T
(4.3)
where P is probability, ci is unobserved firm i heterogeneity, and β is the
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vector of coefficients to the explanatory variables. The Φ symbol indicates
the standard normal distribution. Two common assumptions are added
to (4.3). The first is that the CEO turnover variable is independently dis-
tributed across time t, conditional on the explanatory variables and unob-
served firm heterogeneity. The second assumption is that unobserved firm
heterogeneity is normally distributed with zero mean and a fixed standard
deviation
(
ci ∼ Φ
(
0,σ2c
))
. With these assumptions in hand, I estimate the
relationship with maximum likelihood methods.
For panel data the probit models meet with the incidental parameters
problem (Woolridge, 2002, page 484) when assuming a fixed effects model
and performing within transformations, leading to inconsistent estimates.
For this reason, the fixed effects model is dropped, and instead I add 14
year and 19 industry dummies to control for firm heterogeneity as much
as possible. The dummy coefficients are not reported. Since unobserved
firm heterogeneity cannot be removed, the coefficient values will be bi-
ased. However, the coefficients will show the correct direction of impact
of each explanatory variable. Furthermore, since the bias is known, the
slope coefficients are observable at the average of the distribution, that is,
when ci = 0 given the assumptions for (4.3). These so-called average par-
tial effects (APE) βc are estimated as βc = β/
(
1+ σ2c
)1/2. I report the most
important in the text.
4.6 Descriptive evidence
The objective in this section is to give some stylized facts about CEO turn-
over and board turbulence. First, I report some overall statistics, and then
turn to the simultaneity of CEO, chairman and director changes around
the CEO turnover event.
Table 4.1 in section 4.3.2 shows the main characteristics of the various
definitions of turnover. It is plain that overall CEO turnover is about 20
per cent. This is higher than in American data, where Fich and Shivdasani
(2006) report a departure rate of 11.28 per cent. The contemporaneous de-
parture of CEO and chairman takes place at an average rate of 11 per cent.
Identified forced CEO dismissals happen at an average rate of approxi-
mately 4 per cent. In Fich and Shivdasani (2006) the forced CEO dismissals
are 18 per cent of all dismissals, that is, comparable to the proportion in
our data. Thus, my proxy for forced dismissals implies a high simultane-
ous CEO and chairman turnover. As will become evident, this is repeated
for board turnover as well.
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Do CEO, chairman and director changes occur with different intensi-
ties over the period? Table 4.2 shows changes in each year of my sample.
Table 4.2
Clearly, the changes happen with different intensities over the period.
At the lowest, 10.3 per cent of CEOs are new (1995), while the highest is in
2001 at 28.3 per cent of CEOs. The result for the CEO confirms the Huson
et al. (2001) finding that CEO firings have been trending upwards during
the sample period, although the influx of new directors is at its lowest in
the middle. The variation in changes affects the CEO, the chairman and
the directors usually in the same year.
In the same table, firm performance, expressed as stock return and
return on assets (ROA), is set out for each year. The expectation is that
turnover is high in years of low firm performance, but low in years of
high firm performance, as former studies show. Yet, it is hard to detect
any pattern. These summary statistics show no such definite relationship.
The simultaneity of CEO and chairman departures is shown in figure
4.2.
Figure 4.2
It turns out that most of the chairman changes occur simultaneously
with the change of new CEO. Furthermore, notice that changes are fairly
symmetric around the year of CEO turnover, with slightly more chairman
changes taking place before the CEO turnover.
Figure 4.3 shows the director changes around the CEO turnover event.
Figure 4.3
The same-year spike shows up for director turnover as it does for the
chairman. New directors arrive either because they substitute old, or be-
cause the board size is enlarged. Again changes are distributed around
the CEO turnover year, but this time is clearly higher before CEO turnover
than after. The values at the tails of the distribution are less reliable, since
fewer observations appear here.
The conclusion to this simple overview is that chairman and director
turnover tend to occur simultaneously with CEO turnover, and when they
do not, they occur before rather than after the new CEO is in place. This
contradicts the CEO control hypothesis, and supports the joint control hy-
pothesis. Thus, the board and the CEO seem to form a team.
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4.7 Econometric evidence
Is the simultaneity in CEO and board departures in figures 4.2 and 4.3 also
present in a multivariate setting? This section tests for this and for the ef-
fects of other variables. Section 4.7.1 reports the results for CEO turnover.
Chairman turnover and board turbulence are shown in 4.7.2, and section
4.7.3 repeats the board turbulence analysis, but this time with dummies
indicating whether former firm performance is high or low.
4.7.1 CEO turnover
The starting point is the multivariate probit estimation of CEO depar-
ture given the simultaneous and lagged board turbulence. I perform re-
gressions for the three definitions of CEO turnover, that is, all turnover,
CEO turnover simultaneous with chairman turnover, and forced turnover.
Stock return and ROA are the measures of firm performance in each turn-
over definition. In this section, estimations of busy directors instead of the
network variable are undertaken.
Table 4.3 shows results of regressions of CEO turnover, with the differ-
ent definitions, and the two specifications of firm performance.
Table 4.3
The Pseudo-R2 shows satisfactory results in all regressions, indicating
relevant model selection. Notice that all explanatory variables are lagged
one period, unless otherwise indicated.
The simultaneous board turbulence is positively and significantly as-
sociated with CEO turnover in all regressions, while the lagged turbulence
is significant for the all CEO turnover category only. This pattern is com-
mon to both the stock return and ROA. In the all CEO turnover category,
the economic significance of the simultaneous is higher than the lagged,
since the contemporaneous average partial effects (APE) is 0.25 and the
lagged is 0.09 for the stock return, and 0.23 and 0.09 for ROA. Thus, CEO
turnover comes with a higher rate of substitution of board members and
relative change in board size. This indicates that the CEO-board relation-
ship is of the joint control type. The friendly board (Adams and Ferreira,
2007) type comes to mind.
I run an exclusion test for the board turbulence variables. The null hy-
pothesis that the coefficients of the two variables are zero is rejected. This
further strengthens my conclusion that CEO turnover and board turbu-
lence are related, and that joint control is the most common control type.
124 CHAPTER 4. BOARD CONTROL
At the same time, this is also a powerful test of the shareholder control
hypothesis that CEO turnover and board turbulence are unrelated. The
results of the exclusion test mean rejection of the shareholder control hy-
pothesis.
Now look at the other explanations of CEO turnover. The negative ef-
fect of firm performance conforms to the evidence found from the earliest
(Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985; Weisbach, 1988; and Warner et al., 1988)
and to the latest (Parrino, 1997; Huson et al., 2001; Dahya et al., 2002; and
Fich and Shivdasani, 2006) studies. Thus, the general result is that higher
performance reduces the likelihood of CEO turnover. The result confirms
the prediction common to all board control types. However the effect is
economically rather weak, with both coefficient values and APEs close to
zero, and not always significant. But again agreeing with former stud-
ies, the effect is stronger in regressions of forced dismissal than in all CEO
turnover regressions. This is to be expected. The forced dismissals are
likely to appear more often in crisis situation than the all CEO turnover
category, even though we have noticed the difficulty of drawing a line be-
tween the two. The results hold for both stock market and ROA, contrary
to the Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) argument that accounting informa-
tion is the more reliable.
Outside ownership concentration is significant in only one regression
and its sign is not consistent in the regressions. This confirms the expecta-
tion for all control types.
The results of board independence are contrary to expectations for all
board control types and also at variance with the extant literature. It has a
negative sign in all regressions, indicating that higher board independence
leads to a lower likelihood of CEO turnover. This applies to all turnover
as well as to forced dismissals. Its APE is -0.01 in the all CEO turnover
in both the stock return and the ROA regressions, and closer still to zero
in the forced turnover regressions. Thus, the longer the average board
tenure relative to the CEO’s tenure, the less likely the board is to discharge
the CEO. Denis and Denis (1995) find that board independence has less
importance when controlling for blockholder pressure, takeover attempts,
financial distress, and shareholder lawsuits. It is possible that a similar ef-
fect appears when including board turbulence in the regressions. The odd
result for independence may of course be due to the fact that the indepen-
dence measure here is the tenure difference between the board on average
and the CEO.
Among the CEO entrenchment variables only the imported CEO is
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consistently significant in all regressions, and with a sign consistent with
an information interpretation rather than a colluding board interpreta-
tion. An increase in the fraction of CEOs from other companies means
a markedly higher likelihood of CEO turnover. Looking at the stock re-
turn case, the APE is 0.33 for the regression for all CEO turnovers. Thus,
having friends on the board in the Gilson and Kraakman (1991) sense does
not seem to make the board friendly towards the CEO. This refutes the hy-
potheses for entrenchment made under the assumption of CEO control.
I find that the CEO’s age has an impact in all turnover regression, but
not in forced dismissals. However, the APE is close to zero in both. This
indicates that resignations are to some extent voluntary.
My results for the network variable have no counterpart in the litera-
ture. The higher the board network measure, the less likely the board will
be to dismiss the CEO. The APE for both the stock return and the ROA
case is -0.23 in the regression using all CEO turnovers, and -0.10 in forced
turnover. This is contrary to the shareholder control prediction that a bet-
ter networked board is better able to compare potential CEO candidates.
Fich and Shivdasani (2006) obtained a similar result for busy directors. I
make a more detailed comparison below, see table 4.4.
Are busy directors less likely to dismiss the CEO? A main result in Fich
and Shivdasani (2006) answers in the positive. My network variable is
not directly comparable, since it takes account of both direct and indirect
director connections to other firms, but the results in table 4.3 point in
the busy director direction. The Fich and Shivdasani (2006) measure is a
dummy variable showing 1 if the board has more than half busy directors.
A director is termed busy if he or she holds three or more board positions
in other listed firms. In order to compare, I have constructed busy director
variables in the same manner, but I have set two more cut-off points, one
at zero and the other at 1 outside directorships in addition to the cut-off at
three. The results are shown table 4.4.
Table 4.4
Only coefficients for the busy director dummy variables are reported.
Overall statistics and other explanatory variables’ coefficient values and
their significance remain highly similar to the results in table 4.3. Table
4.4 shows that the dummy variables replacing the network variable are
only significant at the cut-off of three other directorships. The sign and
significance is the same as for the network variable in the three or more
directorships category. Here, the APE is -0.35 for both stock return and re-
turn on assets for the busy director specification, compared to -0.23 for the
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network variable. Thus, a board filled with busy directors is less likely to
dismiss the CEO, and the conclusion is very much in line with the results
for the network variable. This confirms the Fich and Shivdasani (2006)
result that really busy directors are less likely to terminate the CEO’s con-
tract.
Together, the joint board control type finds support in the regressions
on CEO turnover. The conclusion rests on the confirmation of the simul-
taneity of CEO turnover with board turbulence joint control type predic-
tion, and it is further confirmed by the entrenchment variables’ low sig-
nificance or reverse sign. Thus, the CEO and the board work as a team, as
modelled in Adams and Ferreira (2007). The conclusion is confirmed in re-
gressions with definitions of CEO turnover ranging from the all turnover
to forced turnover, and with definitions of firm performance being either
the stock return or ROA.
4.7.2 Chairman turnover and board turbulence
Can CEO turnover predict later board turbulence? This is the prediction
under CEO control of the board, while under joint control it is not lagged,
but contemporaneous CEO turnover that should predict board turbulence.
Till now I have studied the CEO turnover and impacts from board turbu-
lence before the turnover. Now, I look at what happens to board turbu-
lence in the same year and the year following a CEO appointment. My
testing strategy is first to perform probit analyses of chairman turnover,
and second to use board turbulence as a dependent variable, while CEO
turnover is among the explanatory variables. The importance of the chair-
man position warrants a separate analysis.
The testing procedure for the problem of chairman departure is multi-
variate probit estimations as it is for CEO turnover. As before, all probit
regressions are performed with a full set of time and industry dummies.
The simultaneous CEO/chairman turnover dependent variable is ignored
here, since this has a definition close to the new chairman dependent vari-
able. Chairman turnover has likewise been removed from the turbulence
measure. Table 4.5 shows the results.
Table 4.5
Table 4.5 is easily summarised. Chairman turnover tends to be con-
temporaneous with board turbulence and with CEO turnover. Lagged
board turbulence is significant in the stock return regressions, but lagged
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CEO turnover is not significant in any. Apart from this, firm performance
has little influence upon chairman’s turnover. The APEs show that the
effects are economically significant, except for the firm performance vari-
able. Other board characteristics have no impact. Again, the joint control
of board and CEO emerges as the defining characteristic of the CEO-board
relationship.
Next, the investigation turns to the effects of CEO turnover and other
variables upon board turbulence. Table 4.6 gives estimates.
Table 4.6
Table 4.6 shows that the positive, contemporaneous association be-
tween CEO turnover and board turbulence is confirmed in most regres-
sions. However, the impact is higher for the lagged CEO turnover vari-
able. In the regressions containing forced dismissals, the contemporane-
ous effect is not significant. The diverse results for this extreme case may
be due to the board dismissing the CEO and staying on to a greater ex-
tent than in all CEO turnover. Overall, the results give some support to
the CEO control hypothesis inferred from Hermalin and Weisbach (1998)
that board turnover happens after the new CEO has taken office. How-
ever, since significance is found for the contemporaneous effect as well,
confirmation of the hypothesis is not clear-cut.
The CEO control hypothesis obtains no confirmation among the re-
maining variables. Firm performance turns out to be unrelated to board
turbulence. As in earlier regressions, the value is close to zero, and signif-
icant in only one regression. This is perhaps surprising. If shareholders
are dissatisfied with the firm’s performance, they should seek the ‘voice’
alternative (Hirschman, 1970) to replace the existing board. If the board
control is of the CEO control type, we should expect a positive and sig-
nificant sign for the lagged firm performance. Thus, the result does not
confirm the CEO control hypothesis on this point.
Outside ownership concentration is an important variable for board
turbulence as opposed to CEO turnover. This variable shows significance
in all regressions. The sign is positive, indicating that a higher outside
ownership concentration leads to higher board turbulence. The result con-
firms the Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Bolton and von Thadden (1998)
proposition that monitoring effort increases with higher outside owner-
ship concentration. Similar results do not emerge for CEO and chairman
turnovers in tables 4.3 and 4.5. This may indicate that outside owners
wield their influence through the election of directors to the board. Thus,
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board turbulence is a result of shareholders’ actions, while they do not in-
fluence CEO turnover. Director tenure depends more upon shareholders
than CEO tenure. This piece of evidence does not confirm the CEO control
type either.
Board independence is negatively associated with board turbulence.
Thus, there is a tendency to keep an independent board. This is against
the CEO control hypothesis, since the CEO would aim to reduce board
independence.
CEO entrenchment should increase board turbulence. Consistent with
the CEO turnover regressions, this cannot be confirmed, as few significant
results are forthcoming and the significant result for the CEO director is
contrary to expectation. Thus, these variables point towards other board
control types than CEO control as well.
Moreover, board average age is negatively associated with board tur-
bulence, an expected result. Equally expected is the employee directors
result. Co-determination is related to lower board turbulence.
The evidence in this section is not as unequivocal as in the last. The
CEO control hypothesis receives support for the lagged CEO turnover
variable, but all other results point in a different direction. In particu-
lar, the result for outside ownership concentration rejects the CEO control
hypothesis. Shareholder control must be rejected, since CEO turnover and
board turbulence are related. Again the joint control hypothesis emerges
as the most plausible explanation.
4.7.3 Board turbulence and firm performance
In the case of CEO control, the CEO gets to select the board after showing
good firm performance. Till now, I have treated all turnover equally with
regard to effects upon board turbulence. But actually, I should differenti-
ate between turnovers leading to better firm performance and those lead-
ing to worse. Then the Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) hypothesis should
imply that board turbulence increases after the CEO turnover in firms with
improved performance. In case of bad performance, the CEO should be
changed. Thus, the implication is that board turbulence is unchanged with
weak performance after a new CEO enters office.
To perform a test, I categorise firm performance as “improved” or “re-
duced” in the following way. First, stock returns are year and industry ad-
justed. I calculate the adjusted stock return Rijt =
(
rijt − rjt
)
/|rjt|, where
rijt is the stock return of firm i in industry j in year t, and rjt is the av-
erage stock return in industry j in year t. Second, a firm is classified as
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“improved” if the two-year average adjusted stock return following the
CEO turnover year is higher than the two-year average stock return before
turnover, that is, if 1/2
(
Rij1 + Rij2
)
> 1/2
(
Rij−1 + Rij−2
)
. Correspond-
ingly, the firm falls in the “reduced” category if the adjusted stock return
is lower than before turnover, calculated in the same manner as the im-
proved. Thus, the measure excludes year 0 when a new CEO is recorded.
This is done in order to avoid observations that the new CEO may for ex-
ample initiate a “big bath”, whereby the firm’s financial position is made
to look unfavourable, or contrarily, whereby he or she tries to increase
shareholder expectations to the firm leading to higher stock return. Mur-
phy and Zimmermann (1993) document evidence of such behaviour.
Figure 4.4 shows board turbulence around the year of CEO turnover
for improved and reduced firm performance companies.
Figure 4.4
It turns out that in firms with improved stock return, the board tur-
bulence increases before the turnover year, and falls thereafter. Except for
high values in the tails, the board turbulence is highest in the turnover
year. The same general pattern is repeated in firms with reduced stock
return. Again excepting the high values in the tails, the turnover year has
the highest turbulence in this category as well. Also, the level of board
turbulence is about the same in the two types of firm, although they may
differ in particular years. No pattern emerges from the difference in aver-
age board turbulence between the two types. Thus, a striking similarity is
evident for both types of firms.
This is very much against the CEO control hypothesis. Instead CEO
and directors tend to leave together. They appear to be a team, that is, the
case of joint control is confirmed.
I make a rigorous test by creating dummy variables for firms that ex-
perience an improved performance after the CEO turnover and firms that
have weaker performance. Given the information in figure 4.4, I should
expect the effects to be negligible for both variables. Table 4.7 shows re-
sults.
Table 4.7
Again overall statistics of the regressions are satisfactory. As expected
from figure 4.4, the dummy variables are not important. They are not sig-
nificant in any regression. The exclusion restriction test further confirms
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this conclusion. The test says that no confirmation of non-zero coefficients
can be given. I cannot confirm the CEO control hypothesis that good per-
formance leads to higher board turbulence following CEO turnover.
A comparison of the coefficient values in table 4.7 to the correspond-
ing values in table 4.6 shows a very close similarity. The same variables
as before are the significant ones. The only noticeable difference is that
the employee directors variable has become significant to a greater extent.
Thus, having employee directors on the board reduces board turbulence
among shareholder elected directors.
4.8 Conclusions
The CEO appointments and dismissals are part of the board’s primary
functions (Monks and Minow, 2001). When the board is unable to fulfil
this task for some reason, the potential for agency cost increases. Berle
Jr. and Means (1932) described how the CEO in effect chooses his own
board, which comes about when ownership and control are separate. The
monitored CEO elects his own monitors. The board becomes “endoge-
nously determined” (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). Therefore the CEO
and director turnover constitute a natural setting for studying manifesta-
tions of agency problems. This has been exploited in the empirical liter-
ature for CEO-chairman duality (Goyal and Park, 2002) and a staggered
board (Falaye, 2007), and both imply a lower CEO turnover. The fact that
company law bans both CEO-chairman duality and staggered boards in
Norway (Aarbakke et al., 1999) makes the institutional setting favourable
for the study of the relative timing of CEO turnover and board changes,
and may reveal whether CEO control needs some form of regulatory pro-
tection to be realised.
In this paper, I use the timing of CEO turnover relative to director sub-
stitutions and board enlargements to characterize the distribution of con-
trol between the CEO and the board. I differentiate between three forms of
control. CEO control happens when the CEO chooses his own board. Then
the CEO stays and directors are substituted, or new are added. Share-
holder control is the case when the board fulfils its primary functions of
hiring and firing the CEO. When this is so, CEO turnover tends to be un-
related to director turnover. The third case is joint control, when the CEO
and the board together constitute a team and are jointly responsible for
firm performance. Then CEO turnover tends to be simultaneous with di-
rector turnover. Thus, the timing of CEO and director turnover should
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reveal the board control type, and thereby the seriousness of agency costs.
The shareholders have no part to play in the choice of directors under
CEO control. Therefore shareholders’ influence over the election of direc-
tors varies from none in the case of CEO control to high in the cases of
shareholder and joint control. At the same time, if the election and hiring
processes are functioning correctly, owners should have no influence over
the choice of CEO. Thus, the influence of ownership on the election of di-
rectors and the hiring of a CEO can further differentiate between types of
board control.
CEO turnover is the dependent variable in one type of regressions,
with former and simultaneous board turbulence as explanatory variables
together with other variables. In the other type of regressions, the roles
are reversed, with board turbulence as the dependent. Now the simulta-
neous and former CEO turnovers are explanatory variables. The regres-
sions show that simultaneity is important and significant in both types of
regressions. However, the most important in the board turbulence regres-
sions is the former CEO turnover, indicating that board changes take place
after the CEO has taken office. These results hold across different specifi-
cations of CEO turnover, from the all CEO turnover to forced, and across
definition of firm performance, that is, stock return and return on assets.
Thus, the CEO turnover and the board turbulence regressions do not give
a clear-cut answer regarding the location of board control.
However, the results for outside ownership concentration point to-
wards joint or shareholder control. Higher outside ownership concentra-
tion implies that board turbulence increases, while no significant relation
to CEO turnover can be detected. Thus, the shareholders wield their in-
fluence through the board. A more independent board is less likely to
fire a CEO and is itself less likely to be changed. Consistent with Fich
and Shivdasani (2006) busy directors are less likely to fire the CEO. The
joint control result is further confirmed from the entrenchment variables,
as these turn out to be either non-significant, or the reverse of expectations
for the imported CEO in the CEO turnover regressions. Both the results
for the individual variables, and the fact that they all point in the same
direction indicate that the board control is of the joint control type.
My main conclusion is that the control type between CEO and direc-
tors is one of joint control, that is, the CEO and directors together consti-
tute a team. This supports the friendly board hypothesis of Adams and
Ferreira (2007).
Thus, the data do not support the Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) hy-
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pothesis that board composition is endogenously determined. It seems
that CEO control can only be realised if some protection is given, for in-
stance in the form of CEO-chairman duality or a staggered board, shown
in Goyal and Park (2002) and Falaye (2007). The results in this paper show
that when such protection is not in place, shareholders are important in
choosing directors. By implication, for the CEO to gain control over the
board, regulations must favour CEO protection.
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Figure 4.1 The age of arriving and departing CEO
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Figure 4.2 The percentage chairman change relative to CEO change. The
line represents the chairman changes, while bars are the number of obser-
vations in a given year (right hand scale).
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Figure 4.3 The average number of new shareholder elected directors rela-
tive to CEO change. The line represents the director changes, while bars
are the number of observations in a given year (right hand scale).
Year relative to CEO change
D
ire
ct
or
 c
ha
ng
e O
bservations
-12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
0
1
2
3
4
5
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
140 CHAPTER 4. BOARD CONTROL
Figure 4.4 Board turbulence in firms experiencing an improved stock re-
turn subsequent to a CEO turnover and firms with reduced stock return.
Board turbulence is drawn as a line, observations as bars.
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4.10 Tables
Table 4.1 Definitions of variables used in the analysis and their main statistical
properties
Variable N Mean Std Min Max Explanation
CEO turnover 2203 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 All CEO turnovers; equals 1 if the CEO is new
CEO/chair
turnover
2203 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 All CEO and chairman turnovers, equals 1 if both are
new
Forced
turnover
2203 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 Forced CEO dismissals, equals 1 if CEO is forced from
office
Chair turnover 2203 0.24 0.42 0.00 1.00 All chairman turnovers, equals 1 if chairman is new
Board turbul-
ence
2025 1.43 1.50 0.00 8.00 Sum of proportions of director substitutions and board
size change on board size
Return on as-
sets
1643 4.93 16.74 -96.51 119.74 Earnings before interest, taxes and extraordinary
items on the book value of assets
Stock return 1503 16.99 102.84 -98.93 2328.57 The yearly stock return adjusted for dividends and
stock splits
Directors’
holdings
1859 0.06 0.19 0.00 1.00 Proportion of equity owned by the board of directors
CEO holdings 1863 0.04 0.14 0.00 1.00 Proportion of equity owned by the firm’s CEO
Outside owners 1795 0.17 0.22 0.00 1.00 The sum of squared equity proportions across all the
firm’s outside owners
Independence 2206 -0.31 2.14 -12.86 10.33 The average tenure of the non-employee directors mi-
nus the tenure of the CEO
CEO dir 2201 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 Equals 1 if the CEO is a member of his company’s
board and zero otherwise
Exported CEO 2201 0.35 0.75 0.00 6.00 The number of outside directorships held by the firm’s
CEO
Imported CEO 2201 0.05 0.10 0.00 0.67 The proportion of CEOs from other companies on the
board
Network 2201 0.18 0.08 0.07 0.32 Information centrality (Wasserman and Faust, 1994)
CEO’s age 2195 47.02 7.71 24.00 72.00 The CEO’s age
Board age 2209 50.18 5.51 27.20 73.50 The average age of shareholder elected directors
Employee dir. 2207 0.13 0.16 0.00 0.50 The number of employee directors divided by the num-
ber of directors
Firm size 1937 5.66 0.86 2.15 9.43 The natural logarithm of accounting income
Risk 1733 0.77 0.66 -0.99 8.13 The company’s exposure to market changes
Other dir’ships 2201 0.54 0.55 0.00 4.33 A board’s average number of outside directorships
In all board characteristic definitions (such as Network), employee directors are removed.
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Table 4.2 The annual percentage frequency of new CEOs and chairmen, the av-
erage number of new directors and its standard deviation, and the average yearly
percentage stock return and return on assets (ROA) and their standard deviation
on all non-financial Norwegian firms 1989-2002
New New New directors Stock return ROA
Year CEO chair N Avg. Std. N Avg. Std. N Avg. Std. N
1989 13.8 13.8 94 27.9 28.1 95 62.7 75.8 88 10.3 12.4 88
1990 20.4 17.3 98 21.8 29.0 99 -3.3 41.4 82 8.1 10.9 88
1991 21.7 22.8 92 25.6 27.8 93 -17.7 36.7 80 5.3 9.1 80
1992 14.7 20.0 95 17.7 23.3 95 -22.9 50.9 75 3.3 14.6 91
1993 20.9 22.0 91 19.3 23.1 91 123.6 125.7 84 8.0 8.4 96
1994 10.8 18.6 102 21.5 27.4 102 10.0 57.8 92 8.2 12.7 106
1995 10.3 14.1 185 16.1 27.7 186 40.8 98.2 97 9.5 10.3 106
1996 18.8 25.0 192 32.1 32.9 192 50.8 74.2 102 7.3 14.7 116
1997 11.7 16.8 214 25.0 31.5 215 31.0 70.6 115 7.2 19.7 149
1998 23.6 26.9 216 29.5 29.6 217 -34.6 31.9 151 5.4 18.5 163
1999 23.9 30.0 213 28.8 30.4 213 72.2 222.2 146 3.9 16.9 151
2000 26.3 32.5 209 32.0 33.3 209 4.6 63.6 127 2.2 21.8 145
2001 28.2 25.7 202 28.4 29.0 202 -18.2 42.0 131 -2.1 19.9 140
2002 26.1 26.6 199 26.4 27.8 199 -30.8 48.7 133 -2.3 19.9 124
Avg. 20.1 23.3 26.1 29.8 17.0 102.8 4.9 16.7
Total 443 514 2202 2208 1503 1643
“New CEO” is the percentage of new CEOs in the population of firms, “New chairman” is the
percentage of new chairmen in the population of firms, and “New directors” is the percentage of
new directors. “Avg.” is the average size of the change in e.g. the number of new directors,
“Std.” is the standard deviation to the change, and “N” is the number of firms for the
respective variable. “Stock return” is defined as the yearly stock return adjusted for dividends
and stock splits. ROA is earnings before interest, taxes and extraordinary items on the book
value of assets. Stock return and ROA averages and standard deviations are unweighted.
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Table 4.3 Is CEO turnover simultaneous with board turbulence? CEO turnover as
binary dependent variable in regressions with board turbulence, firm performance,
and board characteristics as independent variables.
FP is Stock return FP is Return on assets
CEO and CEO and
All CEO chairman Forced All CEO chairman Forced
Lagged variables turnover turnover turnover turnover turnover turnover
Constant -0.648 -0.680 -23.701∗∗ -1.033 -0.837 -5.368∗∗
Turbulence, same year 1.039∗∗ 1.683∗∗ 0.549∗∗ 0.951∗∗ 1.584∗∗ 0.493∗∗
Turbulence 0.382∗∗ -0.056 0.011 0.361∗∗ 0.075 -0.008
Firm performance (FP) -0.001∗∗ -0.002∗ -0.002∗ -0.009∗∗ -0.001 -0.011∗∗
Outside owner 0.009 0.224 -0.618 -0.103 0.164 -0.713∗
Independence -0.043∗∗ -0.036 -0.066∗∗ -0.046∗∗ -0.037 -0.064∗∗
CEO ownership 0.180 0.458 -0.447 0.182 0.449 -0.476
Imported CEO 1.374∗∗ 1.477∗∗ 1.185∗ 1.389∗∗ 1.250∗∗ 0.911
Exported CEO 0.002 -0.048 0.079 0.005 -0.039∗∗ 0.083
CEO director -0.055 0.266∗ -0.216 -0.015 0.265 -0.272
Network -0.963∗∗ -0.795 -1.559∗∗ -0.953∗∗ -0.826∗ -1.449∗∗
CEO age 0.016∗∗ 0.003 0.010 0.016∗∗ 0.003 0.005
Employee directors -0.006 0.430 -0.274 0.127 0.410 -0.223
Firm size -0.071 -0.102 0.110 -0.044 -0.098 0.148∗
Risk 0.090 0.126 0.080 0.079 0.098 0.013
N 1147 1147 1147 1227 1227 1229
Pseudo-R2 0.539 0.599 0.428 0.506 0.559 0.382
Exclusion Turbulence 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.006
Probit estimations using maximum likelihood, see (4.3) and explanations there.
“CEO turnover” is defined as all turnovers, simultaneous turnover of CEO and chairman, and
as forced dismissal. “Firm performance” is specified as either stock return or return on assets.
Pseudo-R2 is calculated as 1−Lur/Lo (Woolridge, 2002, page 465) where Lur is the
log-likelihood function for the estimated model, and Lo is the the log-likelihood function in the
model with only an intercept. In board turbulence, the chairman’s impact has been removed in
CEO and chairman turnover regressions. All regressions contain full sets of unreported year
and industry dummies.
The exclusion turbulence test (Greene, 2003, p. 102) is a test of the null hypothesis that the
board Turbulence coefficients are both zero.
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Table 4.4 Are busy directors less willing to dismiss the CEO? Dummy variables
showing that half or more of the board are labelled busy directors have replaced
the Network variable in table (4.3). Only coefficients of new dummy variables are
reported along with the original network results.
At least half of board Stock return
are busy directors All CEO CEO/Chair Forced
when each hold turnover turnover turnover
more than 0 other directorships -0.008 0.040 -0.013
more than 1 other directorships 0.092 -0.036 0.122
more than 3 other directorships -6.119∗∗ -5.533∗∗ -5.386∗∗
Network -0.963∗∗ -0.795 -1.559∗∗
The same probit model as in table 4.3 is estimated here, except that lagged dummy variables
showing various definitions of busy directors have replaced the lagged Network variable.
Table 4.5 Chairman turnover following or contemporaneous with CEO turnover?
Probit estimations using maximum likelihood.
Stock return Return on assets
All CEO Forced All CEO Forced
Lagged variables turnover turnover turnover turnover
Constant -2.498∗∗ -2.215∗∗ -2.125∗∗ -1.846∗∗
Turbulence, same year 2.930∗∗ 3.016∗∗ 2.930∗∗ 3.005∗∗
Turbulence -0.352∗∗ -0.300∗ -0.202 -0.160
CEO turnover, same year 0.649∗∗ 0.320 0.709∗∗ 0.376∗
CEO turnover -0.108 0.138 -0.127 0.134
Firm performance (FP) -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗∗ 0.004 0.003
Outside owner 0.119 0.174 0.237 0.276
Independence -0.010 -0.024 -0.009 -0.026
Board ownership 0.091 0.130 0.054 0.099
Imported CEO 0.611 0.729 0.638 0.748
Exported CEO -0.040 -0.043 -0.068 -0.068
CEO director 0.167 0.203 0.139 0.178
Network 0.256 0.159 0.138 0.062
CEO age -0.002 0.003 -0.005 0.001
Employee directors 0.457 0.469 0.348 0.409
Firm size 0.109 0.064 0.078 0.032
Risk -0.085 -0.048 -0.053 -0.018
N 1147 1147 1227 1227
Pseudo-R2 0.667 0.655 0.643 0.628
Exclusion Turbulence 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
“Firm performance” is specified as either stock return or return on assets.
Pseudo-R2 is calculated as 1−Lur/Lo (Woolridge, 2002, page 465) where Lur is the
log-likelihood function for the estimated model, and Lo is the the log-likelihood function in the
model with only an intercept. In board turbulence, the chairman’s impact has been removed.
All regressions contain full sets of year and industry dummies. These are not reported.
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Table 4.6 Higher board turbulence following CEO turnover? GMM estimation
with board turbulence as dependent variable, and varying with different definitions
of CEO turnover and firm performance. All listed non-financial firms at Oslo Børs
1989 to 2002.
FP is Stock return FP is Return on assets
Stock return Return on assets
CEO and CEO and
All CEO chairman Forced All CEO chairman Forced
Lagged variables turnover turnover turnover turnover turnover turnover
CEO turnover, same year 0.106∗∗ 0.317∗∗ 0.055 0.115∗∗ 0.327∗∗ 0.068
CEO turnover 0.192∗∗ 0.132∗∗ 0.104∗ 0.192∗∗ 0.148∗∗ 0.125∗∗
Firm performance (FP), same year 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
Firm performance (FP) 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001∗
Outside owner 0.443∗∗ 0.530∗∗ 0.619∗∗ 0.508∗∗ 0.433∗∗ 0.699∗∗
Independence -0.074∗∗ -0.064∗∗ -0.054∗∗ -0.076∗∗ -0.066∗∗ -0.053∗∗
Board ownership -0.179 -0.177 -0.150 -0.157 -0.096 -0.144
Exported CEO 0.007 0.017 0.004 0.009 0.018 0.017
Imported CEO -0.104 -0.076 -0.007 -0.110 -0.046 -0.105
CEO director -0.100 -0.079 -0.140∗∗ -0.114∗ -0.081 -0.187∗∗
Network -0.025 -0.093 0.004 -0.043 -0.051 -0.078
Board average age -0.021∗∗ -0.019∗∗ -0.021∗∗ -0.022∗∗ -0.020∗∗ -0.025∗∗
Employee directors -0.691 -0.904∗∗ -0.819∗ -0.897∗∗ -0.970∗∗ -1.007∗∗
Firm size -0.029 -0.021 -0.010 -0.051 -0.041 -0.038
Risk -0.060 -0.034 -0.053 -0.064 -0.039 -0.063
N 1135 1135 1135 1237 1237 1237
Hansen J, p-value 0.528 0.519 0.305 0.510 0.642 0.488
Over ID test p-value 0.080 0.123 0.046 0.207 0.407 0.285
A full set of year and industry dummies are included as instruments in all regressions in
addition to instruments from the explanatory variables and transformations.
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Table 4.7 Higher board turbulence following successful CEO turnover? GMM
estimation with board turbulence as dependent variable, and varying with differ-
ent definitions of CEO turnover and firm performance. All listed non-financial
firms at Oslo Børs 1989 to 2002. Dummy variables indicate improved or reduced
performance with new CEO.
FP is Stock return FP is Return on assets
CEO and CEO and
All CEO chairman Forced All CEO chairman Forced
Lagged variables turnover turnover turnover turnover turnover turnover
CEO turnover, same year 0.107∗∗ 0.316∗∗ 0.052 0.113∗∗ 0.324∗∗ 0.063
CEO turnover 0.188∗∗ 0.134∗∗ 0.099∗ 0.189∗∗ 0.147∗∗ 0.123∗∗
Improved FP dummy 0.279 0.467 0.578 0.306 0.439 0.529
Reduced FP dummy 0.321 0.519 0.632 0.352 0.492 0.591
Firm performance, same year 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
Firm performance 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001∗
Board ownership -0.182 -0.140 -0.152 -0.163 -0.094 -0.148
External owner 0.450∗∗ 0.406∗∗ 0.635∗∗ 0.518∗∗ 0.427∗∗ 0.715∗∗
Independence -0.073∗∗ -0.064∗∗ -0.054∗∗ -0.075∗∗ -0.066∗∗ -0.053∗∗
CEO director -0.093 -0.047 -0.133∗ -0.112 -0.064 -0.182∗∗
Exported CEO 0.006 0.014 0.003 0.010 0.017 0.018
Imported CEO -0.095 -0.064 -0.001 -0.109 -0.029 -0.103
Network -0.028 -0.104 -0.006 -0.042 -0.059 -0.089
Board average age -0.021∗∗ -0.020∗∗ -0.022∗∗ -0.023∗∗ -0.020∗∗ -0.026∗∗
Employee directors -0.697 -0.936∗∗ -0.815∗ -0.888∗∗ -1.017∗∗ -0.999∗∗
Firm size -0.026 -0.020 -0.006 -0.052 -0.046 -0.035
Risk -0.060 -0.035 -0.053 -0.063 -0.041 -0.058
N 1134 1134 1134 1235 1235 1235
Hansen J, p-value 0.533 0.522 0.298 0.544 0.645 0.503
Over ID test p-value 0.088 0.164 0.056 0.267 0.412 0.319
Exclusion FP dummies 0.739 0.766 0.724 0.737 0.941 0.686
A full set of year and industry dummies are included as instruments in all regressions in
addition to instruments from the explanatory variables and transformations. ‘Improved FP
dummy’ is a binary variable taking the value 1 if the CEO turnover has resulted in an improved
firm performance (FP). ‘Reduced FP dummy’ is a binary variable taking the value 1 if the
CEO turnover led to reduced firm performance. ‘Exclusion FP dummies’ is an exclusion test
(Greene, 2003, p. 102) of the two firm performance dummies for improved or reduced firm
performance subsequent to CEO turnover.
